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I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana law permits prejudgment summary seizure and sequestra-
tion' of goods bought by a defaulting vendee under an installment
653
1. IA. CODE Crv. PRo. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961) provides:
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payment contract.2 In an ex parte proceeding, the vendor must post
a bond and file a petition and supporting affidavit alleging specific facts
relating to the default.3 The action is taken without prior notice to
the debtor.4 In Orleans Parish, a writ of sequestration will issue only
upon application to a city court judge.
Respondent W. T. Grant Company filed its petition based on peti-
tioner's deficient payments for certain consumer goods. Instead of
pursuing his statutory remedies of posting a release bond6 or requesting
a postseizure hearing, 7 petitioner moved to dissolve the writ on the
When one claims the ownership or right to possession of property, or a mort-
gage, lien, or privilege thereon, he may have the property seized under a writ
of sequestration, if it is within the power of the defendant to conceal, dispose
of, or waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the property
from the parish, during the pendency of the action.
Sequestration has been defined as
a mesne process by which a writ is issued at the commencement of or pending
an action, enabling the claimant to have property in the possession of the de-
fendant or a third person taken into legal custody until after judgment so that
the property may be delivered to the party adjudged to be entitled to it, where
the defendant has the power to place the claimant in a disadvantageous posi-
tion and the claim is against the particular property.
Johnson, Attachment and Sequestration: Provisional Remedies Under the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure, 38 TuL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1963).
2. There is no "conditional sale" under Louisiana law. Title to property under an
installment contract passes to the vendee. Morelock v. Morgan & Bird Gravel Co., 174
La. 658, 141 So. 368 (1932). The vendor retains a "privilege" in the chattels that can
be defeated by the vendees subsequent resale. See generally Note, Civil Law-Vendor's
Privilege, 4 TuL. L. REv. 239 (1929).
3. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961) provides:
A writ of attachment or of sequestration shall issue only when the nature
of the claim and the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for
the issuance of the writ clearly appear from specific facts shown by the petition
verified by, or by the separate affidavit of, the petitioner, his counsel or agent.
4. For this reason sequestration is considered a "harsh" process, and the procedure
must be followed strictly. Hancock Bank v. Alexander, 256 La. 643, 237 So. 2d 669
(1970); Harrison v. Atlas Signcrafts Co., 200 So. 173 (La. Ct. App. 1941). Sequestra-
tion cannot be used when other less harsh remedies are available. Mathe v. Mathe, 177
La. 579, 148 So. 884 (1933) (dictum).
5. In all other parishes the order for sequestration is signed by the clerk of the
court. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 281 (West 1960).
6. LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3507 (West 1961); see notes 144-71 infra and
accompanying text.
7. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961).
In the postseizure hearing, defendant need only point out a defect in the plaintiff's
prima facie case (evidenced by the petition and affidavit). This shifts the burden of
proof to the plaintiff. Victory Elec. Works v. Maryland Cas. Co., 140 So. 2d 182 (La.
Ct. App. 1962). If defendant is successful in his motion, the court may allow damages
for the wrongful seizure and attorney's fees. LA. CODE Clv. PNo. ANN. art. 3506 (West
1961).
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ground that the sequestration procedure deprived him of his property
without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment.8
The motion was denied by the trial court, as was a motion to review
to the state court of appeals. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted
review and affirmed the trial court's decision.'" On writ of certiorari,
the Supreme Court affirmed and held that the Louisiana sequestration
procedure in Orleans Parish did not operate as a taking of the debtor's
property without due process of law."
The Supreme Court's reasoning and decision in Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co. significantly departed from the prior law determining the
constitutional restrictions upon the exercise of creditors' summary
remedies.' 2  In Fuentes v. Shevin" the Court struck down the replev-
in' 4 statutes of Pennsylvania'5 and Florida,'" which provided for
repossession of a defaulting debtor's property on an ex parte application
by the creditor to the clerk of the court.17  The Court stated that the
creditor's interest in expediting the claim and preserving the property
did not justify disturbing the debtor's continued use and possession.'
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "[NMor shall any state deprive any person of
... property, without due process of law ...."
9. See W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 631, 269 So. 2d 186, 187 (1972).
10. W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 269 So. 2d 186 (1972). The court
held for Grant on two grounds: (I) that the Supreme Court carved out an exception
to its holding in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), when it stated: "There may
be cases in which a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor
will destroy or conceal disputed goods." Id. at 93; and (2) that a purchaser who ac-
quires goods subject to a vendor's privilege is presumed to know the legal implications
of his possession and the potential loss of possession upon his default. W.T. Grant Co.
v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 640-41, 269 So. 2d 186, 191 (1972).
II. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The Court did not comment
upon the alternative ground of the lower court's holding, the presumed knowledge of
the purchaser. See note 10 supra.
12. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment replevin); Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment wage garnishment). But cf.
North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975),
discussed at notes 485-512 infra and accompanying text.
13. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
14. Historically, replevin was used to recover property wrongfully taken (e.g., by a
landlord's agents). Eventually, replevin evolved into a procedure to seize property
wrongfully detained. See generally J. CoBBEY, A PRAcrcAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
REPLEVIN §§ 19-23 (2d ed. 1900); Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Col-
lector, 15 ARuZ. L. REV. 521, 545-46 (1973).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1821 (1967); PA. R. Civ. P. 1073-87 (1974).
16. Ch. 67-254, § 28, [1967] Fla. Laws 661.
17. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 73-78 (1972).
18. Id. at 90 n.22.
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That the debtor might receive a postseizure hearing19 and damages for
mistaken repossession ° were not mitigating factors. Before any
"significant property interest"'21 could be disturbed, the debtor was en-
titled to a hearing on the probable validity of the creditor's claim.22 The
creditor's interests in the property were largely ignored in the Court's
formulation of the due process standard that the Pennsylvania and
Florida statutes failed to meet: "Procedural due process is not intended
to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it is
intended to protect the particular interests of the person whose posses-
sions are about to be taken. 23
Justice White, dissenting, viewed the problem before the Court as
one of substantive law and not procedural rights.24 He felt that both
the creditor and debtor had interests in the property and that the con-
tract between them should govern the prejudgment disposition of the
property;25 that is, if the debtor does not make the stipulated payments,
his right to possession should terminate.28 Justice White also implied
that replevin is a commercially reasonable practice. He pointed out
that self-help repossession available under the Uniform Commercial
Code2 7 (UCC) affords fewer procedural safeguards than statutory
replevin, but is nonetheless sanctioned by those with expertise in com-
mercial law. Justice White concluded:
The procedure that the Court strikes down is not some barbaric hang-
over from bygone days. The respective rights of the parties in secured
transactions have undergone the most intensive analysis in recent
years.... I am content to rest on the judgment of those who have
wrestled with these problems so long and often and upon the judgment
of the legislatures that have considered and so recently adopted provi-
19. Id. at 80.
20. Id. at 82, quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972): "This Court
has not.. .. embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be
undone." See also Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 232 (1946).
21. 407 U.S. at 86, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). That
the debtors in Fuentes did not have title under their conditional sales contracts was irrel-
evant. 407 U.S. at 86.
22. 407 U.S. at 97, quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. 407 U.S. at 90 n.22.
24. Id. at 99-103 (White, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 99.
26. Id. at 100.
27. UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE § 9-503 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
[Vol. 1974:653
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sions that contemplate precisely what has happened in these cases. 28
The majority's due process analysis was, to Justice White, "no more
than ideological tinkering with state law."29
In Mitchell, Justice White amplified concepts expressed in his
Fuentes dissent; joined by Justices Powell (concurring) and Rehnquist,
the Fuentes dissent became the Mitchell majority.30 Declining to fol-
low the due process concepts set forth in Fuentes, the Court purported
to adopt a balance-of-interests analysis. In a secured consumer trans-
action, the buyer in possession no doubt "owns" the goods, but the
ownership interest is defeasible on default. According to state law, the
seller also has a current, real, and substantial interest in the same prop-
erty."  Thus, the impact of Louisiana procedure on the rights of both
parties had to be considered in order to resolve what process was due.
First, according to the majority, the creditor's interest under the con-
tract entitles him to either payment of the purchase price or immediate
possession. If the consumer maintains possession and use of the goods
pending final judgment, the security may depreciate, leaving the seller
unprotected. Unlike the seller who posts bond, a consumer whose pos-
session is wrongful does not stand ready to make his opponent whole. 32
Secondly, the Court stressed that if the debtor were permitted to
maintain use and possession, the creditor would run the risk that the
debtor would destroy, conceal, or transfer the goods. Further, Loui-
siana law provides that the creditor's lien (known as a "vendor's
privilege") "expires if the buyer transfers possession." 3  Thus, pre-
28. 407 U.S. at 103. But see Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945
(W.D. Mich. 1974) (self-help provisions of UCC unconstitutional).
29. 407 U.S. at 102.
30. The Fuentes majority and the Mitchell dissent consisted of Justices Stewart,
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall. Compare Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974), with Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975).
31. The interest of the seller was said to be "measured by the unpaid balance of
the purchase price." 416 U.S. at 604. The debtor's interest likewise was measured in
dollarm-and-cents terms. Id.; see text accompanying notes 253-54 infra.
In Fuentes, Justice White had noted that early in a transaction the seller often has
"more at stake than the buyer, at least in monetary terms." 407 U.S. at 99. See Wil-
liams, Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional Rights, 25
U. FLA. L. REv. 60, 98 (1972).
32. 416 U.S. at 608.
33. Id. at 609. For a discussion of expiration of the creditor's lien see text accom-
panying note 301 infra.
Vol. 1974:653]
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seizure notice and hearing would permit a bad faith debtor to transfer
the goods and cause the creditor to lose his privilege.
Thirdly, in the opinion of the majority, due process does not guaran-
tee the consumer's possession and use of the goods until all issues are
finally determined judicially. To the contrary, the issues in a prelimi-
nary action for possession pending trial may properly be limited to
determining that a lien exists, that the consumer is in possession, and
that he has defaulted. 4 If the seller proves, ex parte, these three
"ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary
proof," 35 he has established sufficient probability of ultimate success
on the merits to warrant a temporary bonded sequestration of the collat-
eral. The nature of these issues and the potential damage award avail-
able minimize the danger that the writ will be wrongfully issued by the
judge.36
Having accounted for the creditor's interests and risks, Justice White
stated the equation as follows:
[W]e remain unconvinced that the impact on the debtor of deprivation
of the household goods here in question overrides his inability to make
the creditor whole for wrongful possession, the risk of destruction or
alienation if notice and a prior hearing are supplied, and the low risk
of a wrongful determination of possession through the procedures now
employed. 37
The impact on the consumer was further eased, according to the Court,
by the Louisiana provision that gives him an early opportunity to put
the creditor to his proof and by the nonimpairment of the consumer's
basic source of income "pending the hearing on possession."38  Loui-
siana was not required by due process to be blind to creditor interests,
and, considered as a whole, the state's sequestration procedure was
held to be a constitutional accommodation of interests.39
One commentator has suggested that the Fuentes Court gave short
shrift to the interests of creditors:
It is time that the Court ceased due process balancing simply by assign-
ing appropriately pejorative labels to the [creditors' interests] and
34. 416 U.S. at 607.
35. Id. at 609.
36. The Court placed substantial emphasis on the role of the judge in the Louisiana
scheme. See id. at 606, 609-10, 620 n.14.
37. Id. at 610.
38. Id.
39. Id.
[Vol. 1974:653
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instead engaged in a serious attempt to measure the costs and benefits. 40
Even a cursory reading of the Mitchell opinion compels the conclusion
that the debtor's interests were there given equally casual considera-
tion. Although the majority took pains to limit its holding,41 it is clear
that its decision made assumptions about the realities of consumer
credit that must be more fully examined. This Note will address the
propositions on which the result in Mitchell rests and will suggest consid-
erations that should be taken into account. First, the Court's due proc-
ess analysis will be discussed and compared with that in Fuentes. Next,
the procedural safeguards found adequate in Mitchell will be exam-
ined. Then will follow an analysis of the various interests at stake in
allowing provisional remedies-the debtor's, the creditor's, and the
state's. Next, the effect of narrowing the issues cognizable in an attack
upon a writ of seizure will be discussed. The Note will conclude with
an attempt to assess the impact of Mitchell and subsequent cases on
prior law.
II. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
The fourteenth amendment guarantee of procedural due process
curbs the arbitrary exercise of governmental power to deprive a person
of his property. 42 At a minimum, due process requires notice and a
hearing at a meaningful time before a final adjudication of rights.43 The
guarantee, however, is flexible 44 -it protects substantive rights and
40. White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More,
1973 Wis. L. REv. 503, 511.
41. In a footnote, the majority stated that its holding was limited to the constitution-
ality of the Louisiana sequestration procedure. 416 U.S. at 618-19 n.13. Louisiana is
the only state that has not adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
42. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889). See also Joint Anti-Facist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63 (1935); Southern Ry. v. Virginia ex rel. Shirley, 290 U.S. 190
(1933); Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U.S. 255 (1903).
43. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). See
also Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage & Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126
(1941); United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Londoner v. City
& County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
44. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155 (1974):
The types of "liberty" and "property" protected by the Due Process Clause
vary widely, and what may be required under that clause in dealing with one
set of interests which it protects may not be required in dealing with another
set of interests.
See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). But see North Ga. Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192, 4194 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975): "We are no more
Vol. 1974:653]
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guarantees only a full and fair procedure, not any particular type of
procedure.45  Upon a balance of the interests involved,40 notice must
be reasonable, and a hearing must be as full and fair as the circum-
stances dictate.47  The threshold of due process rises as individual in-
terests become more fundamental 48 and falls when the governmental
interest is paramount. In "extraordinary situations"49 the govern-
mental interest may be sufficiently crucial to obviate the need for
notice and hearing prior to the deprivation of an individual's property.
The majority opinion in Mitchell purported to be based on a balance-
inclined now than we have been in the past to distinguish among different kinds of prop-
erty in applying the Due Process Clause."
45. The form of procedure must be "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). "The formality
and procedural prerequisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance
of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings." Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 187
(1974) (White, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Inland Empire Dist.
Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304
U.S. 333, 350-51 (1938).
46. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring):
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner
in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to
the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the
functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of the hurt complained
of and the good accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must
enter into the judicial judgment.
See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
47. See cases cited note 43 supra.
48. Certain practices have been characterized as "unconscionable," and they require
a notice and hearing before the deprivation, even when the taking would be only tempo-
rary. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment replevin of con-
sumer goods); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (loss of driver's license by uninsured
motorist after accident and before determination of fault); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (termination of welfare income without notice); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment of wages). See generally Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 191-92 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
49. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)
(seizure of vessel used to transport controlled substance); Ewing v. Mytinger & Cassel-
berry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (removal of misbranded products from interstate com-
merce); Fahey v. Mallonee, 3132 U.S. 245 (1947) (appointment of conservator for fail-
ing savings and loan institution); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (tax
assessment of shareholder distributions received in liquidation); Coffin Bros. & Co. v.
Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (bank superintendent's tax assessment of shareholders of
failed bank); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (prejudgment attachment to se-
cure in personam jurisdiction); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211
U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of adulterated food).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
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of-interests test.50 A true balancing would have involved a considera-
tion of the costs and benefits to each party, with and without a hearing
prior to the interim taking of property.51 As this Note will demon-
strate, the Court did not engage in a complete balancing.5 2  In part,
this was due to the Court's "narrowed issue" approach 53 and its failure
to advert fully to the debtor's interests in the property. 54 The Court's
failure to balance completely may also be attributable to its reinterpre-
tation of the case law upon which Fuentes was based, especially those
cases involving "extraordinary situations."
The "extraordinary situations" category of due process cases was
developed in Fuentes55 to account for those instances in which due proc-
ess was not violated by a seizure of property in the absence of notice
and a hearing.56 Requirements for an "extraordinary situation' were
three: (1) the seizure was necessary to secure an important govern-
mental or general public interest; (2) there was a special need for
50. 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974).
51. A basic premise of due process analysis is that the procedural guarantees must
remain flexible.
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable,
and its content varies according to specific factual contexts. . . . [A]s a gen-
eralization, it can be said that due process embodies the differing rules of fair
play, which through the years, have become associated with differing types of
proceedings. Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain
in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of
the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden
on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account.
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). See also Cafeteria Workers Local 473
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
52. See notes 172-407 infra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 408-69 infra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 172-263 infra and accompanying text.
55. 407 U.S. at 90-93. See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) ("emer-
gency situations"); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) ("extraordinary sit-
uations"): Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) ("extraordinary situations").
56. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Fahey
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697
(1945); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 508 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Admin-
istrator of Wage & Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126 (1941); United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
291 U.S. 457 (1934); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Coffin Bros. &
Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Stoehr
v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554
(1921); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Lon-
doner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Security Trust & Safety Vault
Co. v. City of Lexington, 203 U.S. 323 (1906); Scottish Union & Nat'1 Ins. Co. v. Bow-
land, 196 U.S. 611 (1905).
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prompt action; and (3) the state kept strict control over the summary
proceedings.57  In Fuentes the Court characterized these situations as
"truly unusual."," Characterizing a particular fact situation as "extra-
ordinary" appears to be a shorthand form of balancing of interests: a
situation is "extraordinary" when the government's interest clearly out-
weighs that of the party seeking a prior hearing.
Justice White's opinion in Mitchell inverted the analysis in Fuentes,
converting the extraordinary to the usual. Quoting a case that Fuentes
had characterized as an "extraordinary situation," '59 Mitchell established
the following as the "usual rule":
Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the
judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given
for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate.60
The original source of this quotation, however, continued as follows:
"Delay in the judicial determination of property rights is not uncommon
where it is essential that governmentdl needs be immediately satis-
fied."'"
57. 407 U.S. at 91.
58. Id. at 90.
59. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931). Compare Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974), with Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 &
n.24 (1972).
60. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931), quoted in 416 U.S. at
611.
61. 283 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added). It thus appears that Phillips involved an
"extraordinary situation" and did not represent the "usual rule."
Justice White's invocation of "only property rights" is also interesting. In Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972), Justice Stewart stated:
Such difficulties [of delineation] indicate that the dichotomy between per-
sonal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property does not have
rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful dep-
rivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a
"personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a
home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists be-
tween the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither
could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil
rights has long been recognized.
It would be facile to say that Justice White's reliance on a personal and property rights
distinction is crucial to the Mitchell opinion. But this distinction could be one of the
practical considerations underlying the Court's treatment of "competing interests." On
the other hand, it is clear that the absence of a distinction between personal and prop-
erty rights was quite germane to the resolution of the issues in Fuentes. See 407 U.S.
at 90 n.22. Where Justice White saw only a commercial transaction in which the debtor
"has either defaulted or he has not," id. at 100, Justice Stewart saw a right endangered
by deprivation without due process, id. at 86.
Justice White's majority opinion in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), furtherhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
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As an example of the "usual rul&' Justice White discussed Ewing
v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,6' which involved the multiple seizure
of misbranded drugs without notice or a hearing. Though the "usual
rule" was upheld,63 the Court in Mytinger & Casselberry recognized
the context of the rule:
One of the oldest examples is the summary destruction of property
without prior notice or hearing for the protection of public health. There
is no constitutional reason why Congress in the interests of consumer
protection may not extend that area of control.6 4
The Fuentes Court had focused on the "protection of public health"
and had confined Mytinger & Casselberry to its extraordinary circum-
stances."5
The next attack on the reasoning of Fuentes was Justice White's dis-
tinguishing of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 6  He pointed out that
Sniadach involved wage garnishment, a practice which drives "a wage-
illuminates this problem. There an Illinois statute created a presumption that the father
of an illegitimate child was not fit as a parent and could be deprived of custody, with-
out notice or a hearing, after the mother died. Relying on Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), Justice White held that this
violated due process. The majority set forth a complete balancing of interests and con-
cluded:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state
ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudica-
tion. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Proc-
ess Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values
of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and effi-
cacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and per-
haps more, than mediocre ones.
405 U.S. at 656 (footnote omitted). The Fuentes majority relied on Stanley as one of
the cases that set forth the general rule that barred the taking of property without a
prior hearing. 407 U.S. at 82. Given Justice White's opinion in Mitchell, it is safe
to say that possession of consumer goods is not a "fragile value of a vulnerable citi-
zenry."
In North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (U.S. Jan. 22,
1975), discussed at notes 485-512 infra and accompanying text, Justice White did not
reiterate the "usual rule" purported to govern the deprivation of property rights. Cf.
43 U.S.L.W. at 4195 (Powell, J., concurring).
62. 339 U.S. 594 (1950); see 416 U.S. at 612.
63. 339 U.S. at 600, citing Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
64. 339 U.S. at 599-600.
65. 407 U.S. at 92. Justice Douglas, the author of the Mytinger & Casselberry
opinion, also put the case in the category of "extraordinary situations." See Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
66. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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earning family to the wall." 67  This limitation (i.e. that wages are a
special kind of property) had been specifically rejected in Fuentes.18
The Mitchdll Court's final step of analysis was a detailed distinguish-
ing of Fuentes itself. First, the Court pointed out that in Louisiana
"bare conclusory claims" are not sufficient to cause a writ of sequestra-
tion to issue."9 Moreover, the specific facts to be alleged in the peti-
tion must pass muster before a judge rather than a clerk of the court.7 0
Factually, this appears to be a matter of degree.71 Constitutionally,
the procedure in Louisiana is on equal footing with those struck down
in Fuentes. In each, the procedure is ex parte. In each, the facts
tested are the creditor's facts. In each, all that is tested is the creditor's
belief in the facts, not the probable truth. Fuentes, however, had em-
phasized that the probable validity of the claim is to be aired in an ad-
67. 416 U.S. at 614, quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42
(1969).
68. 407 U.S. at 88: 'This reading of Sniadach . .. reflects the premise that [it]
marked a radical departure from established principles of procedural due process. [It]
did not."
Justice White's reading of Sniadach and also of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), is fully discussed in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 190-93 (1974). According to Justice White, Sniadach and Goldberg
called for a preseizure hearing for two reasons: (1) there would be a substantial risk
that the deprivation might be wrongful (that is, if the deprivation was to turn on the
"fault" of the party claiming the hearing and this "fault" issue would be foreclosed with-
out an adversarial hearing, then the deprivation would be wrongful); and (2) there
would be a great impact on the party claiming the hearing if the property were lost (that
is, loss of wages or termination of welfare benefits). Id.
The "usual rule" of a hearing at some time before final adjudication was, in Justice
Whites view, based on different considerations: (1) there would be a great risk in leav-
ing the party claiming the hearing in possession of the property (e.g., contaminated food
may find its way into commerce, see North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago,
211 U.S. 306 (1908)); (2) the legitimate interest of the party opposing the hearing
would be destroyed if the hearing were granted (e.g., a person in possession of alleged
enemy property may conceal or destroy it, see Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254
U.S. 554 (1921)); (3) the party claiming the hearing would not be in a position to
make the other party whole, whereas the other party would be able to compensate the
claiming party (e.g., a taxpayer might waste or conceal assets when the Commissioner
has levied a jeopardy assessment, see Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931)).
416 U.S. at 188-89. Of course, Justice White did not indicate that the cases supporting
the above considerations might otherwise be characterized as "extraordinary situations."
In the recent case of North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192
(U.S. Jan. 22, 1975), Justice White did not pursue his reasoning as developed in Fuentes,
Arnett, and Mitchell. See notes 485-512 infra and accompanying text.
69. 416 U.S. at 616.
70. Id. But cf. note 5 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 100 infra and accompanying text.
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versary context.72
Secondly, the Mitchell Court stressed that the debtor is protected,
after the fact, by a hearing and the creditor's duty to make him whole
in the event of a wrongful deprivation. 73  Fuentes recognized a similar
postseizure provision in the Florida replevin statute, and considered it
relevant to the due process issue, but explicitly stated that postseizure
reparations by the creditor did not compensate for the unconstitutional
taking.74
Finally, the Court pointed out a defect shared by the statutes struck
down in Fuentes and the Georgia statute struck down in Bell v. Bur-
son75 but not present in Mitchell.76  In Fuentes statutory replevin was
a remedy for "wrongful detention" of property. The majority in
Fuentes felt that this issue of "fault" could not be properly determined
in an ex parte proceeding.77 Justice White stated that the Louisiana
sequestration statutes were not based on this broad "fault" standard;
hence the possibility of the mistaken taking of property was mini-
mized.78
72. 407 U.S. at 83 (footnote omitted):
To be sure, the requirements that a party seeking a writ must first post a bond,
allege conclusorily that he is entitled to specific goods, and open himself to
possible liability in damages if he is wrong, serve to deter wholly unfounded
applications for a writ. But those requirements are hardly a substitute for a
prior hearing, for they test no more than the strength of the applicant's own
belief in his rights.
73. 416 U.S. at 617-18.
74. 407 U.S. at 81-82:
At a later hearing, an individual's possessions can be returned to him if they
were unfairly or mistakenly taken in the first place. Damages may even be
awarded to him for the wrongful deprivation. But no later hearing and no
damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to
the right of procedural due process has already occurred.
75. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). The statute in Bell provided for a summary suspension
of an uninsured motorist's license when the driver was in an accident. The presuspen-
sion hearing did not consider fault or responsibility for the accident. The statute was
held unconstitutional in that it significantly involved the issue of liability, but compelled
suspension of the driver's license without any showing of probability that the driver was
in fact responsible.
It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which
excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision whether licenses
of the nature here involved shall be suspended [is not a hearing "appropriate
to the nature of the case"].
Id. at 542, quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950).
76. 416 U.S. at 616-18.
77. 407 U.S. at 83 & n.13.
78. 416 U.S. at 618.
665
Washington University Open Scholarship
666 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The creditor in Louisiana, however, need only show that it is within
the debtor's power to remove or otherwise dispose of the property. 9
Justice White's analysis fails to consider the fact that a lower standard
of proof works the same deprivation in Louisiana as in Florida and
Pennsylvania. Instead of having to allege any circumstance that would
cause a creditor to feel insecure about the debtor's possession of col-
lateral, the creditor need only allege that the debtor is in possession
of the goods.8 Any person in possession of personalty undoubtedly
has the "power" to dispose of the goods. While the Louisiana proceed-
ing is not based on a "fault" standard, this surely should not tip the
balance in favor of the creditor.
The Court in Fuentes recognized that there "may be cases in which
a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor
will destroy or conceal disputed goods" and thus come within the "ex-
traordinary situations" exception.81 Louisiana's "power to dispose"
standard clearly does not meet this criterion."2
In attempting to cut back on the broad holding of Fuentes, the Court
in Mitchell simply rejected the precedential basis and reasoning of
Fuentes. The due process analysis introduced in Mitchell and its rela-
tion to precedent are confusing. Two days after Mitchell was decided,
the Court in Calero-Tdledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.83 upheld a
Puerto Rico statute that provided for summary seizure of vessels used
to transport contraband.84  Justice Brennan, a dissenter in Mitchell,
joined by seven members of the Court, held that the statute was consti-
tutional on the basis of the Fuentes "extraordinary situations" excep-
tion.85 In a terse concurring opinion, Justice White said:
I add, however, that the presence of important public interests which
permits dispensing with a preseizure hearing in the instant case, is only
one of the situations in which no prior hearing is required. 88
79. LA. CODE Crv. PRo. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961).
80. A prior version of Louisiana's sequestration statute required the creditor to show
reasonable grounds to fear that the debtor might dispose of the property. See id., Com-
ment (a); Johnson, supra note 1, at 15; notes 91-122 infra and accompanying text.
81. 407 U.S. at 93; cf. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W.
4192, 4194 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975).
82. 416 U.S. at 629-30 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
83. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
84. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2512(a) (4), (b) (Supp. 1974); id. tit. 34, § 1722
(1971).
85. 416 U.S. at 676-78.
86. Id. at 691 (White, J., concurring), citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974), and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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This statement does little to clear up the confusion.
A conclusion to be drawn from Justice White's analysis is that the
necessity for a prior hearing will depend on how the majority of the
Court views the magnitude of the aggrieved party's claim. In both
Fuentes and Mitchell, Justice White was convinced that no great hard-
ship to the debtor resulted from the deprivation.17  On the one hand,
consideration of the merits in competing claims is the basis of the bal-
ancing-of-interests test. On the other hand, the competing claims must
be characterized fully: an assumption that no great hardship to one
party results from a certain procedure does not produce complete bal-
acing. As Justice White admitted in his Fuentes dissent:
In considering whether this resolution of conflicting interests is un-
constitutional, much depends on one's perceptions of the practical con-
siderations involved.88
The balancing process cannot function fairly if the Court does not
weigh practical considerations other than those which it chooses to per-
ceive.89 As Justice Marshall has pointed out:
87. Compare 407 U.S. at 99-100 (White, J., dissenting), with 416 U.S. at 610.
88. 407 U.S. at 100.
89. It can be argued that Justice White would uphold the statutes in Fuentes on the
ground that they were reasonable exercises of the states' power to define property rights.
This attitude is implicit in his characterization of the majority's opinion as "ideological
tinkering with state law." 407 U.S. at 102. This is reminiscent of Justice Black's dis-
sent in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-51 (1969):
The arguments [made by the Court] would also be appropriate for Wiscon-
sin's legislators to make against that State's garnishment laws. But made in
a Court opinion, holding Wisconsin's law unconstitutional, they amount to
what I believe to be a plain, judicial usurpation of state legislative power to
decide what the State's laws shall be.
Id. at 345. This type of argument is best directed against those substantive due process
decisions in which the Court invalidated state economic regulations. See, e.g., Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
Mitchell and Fuentes, however, were not substantive due process cases. In neither
case was prejudgment repossession attacked on the basis of the substance of the statute.
In both, rather, the issues were confined to the constitutionality of the procedures em-
bodied in repossession. Justice White's "ideological tinkering!' characterization was per-
haps directed at the majority's statement that procedural due process protected the debtor
from "substantively unfair" deprivations. 407 U.S. at 81. The requirement of a prior
hearing curbs only procedurally unfair takings. Only the substance of the taking in-
volves a consideration of what defenses the debtor should be allowed to raise to defeat
the seizure. See notes 408-69 infra and accompanying text. Fuentes can be read with-
out regard to the "substantively unfair" language because the Court specifically left the
form of the prior hearing to the state legislature. 407 U.S. at 87 & n.18. Justice
White's comments about "ideological tinkering" may, then, be misdirected.
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It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitu-
tion requires. ,But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitu-
tion to be premised upon unfounded assumptions about how people
live.90
MIT. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
In deciding whether a challenged procedure meets the requirements
of due process, courts are inevitably faced with the two interrelated
questions of timing and form. The Supreme Court's treatment of the
two questions in Fuentes and Mitchell provides a casebook example
of legal process: if two issues are crucial to a holding, the result may
be radically different depending on which issue is emphasized and
which is deemphasized. In Fuentes the Court stressed the due process
On its face, Mitchell is a procedural due process case. Mitchell can also be read,
however, as upholding the Louisiana statutes as a reasonable exercise of legislative
power. The test, one of substantive due process, is whether "[a] regulation . . . is rea-
sonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community. . ."
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). Justice White's deference
to the Louisiana legislature indicates that he may have been using this test. See 416
U.S. at 607.
Procedural due process is decided under a different test. Under the balance-of-inter-
ests formula, the Court is required to look at the accommodation of interests a legisla-
ture has made to see if the balance struck was proper. See notes 42-49 supra and ac-
companying text. The Court must necessarily look at legislative facts. If a legislature
has not given adequate consideration to one party's interest, it would be incumbent upon
the Court to do so. In other words, the Court could not rest on the legislature's judg-
ment alone. The difference between substantive and procedural due process is that in
the former the Court defers to the legislative judgment, and in the latter the competing
interests before the legislature are balanced by the Court. Compare Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), with Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
It is here that Justice Whites "perceptions of the practical considerations" enter. If
the Court would happen to have the same perceptions as the legislature, and the legisla-
ture had not taken into account all interests of the parties, then a statute would be up-
held solely on the basis of reasonableness. Balancing of interests, however, would seem
to call for a de novo consideration of legislative facts, clear of preconceived perceptions.
See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 127-28 (1959) (emphasizing that the Court bal-
ance relevant and conflicting factors in disinterested and detached manner).
There is language in North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192,
4194 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975), that indicates that Justice White is still relying on his "per-
ceptions of the practical considerations":
It may be that consumers deprived of household appliances will more likely
suffer irreparably than corporations deprived of bank accounts, but the proba-
bility of irreparable injury in the latter case is sufficiently great so that some
procedures are necessary to guard against the risk of initial error.
90. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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importance of timing. 1  Factual complexity and statutory procedural
safeguards short of preseizure notice and hearing were merely relevant
to the form that the hearing should take.92 In contrast, the Mitchell
Court withdrew from the premise that the timing of procedural safe-
guards is crucial and relied instead on the premise that the form and
apparent quality of the safeguards provided by Louisiana's sequestra-
tion procedure protect the debtor's interests sufficiently to comport
with due process. Louisiana sequestration procedures appeared-at
least on the surface-to provide better debtor protection than the typ-
ical statutes invalidated in Fuentes. Whether these distinctions, relied
on in Mitchell, are meaningful or merely formal is open to question.
A. Grounds for Seizure
At common law, the remedies of replevin and detinue were avail-
able to regain specific property tortiously taken or detained.93 When
replevin was transplanted to the United States, it became available to
remedy "any form of unlawful detention, whether or not the property
was tortiously taken in the first instance." 94 As used today in the se-
cured credit context, replevin has lost all flavor of its roots in tort,95
except as a matter of form. Thus, in most states, in order to obtain
a writ of replevin, 6 the plaintiff must submit an affidavit stating "in
conclusory fashion"97 that the property is wrongfully detained. 98  In
addition, the plaintiff generally must allege ownership and right to pos-
session. 99
91. "The primary question . . . is whether these state statutes are constitutionally
defective in failing to provide for hearings 'at a meaningful time.'" 407 U.S. at 80.
92. 407 U.S. at 82-84, 87 n.18, 97 & n.33; see 416 U.S. at 629-34 (Stewart, J., dis-
senting).
93. See 1. COBBEY, supra note 14, § 51-83; T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCIsE HisToRy
OF THE COMMON LAW 367-69 (5th ed. 1956); Countryman, supra note 14, at 545-46.
94. Countryman, supra note 14, at 546.
95. See 66 AM. JuR. 2D Replevin H§ 1-3 (1973); Annot., 151 A.L.R. 519 (1944);
ci. Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369, 1373 (5th Cir. 1969); W.
PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORiTS § 4, at 19 (4th ed. 1971).
96. Affidavit requirements for the prejudgment writ of seizure should be distin-
guished from pleading requirements, if any, for the underlying replevin action.
97. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 74 (1972).
98. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 512.010 (Deering Supp. 1974) (claim and de-
livery); Mo. REv. STAT. § 533.010(2) (1969) (replevin).
99. See generally 1 CCH SEcuRED TRANSAC'nONS GuiDE % 32, at 1351-93 (1973);
21 AM. Jutr. PL. & PR. FORMs Replevin Forms 291-99 (1972). Some states require that
plaintiff allege specific facts to support ownership and right to possession. See, e.g.,
UTAH R. Civ. P. 64B.
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In apparent contrast to the factual paucity usually permitted in the
application for a writ of replevin, 10 Louisiana provides that a seques-
tration writ shall issue only when the requisite grounds "clearly appear
from specific facts shown by the [verified] petition . . . ... 101 The
grounds for sequestration are unexceptional in that plaintiff must allege
"ownership or right to possession. . or a mortgage, lien, or privilege
.... ,,102 What is noteworthy is the lack of substance in the require-
ment that the property sought to be sequestered be "within the power
of the defendant to conceal, dispose of, or waste . . . or remove...
from the parish. .. .,103
The Court in Mitchell placed heavy emphasis on the premise that
"bare conclusionary claims . . .will not suffice under the Louisiana
statute."'104 As opposed to the facts necessary to establish wrongful
detention under a "broad 'fault' standard,"'10 the facts relevant to se-
questration were said to be "narrowly confined"'10 to those necessary
to establish "default, the existence of a lien, and possession of the
debtor. . .. 1,107 Moreover, these same facts were thought to be par-
ticularly suited to ex parte documentary proof.10 8 It is submitted that
this rationale assumes away substantial problems faced in Fuentes,
reads other parts of Fuentes with license, and ignores some practical
realities in the issuance of writs of sequestration.
Fuentes clearly contemplated that the defendant should have an op-
portunity before the seizure to controvert plaintiff's claims by interpos-
ing facts tending to show that the seizure would be substantively unfair
or mistaken. 0 9 By assuming the propriety of narrowly confined issues,
the Mitchell Court truncated the set of facts that might tend to show
that a prejudgment seizure would be substantively unfair. The only
100. For an example of how little factual material may successfully support a writ
of replevin, see App. at 32-40, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
101. LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961). See generally Johnson, supra
note 1, at 16.
102. LA. CoDE Crv. PRo. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961).
103. Id.; see Miears v. District Court, 519 P.2d 485, 488 (Okla. 1974); text accom-
panying note 349 infra.
104. 416 U.S. at 616; see 407 U.S. at 73; North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975).
105. 416 U.S. at 617.
106. Id.; see notes 408-69 infra and accompanying text.
107. 416 U.S. at 607.
108. Id. at 617-18.
109. See 407 U.S. at 81, 87.
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remaining facts relevant to seizure are those that might show that it
would be mistaken; it was these facts the Court considered particularly
suited to ex parte proof based on the allegations in plaintiff's applica-
tion . 0
According to the Court in Mitchell, there was a distinction even
more basic. Citing the "wrongful detention" language of replevin stat-
utes, the Court inferred the existence of a fault standard and remarked
that "in Fuentes this fault standard. . . was thought ill-suited for pre-
liminary ex parte determination.""' As a characteristic that distin-
guishes the grounds on which the remedies rest, the finding of a fault
standard in replevin and none in sequestration is insupportable. Al-
though historically replevin sounded in tort, 12 its tortious fault stand-
ard no longer exists in the secured credit context, unless the possibility
of debtor misconduct of a more morally delinquent"13 nature than mere
contractual default be considered. If fault in the tort sense of antisocial
conduct is to be inferred from the term "wrongful detention," it is
equally present in Louisiana's grounds for sequestration, which are con-
cerned with whether it is within the debtor's power to "conceal, dispose
of, or waste . . . or remove the property . . . .", If, however, the
Court meant "fault standard" in the sense of breach of contract, any
distinction vanishes, for both replevin and sequestration are based on
the creditor's right to possession on account of the debtor's default.
The Mitchell Court's reading of Fuentes as concerned with a fault
standard lent false support to the Court's view that the narrowly con-
fined issues in sequestration are simpler than those in replevin and thus
more suitable for ex parte determination. In Fuentes the Court had
said that the simplicity of the issues "certainly cannot undercut the right
to a prior hearing of some kind.""15
The clear implication of the majority opinion in Mitchell is that the
facts that must be alleged in the petition and affidavit for sequestration
may make out a case sufficiently more convincing than that shown by
the typical replevin affidavit to render an adversary hearing unneces-
sary. Although the requirement that "the grounds . . . for the issu-
110. See 416 U.S. at 607, 617-18.
111. Id. at 617.
112. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
113. W. PRossER, supra note 95, § 4, at 18-19.
114. LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961); see notes 291-344 infra and
accompanying text (discussion of debtor misconduct).
115. 407 U.S. at 87 n.18.
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ance of the writ clearly appear from specific facts shown by the peti-
tion"" 6 would, in the abstract, provide for a more convincing showing
than a statute requiring bare conclusory assertions of right, it may legit-
imately be asked whether there are significant and essential distinctions
in practice.
The framers of the Louisiana scheme apparently envisioned that the
application for sequestration should contain facts adequate to make out
a prima facie case in the underlying debt action."17 A survey of the
cases that have reached the appellate courts suggests, however, that
creditors have been successful in obtaining writs of sequestration based
on allegations hardly less conclusory than those usually sufficient for
a writ of replevin." 8 In Mitchell the creditor's successful application
consisted of a petition and affidavit that merely alleged an amount past
due and owing on a stove, refrigerator, and washing machine and
prayed for a writ of sequestration in recognition of the vendor's lien;
contract forms were attached." 9 One questions whether such an appli-
cation contains facts sufficiently illuminating to support a constitutional
116. LA. CODE CIV. PRo. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961).
117. Id., Comment (a) states that "[tihe petition for a writ . . . of sequestration
must contain allegations to support the principal cause of action as well as the provi-
sional remedy." See id. form 348 (West 1963) (H. McMahon, Coordinator and Re-
porter, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, co-author); cf. Hancock Bank v. Alexander,
256 La. 643, 652-53, 237 So. 2d 669, 672 (1970). See also 22 AM. JuR. PL. & PR.
FoRms Sequestration Forms 1, 3 (1973).
118. Thus, in Hancock Bank v. Alexander, 227 So. 2d 183 (La. Ct. App. 1969), rev'd
on other grounds, 256 La. 643, 237 So. 2d 669 (1970),
the sole allegation of the plaintiff bank's petition upon which the writ of se-
questration was sought [and issued] was that it was within the power of the
defendants to sell, dispose of, waste, or remove the property during the pend-
ency of the action.
Id. at 186 (footnote omitted); see Wright v. Hughes, 254 So. 2d 293 (La. Ct. App.
1971); cf. Terzia v. Grand Leader, 176 La. 151, 145 So. 363 (1933); Interstate Trust
& Banking Co. v. Hebert, 7 La. App. 428 (1927).
In Young v. Guess & Swanson, 115 La. 230, 38 So. 975 (1905), under the narrower,
stricter requirements of the old Code of Practice of 1870, the Louisiana Supreme Court,
in dissolving an existing sequestration, responded to an affidavit alleging that defendant
was about to make away with the collateral (a sawmill!) as follows:
To sustain an affidavit . . . at least one fact or some slight circumstances
should be proven. . . . If we were to sustain [this sequestration], then on
every claim secured by vendor's privilege upon affidavit the writ might issue.
The defendant would be, as to the cause for sequestration, left without any de-
fense whatever.
Id. at 231, 38 So. at 976. See LA. CODE PRAc. arts. 275-76 (1870); LA. CODE Civ. PRO.
ANN. art. 3571, Comment (a) (West 1961); Johnson, supra note 1, at 2-3.
119. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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distinction. 20
The Fuentes Court remarked that conclusory allegations "test no
more than the strength of the applicant's own belief in his rights."'1 21
It seems clear that a Louisiana creditor with a colorable, but wrongful,
claim of default against his debtor can meet the requirements of the
sequestration statute.1 22  Since the same creditor, as plaintiff, cannot
be expected to allege facts tending to defeat his claim to possession,
the conclusion that seizure without notice or hearing is safer in Louisi-
ana than in the general replevin jurisdiction is questionable.
B. Judicial Control
The Court in Mitchell relied heavily on the role of the judge123 in
the Louisiana scheme as a means to distinguish the statutes at issue
in Fuentes24 and to support the proposition that Louisiana's procedural
safeguards minimize the risk of wrongful seizure. The debtor "was
not at the unsupervised mercy of the creditor and court functionaries"
because, it was said, "Louisiana law provides for judicial control of the
process from beginning to end."' 25  In Arnett v. Kennedy, Justice
White reiterated the premise that summary action should not be taken
without prior notice and hearing unless authorized by a judge in a man-
ner that minimizes the possibilities of wrongful seizure.' 26
Even if it is assumed that a judge rigorously evaluates the materials
presented by the creditor in application for a writ of seizure, the result
is still a "secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.' ' T
120. No statement of the debtor's account was attached, nor were other facts alleged
that tended to prove default. Id.; see 416 U.S. at 630-32 (dissenting opinion).
121. 407 U.S. at 83.
122. 416 U.S. at 632 (dissenting opinion).
123. The majority opinion contains at least thirteen references to "judge" or "judicial
control" in this context. See 416 U.S. at 601-20.
124. Id. at 615:
Because carried out without notice or opportunity for hearing and without ju-
dicial participation, [seizures under the Pennsylvania and Florida statutes were]
held violative of the Due Process Clause.
125. Id. at 616 (footnote omitted). It should be noted, as the Court was care-
ful to do, that Orleans Parish is the only Louisiana jurisdiction in which the court clerk
may not issue writs of sequestration. See LA. CODE Crv. PRO. ANN. arts. 281-83 (West
1960). In one footnote, the Court limited its holding to the constitutionality of the Lou-
isiana procedure, 416 U.S. at 618-19 n.13, and in another, the Court further limited its
holding by stating that "[tihe validity of procedures obtaining in areas outside Orleans
Parish is not at issue." Id. at 606 n.5.
126. 416 U.S. 134, 191 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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That the allegations are evaluated by a judge rather than a court clerk
makes them no less conclusory and no more illuminating of the ultimate
issues to be decided in a trial on the merits. 28 In all probability, the
great majority of sequestration applications submitted for judicial ap-
proval consist of pro forma allegations contained in preprinted forms
based on preprinted petitions.' 29 The reply of the Mitchell dissent that
the judge "can . . . do no more than ascertain the formal sufficiency
of the plaintiff's allegations" seems unanswerable. 80
Probably because issuance of process for provisional remedies by a
judge, rather than a court clerk, has been a relatively rare procedure
in the United States, there apparently has been no formal study of the
extent and rigor of judicial participation in the decision to issue writs.
The analogous area of judicial participation in the issuance of criminal
arrest or search warrants, however, has been the subject of greater judi-
cial and academic scrutiny. 18' While the cases have regularly empha-
sized the importance of preissuance intervention in the arrest warrant
process by neutral and detached magistrates 8 2 "to assure a reliable
finding of probable cause" that will "protect the public from arbitrary
and unlawful police intrusions,"'13 3 there are strong indications that
128. See text accompanying notes 108-10 supra.
129. See note 117 supra.
130. 416 U.S. at 632. This is not surprising in view of the propensity of large com-
mercial creditors to file suits en masse. See text accompanying note 276 infra. It has
been suggested that some courts process application papers by rubber stamp. See, e.g.,
Hobbs, Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.: The 1974 Revised Edition of Consumer Due Proc-
ess, 8 CLEARINGHOuSE Rv. 182, 184 (1974).
131. See, e.g., Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Giordenello
v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948);
W. LAFAVE, ARREST: TIH DECISION TO TAKE A SusPEcT INTO CUSTODY 15-50 (1965);
F. MILLER, PaosEcTrmoN: TaE DECIsION TO CHARGE A SusPEct wrrH A CRn m 45-63
(1969); LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and
Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 987 (1965).
132. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Giordenello v. United States,
357 U.S. 480, 485-88 (1958); cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-50
(1971) (search warrant); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 115 (1964) (same);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (same). Although the Supreme
Court has stated that it prefers judicial intervention, Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963), in Shadwick the Court held that a municipal court clerk who
was "removed from prosecutor or police and. . . subject to the supervision of the mu-
nicipal court judge," 407 U.S. at 351, could issue arrest warrants for violations of mu-
nicipal ordinances.
133. 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 777, 780. Also of primary concern is the insulation of the
warrant decision from the judgment of the prosecutor, an "officer engaged in the often
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judicial intervention has not performed its intended function. Based
on the American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administration of
Criminal Justice in the United States, Professor Miller observes:
[T]he formal law in each state provides in varying degree for judicial
intervention in the warrant process, which could serve as a limitation
on the powers of the prosecutor. However, magistrates vested with
power to so control prosecutors have not exercised the power.
... At most, the judge cursorily scans the warrant before signing; fre-
quently he signs without examining the contents at all. Obviously,
whatever the reasons, it is clear that magistrates do not exercise any real
control over the issuance of warrants, and the effective decision is made
by the prosecutor.
In short ... there is virtually no judicial inquiry into the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants. And this is true
despite the variety of formal schemes for the allocation of this func-
tion.1 3 4
It might be expected that the issuance of arrest warrants would be more
closely supervised than the issuance of civil process. Even if civil and
criminal process are administered with equal degrees of rigor, however,
Justice White's conclusion that "Louisiana law provides for judicial con-
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 449 (1971), quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (Jackson,
J.).
The language used by the Justices in discussing the judicial control issue in civil cases
sometimes appears to arise from the fourth amendment cases. Compare North Ga. Fin-
ishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192, 4194 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975) (White, J.)
("probable cause"), and id. at 4195 (Powell, J., concurring) ("neutral officer"), with
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972) (Powell, J.) ("issuing magistrate
must . . . be neutral and detached, and ... capable of determining whether probable
cause exists").
134. F. MiLLER, supra note 131, at 52-54 (footnotes omitted); see LaFave & Reming-
ton, supra note 131, at 991-92:
Judicial participation in law enforcement decisions is not very meaningful in
practice. The judicial officer is usually not consulted in advance, and, when
he is, his participation is largely perfunctory.
Cf. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964). The situation with regard to search
warrants is less clear. Compare L. 'DFFANY, D. McINTR-E & D. RoTFNBERG, DTEc-
TION OF CRIME 119 (1967) ("Generally magistrates give more attention to requests for
search warrants than they do to requests for arrest warrants"), and id. ("With rare ex-
ceptions, magistrates do read and carefully consider the evidence presented . . . [for]
a search warrant"), with id. at 120 ("[IThe trial judiciary . . . does not always take
seriously its commitment to make a 'neutral and detached' decision as to whether there
exist grounds for a search").
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trol of the process from beginning to end"'18 does not inspire much
confidence,
Inquiry into the case law of Louisiana lends little support to the prop-
osition that participation of the judge minimizes the risk of issuance
of a wrongful writ in that state. Cases cited by the Mitchell majority
support no more than the conclusion that the Louisiana courts will dis-
solve a sequestration writ that is issued upon a formally insufficient pe-
tition or affidavits.' 3 6 Moreover, the Louisiana sources strongly imply
that the issuing judge may have little or no discretion to refuse to order
sequestration if the application is formally sufficient.'3 7 Nor do the
statutes appear to contemplate any great degree of rigor, for they per-
mit the judge to sign an order in chambers, or during vacation, or even
before the petition is filed.'38 It seems fair to say that the judicial par-
135. 416 U.S. at 616.
136. Wright v. Hughes, 254 So. 2d 293 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Hancock Bank v. Alex-
ander, 227 So. 2d 183 (La. Ct. App. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 256 La. 643, 237
So. 2d 669 (1970); see 416 U.S. at 616-17 n.12. In Wright, plaintiff-lessor failed to
specify his reasons for believing his lessee would remove property subject to his lessor's
privilege under LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3572 (West 1961). 254 So. 2d at 296-
97. Ia Hancock, the plaintiff failed to allege a mortgage or privilege. 227 So. 2d at
186-87. See 416 U.S. at 633 n.4 (dissenting opinion); note 118 supra.
137. Notwithstanding the Court's characterization of the case, 416 U.S. at 616-17
n.12, in Leon Zion Mercantile Co. v. Pierce, 163 La. 477, 112 So. 371 (1927), the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana said:
It was the mandatory duty of the judge to sign the order when presented
to him with proper affidavit and bond, and his refusal to do so cannot be justi-
fied on the ground that the petition for the writ had not been filed by the clerk
of his court.
Id. at 479, 112 So. at 371. The defendant judge, against whom mandamus was granted,
had refused to sign a sequestration order on the grounds that the petition had not been
filed with the court clerk and that costs for the writ had not been shown to have been
paid. Id. at 479, 112 So. at 371; see Comment, The Writ of Sequestration in Louisiana,
5 LA. L. RPv. 102, 105 n.27 (1942). One commentator, cited by the Mitchell Court,
equivocates but nevertheless states: "If the court finds that the nature of the claim and
the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon . . . are clearly set forth...
it should sign the order .... ." Johnson, supra note 1, at 20 (emphasis added).
Sequestration under article 3571 should not be confused with sequestration under ar-
ticle 3573. Under the procedure of article 3573, traditionally called "judicial" sequestra-
tion, both parties are in court, the judge clearly may exercise discretion in granting or
refusing to order seizure, and mandamus does not lie. See Trahan Drilling Contractors,
Inc. v. Sterling, 335 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1964); State ex rel. Knighton v. Derryberry, 188
La. 412, 177 So. 256 (1937). Sequestration under what is now article 3571 has been
known traditionally as "legal" or "conventional" sequestration. See Comment, supra at
102 & n.7. No case has been found contrary to the implication of Zion that mandamus
will lie to compel legal sequestration. Compare LA. CODE PRAc. arts. 273-75 (1870),
with IA. CoDE Crv. PRo. ANN. arts. 3571, 3573 (West 1961).
138. LA. CODE CIV. PRo. ANN. arts. 194(2), 196(1) (West 1960); id. art. 3502https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
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ticipation according to Louisiana practice, approved in Mitchell, affords
the debtor substantially less protection against the wrongful issuance
of a writ than do the prior notice and opportunity to be heard mandated
by Fuentes.139
Justice White's reliance on the safeguard afforded the debtor by ju-
dicial participation 140 does not appear to be joined by other members
of the Court. In Mitchell, Justices Douglas and Marshall joined in the
dissenting opinion in which Justice Stewart said that "the fact that the
official who signs the writ . . . is a judge instead of a court clerk is
of no constitutional significance."141  In North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., Justice Powell said that he was "not in accord with
the Court's suggestion that the Due Process Clause might require that
a judicial officer issue the writ of garnishment."' 42 In the same case,
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice,
voiced his opinion that "[tihe clerk-judge distinction, relied on by the
Court, surely is of little significance so long as the court officer is not
an agent of the creditor."'143 Were this issue to be isolated, it seems
doubtful that Justice White's distinction would prevail.
C. Bonding
The Louisiana Code, following the typical pattern,144 requires that
(West 1961).
In one case, a writ of sequestration was dissolved on appeal because the issuing judge
apparently had failed to give the papers an inspection sufficiently rigorous to detect that
no signatures appeared on the sequestration bond. Time Fin. Co. v. Johnson, 161 So.
2d 392 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
139. See 407 U.S. at 90-93; Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 110 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); cf. Roscoe v. Butler,
367 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1973); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004 (D.
Del. 1972). But cf. Highley Hill, Inc. v. Knight, 360 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1973).
140. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192, 4194 (U.S.
Jan. 22, 1974), discussed at notes 485-512 infra and accompanying text; Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 191 (1974)
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In Fuentes ...the risk of
wrongful deprivations was unnecessarily increased by allowing a clerk, rather than a
judge, to pass on the creditor's claim"); notes 123-24 supra.
141. 416 U.S. at 632.
142. 43 U.S.L.W. 4192, 4195 n.3 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975) (concurring opinion) (empha-
sis original).
143. Id. at 4198 (dissenting opinion); cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
450 (1971) (search warrant issued by state attorney general, "who was actively -in
charge of the investigation and later was to be chief prosecutor at the trial," held in-
valid).
144. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CoDE § 515.010 (Deering Supp. 1974) (bond); id. §Washington University Open Scholarship
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the applicant for a writ of sequestration execute a bond "to protect the
defendant against any damage resulting from a wrongful issuance
... ",,1 Conversely, the debtor may, if he acts within ten days of
the seizure,146 recover the property by posting a release bond for pay-
ment of "any judgment which may be rendered against him. 147 The-
oretically, bonding requirements are a procedural safeguard that pro-
tects the interests of both parties. As is often the case, however,
theory comports imperfectly with reality.
In addition to providing a fund from which the debtor may recover
damages, the expense of executing a surety bond is said to deter credi-
tors from instituting meritless, vexatious seizure actions. 148  Although
creditors are loathe to throw good money after bad, the considerable
proportion of consumer suits ending in default judgments no doubt
makes the risk more attractive.149  If the creditor is prepared to incur
filing and attorney fees necessary to institute a suit, it is difficult to see
how the expenditure of an extra $10 for an easily obtained $1000
515.020 (counterbond); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 104(e) (1963) (bond); id. § 104(j)
(counterbond); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 533.030, .270 (1969) (bond); id. §§ 533.040, .310
(counterbond); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-587 (1957) (bond); id. § 8-588 (Supp. 1974)
(counterbond); statutes cited note 356 infra. See generally 66 Am. Jun. 2D Replevin
§§ 64-66 (1973) (bond); id. §§ 72-73 (counterbond).
145. LA. CODE Crv. Pro. ANN. art. 3574 (West 1961). See also id. art. 3501. In
Louisiana, the amount of plaintiffs bond is determined by the court. Id. art. 3574.
Outside Louisiana the typical statute requires that plaintiff post bond equal to double
the value of the property. See, e.g., statutes cited note 144 supra. In Mitchell, the
plaintiff's bond was set at $1125; the claimed unpaid balance was $574.17. 416 U.S.
at 601. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 17-19; Comment, supra note 137, at 105.
146. LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3576 (West 1961). For examples of provisions
in other states see statutes cited note 144 supra.
147. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 3507 (West 1961). The next article of the Lou-
isiana Code provides that the defendant must post a bond equal to the lesser of 125%
of the value of the property seized or 125% of the amount of the plaintiffs claim. Id.
art. 3508; see Johnson, supra note 1, at 24-25. In Mitchell, the debtor posted no bond.
Outside Louisiana, bond amount requirements are variously stated, e.g., equal to plain-
tiff's undertaking, double the value of the property, equal to plaintiffs claim. See, e.g.,
statutes cited note 144 supra.
Defendant's release bond is also called a redelivery bond, a forthcoming bond, or a
counterbond. See RESrATEmENT OF SECUtrITY § 199 (1941). See generally 10 J. AP-
PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACnCE § 6065 (1943) [hereinafter cited as APPLEmAN].
148. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 100-01 (1972) (White, J., dissenting); Ore-
gon v. Lytle, 180 La. 646, 157 So. 377 (1934); RESTATEMENT OF SEcuRITY § 197
(1941); A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP §§ 10.1, .31 (5th ed. 1951) [hereinafter
cited as STEARNS]; Johnson, supra note 1, at 17; Brief for General Motors Acceptance
Corp., et al., as Amici Curiae at 24, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
149. See White, supra note 40, at 529. See also text accompanying note 271 infra.
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surety bond would have any significant deterrent effect.150
Likewise, the question of how well the surety bond indemnifies the
debtor against the consequences of an improper seizure is not free from
doubt. The surety bond is a written contract in which the surety and
the plaintiff-creditor become obligated to the defendant-debtor. 15'
The standard bond conditions provide that the creditor will prosecute
the action diligently, restore the property seized, or its money value,
if the court determines that the seizure was wrongful, and pay damages
occasioned by a wrongful seizure.' 52  The debtor may not recover on
the bond until a final judgment, appellate or otherwise, is rendered
against the creditor.' 5 3  An obvious result of this scheme is that bond-
ing provides no protection for the debtor who disputes the amount of
the claim rather than the existence of the debt. 5 4 Less obvious, but
perhaps of equal consequence, is that even if the debtor defeats the
creditor's action, he necessarily obtains nothing but a right of action
on the bond. 155 If the surety company balks, recovery on the bond
150. Professor Johnson's study incorporates data that indicate that the average legal
and court costs of seizing collateral are on the order of $250 and $370 respectively in
Louisiana and California. Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic
Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 82, 98 (1973). Professor White argues that these estimates
may be too high; he suggests, however, that $60-80 is probably the absolute minimum
for "assembly line" operations. White, supra note 40, at 518. Neither appears to con-
sider bond costs sufficiently significant to include them in his calculations.
The $10 hypothetical premium is based on the 1% replevin bond rate standard in St.
Louis, Missouri, in July 1974. If the principal is "substantial," for example W.T. Grant
Co., no collateral is required. Interview with Anonymous Bonding Agent of a Large
St. Louis Insurance Company, in St. Louis, Mo., July 1974. The 1% rate appears to
be standard nationwide. See Alexander, Wrongful Attachment Damages Must Be Fixed
in the Original Suit, 4 U.S.F.L. REv. 38, 40 (1969).
151. RESTATEMENT OF SEcUrrY §§ 82-83 (1941); see Kenney, A Dissertation on Fi-
delity and Surety Law, 479 INs. L.J. 763 (1962). On judicial bonds generally, see 10
APPLEMAN 43-44; 11 id. at 46; 66 AM. JUR. 2D Replevin §§ 130-59 (1973); 70 AM.
Juit. 2D Sequestration §§ 22, 32, 35-36 (1973); STEARNS §§ 10.1-.54.
152. 10 APPLEMAN § 6062; STEARNS § 10.32, at 403.
153. See 10 APPLEMAN § 6062, at 347 (and cases cited); STFA.NS § 10.34 (and cases
cited); Alexander, supra note 150, at 40-41.
154. See Note, Attachment in California: A New Look at an Old Writ, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 1254, 1266 (1970).
155. This is true except in the apparently unusual situation in which the court renders
judgment against both the plaintiff and his surety; res judicata merges the bond action
in the original judgment. See Dykstra v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Wis.
269, 280 N.W. 324 (1938); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 47 (1942). Judgment
against the surety is unusual because sureties are generally considered to be parties to
the original action only for limited purposes. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Williams, 228 S.W.2d
243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); STEARNs § 10.35, at 406.
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may require extensive, separate litigation. Although the doctrine of
collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of matters adjudicated in the
original suit,156 there may remain several issues and defenses to be re-
solved in the action on the bond. Probably the most important issue
often left unresolved is the measurement of defendant's damages.'67
Failure to establish the damages in the original action is an open invi-
tation to litigation, delay, frustration, and expense, sufficient, in the
words of one commentator, to render "[m]eaningful relief . . . [a]
mere illusion."'' 8  If damages are assessed in the original action, the
amount of recovery on the bond is fixed; 5 9 nevertheless, enough issues
remain for resolution in the bond action to permit delay and uncertainty
to engender compromise. 60  Since the bargaining power inherent in
the right to exemplary damages is generally not available in an action
on the bond,' 6' compromise will almost certainly mean that the debtor
will come away from his experience poorer than he began.'60
156. See 11 APPLEmAN § 6320; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 68, 70 (1942);
STEAsuS § 10.35.
157. See 10 APPLEMAN § 6064; 11 id. § 6323; STEARNs § 10.36, at 407 (defendant
entitled to full compensation for his loss).
158. Alexander, supra note 150, at 39, states: "Bonds do not 'insure' payment to the
injured defendant. Meaningful relief is often mere illusion. That is because recovery
on the bond requires extensive litigation." The author further states that "[blond litiga-
tion is a complex field; one may assume bonding companies will use any available tech-
nicality to increase the burdens on the claimant." Id. at 41. For consideration of the
issues which may be litigated in the bond action, see STEAnNS § 10.37. See also 11 Ar-
PLEMAN §§ 6791-809; Alexander, supra note 150, at 41-42.
Under LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961), the defendant may assert
his damage claim on motion to dissolve, by reconventional demand on the merits, or
by separate action. See cases cited id. nn.41-51. The defendant will have an action
for damage's, however, only if the plaintiff is unable to show the existence of grounds
for the seizure, id. arts. 3501, 3571; no action lies if plaintiff "merely" fails to prove
the underlying cause of action. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sneed, 167
La. 432, 119 So. 417 (1928); Johnson, supra note 1, at 27-28.
159. See 11 APPLEMAN § 6320, at 18; STEARNS § 10.35, at 406.
160. Alexander, supra note 150, at 42:
There is nothing wrong with compromise, of course. . . . But it should not
have to happen here. The legal rules we use now give but little relief; recovery
should not be further whittled down by pressured settlements.
The author suggests a reform procedure in which the surety's liability and damages for
wrongful attachment would be fixed, and judgment would be rendered, in the original
suit and proceedings ancillary thereto. Id. at 42-45.
161. See 11 APPLEMAN § 6361, at 86; RESTATEMENT OF SEcURrTy § 198 (1941);
STEARNs § 10.35, at 406.
162. But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 619 (1974) (White, J.) (em-
phasis added): "mhe prevailing party is protected against all loss."
In Fuentes, Firestone argued as follows:
Mhe plaintiff in replevin must "insure" defendant against any damage whichhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
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Although the Louisiana release bond procedure was carefully
pointed out in Mitchell,163 and was undoubtedly a factor in the deci-
sion, the Court refrained from emphasizing it heavily as a procedural
safeguard in favor of the debtor. The Court did observe that, absent
a release bond, "[tihe debtor, unlike the creditor, does not stand ready
to make the opposing party whole . ... 16" On the creditor's side,
it can be argued that the debtor's ability to recover the property quickly
by posting bond makes the deprivation so temporary as to be de mini-
mis."63 Unlike the Mitchell Court, the Court in Fuentes rejected this
rationale, reasoning that the return of one piece of property (the con-
sumer goods) in exchange for the surrender of another (the cost of
a release bond) remains a deprivation nonetheless. 166 In this instance,
theory comports with reality. Although the Court noted Fuentes' data
showing that no release bonds were posted in the 442 cases of prejudg-
ment replevin in Dade County, Florida, in 1969,167 it did not explain
that this was so because bonding agents require liquid collateral from
poor and lower-middle-income debtors in an amount equal to the face
amount of the bond.' While a release bond may provide reasonable
protection pendente lite for a corporate debtor able to obtain a surety
might result from wrongful replevy, in order to secure the writ. He thus binds
himself to stand for any such damage. The fact that plaintiff's replevin bonds
are relatively inexpensive is eloquent testimony to the fact that plaintiffs do
not use the procedure frivolously.
Brief for Appellee Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. at 46-47, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972).
163. See 416 U.S. at 608.
164. Id.
165. See Neth, Repossession of Consumer Goods: Due Process for the Consumer:
What's Due for the Creditor, 24 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 7, 31 (1972); cf. Brief for Ap-
pellee Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. at 45, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Wil-
liams, supra note 31, at 95.
166. 407 U.S. at 84-85; cf. Note, Attachment and Garnishment, 68 MicH. L. REv.
968, 1007 (1970).
167. 407 U.S. at 84 n.14.
168. See App. at 4-6, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The terms for "anti-
replevin" bonds in St. Louis, Missouri, are as follows: 2% premium (compare 1% pre-
mium for "substantial creditors," note 150 supra); if the applicant's net worth is greater
than ten times the amount of the bond, no liquid collateral may be necessary; but if
not, liquid collateral in the form of a cashier's check in an amount varying from 50%
to 100% of the amount of the bond may be required. Interview with Anonymous Bond-
ing Agent of a Large St. Louis Insurance Company, in St. Louis, Mo., July 1974 (agent
did not remember ever signing release bond on behalf of consumer). Alexander, supra
note 150, at 40, reports a 1% premium with liquid collateral in the face amount of the
bond. To discuss availability of surety bonds to low-income debtors is folly. See Ab-
bott & Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A Narrative of Federal Test Litigation in the Legal
Services Program, 57 IowA L. REy. 955, 982 (1972).Washington University Open Scholarship
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bond on the same terms as a "substantial creditor," 00 the terms on
which surety bonds are available to most consumers make this pro-
cedural safeguard unavailable in reality. It is unlikely, moreover, that
most debtors even know that the right to a release bond exists.Y As
one commentator has observed, "the theoretical availability of the
counterbond should have no constitutional consequence."' 7'
IV. BALANCING INTERESTS
A. The Debtor
Secured installment sales contracts for which the goods purchased
constitute collateral are signed today by all classes of buyers from giant
corporations to welfare families. Although low-income families ac-
quire less installment debt than higher income families, installment
credit is nevertheless a "mainstay of low-income consumption. 11 2  In-
stallment credit permits consumers to finance durable goods through
a species of enforced saving 178 and supports the growth of the markets
in which these goods are sold. 74  The process of debt creation has,
in the last twenty-five years, been one of the prime factors supporting
increased affluence and greater satisfaction of the material wants of a
169. Thus in North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192, 4193
(U.S. Yan. 22, 1975), the corporate debtor immediately obtained discharge of the gar-
nishment of its bank account by filing a release bond. The procedure was nevertheless
held unconstitutional. But see Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp.
1335, 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (court noted that even though corporate defendant could
have afforded substantial cost of release bond, existence of bond obligation and its ap-
pearance on corporation's books would impair its credit standing). "Substantial" cred-
itors can obtain surety bonds at a 1% premium on the strength of their credit. See
note 150 supra.
170. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 n.14 (1972); text accompanying notes
225-26 infra.
171. Neth, supra note 165, at 32. The author also suggests that monetary prerequi-
sites have unconstitutional implications. Id. at 31, citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 385
U.S. 371 (1971). For a possible equal protection argument, see Williams v. Shaffer,
385 U.S. 1037 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by War-
ran, C.J.); Kennedy, Due Process Limitations on Creditors' Remedies: Some Reflections
on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 19 AM. U.L. Rnv. 158, 171 (1970) (observing
that equal protection argument was made and dismissed in lower courts in Sniadach).
172. See D. CAPLOVrIz, THE PooR PAY MoRE 94-104 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
CAPLovTz].
Between 1950 and 1971, consumer credit outstanding grew at more than a 9% com-
pound annual rate, rising from $21.5 billion to $137.2 billion. NATONAL COMM'N ON
CoNsuMER FINANCE, REPORT ON CONSUMER CREriT IN Tim UNITED STATES 5 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT]. In 1971, the installment debt breakdown was as
follows:
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substantially enlarged proportion of the nation's consumers of goods
and services. In forty-nine states, when contracts go bad, self-help re-
possession'1 " of collateral held by defaulting business debtors domi-
nates, with little need for resort to judicial remedies.17  "In the under-
world of consumer finance, however, repossession is a knockdown,
drag-out battle waged on both sides with cunning guile and a complete
disregard for the rules of fair play."'177 Summary repossession of non-
TABLE I
INSTALLMENT DEBT BY
INCOME BRACKET
Percentage of Families
Annual Family Income with Installment Debt
Less than $3,000 29
$3,000-4,999 39
$5,000-7,499 51
$7,500-9,999 53
$10,000-14,999 60
$15,000 or more 46
All Families 48
NCCF REPORT 156.
Consumer installment debt hit an all-time peak of $154.5 billion in August 1974, an
increase of more than 50% since 1970 and 3500% since 1946. Bus. WEEK, Oct. 12,
1974, at 94.
173. See Affidavit of V. Morgan, Manager of Retail Credit, Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., App. at 57-59, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (suggestion that, "due to
the improvident savings habits of many consumers" in the $5,000 to $12,000 income
bracket, any restriction on debt creation mechanism would result in denial of "essentials
such as automobiles [and] furniture ... as well as work-saving and luxury appli-
ances"). See also Brief for General Motors Acceptance Corp., et al., as Amici Curiae
at 6, Fuentes v. Shevin, supra:
mhe facility with which hardpressed and impecunious consumers, without
ready access to substantial funds of their own, can afford to possess both neces-
sities and amenities of life is the result of the ease with which they are granted
credit.
174. Affidavit of V. Morgan, supra note 173, at 59. See generally NATIONAL CON-
SUMER FIN. Ass'N, 1974 FINAcE FACTS YEARnooK.
175. The "self-help" repossession remedy is authorized by UCC § 9-503. In Louisi-
ana, self-help repossession is not permitted, and the creditor must proceed by ordinary
judicial process, LA. CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. arts. 2631-44 (West 1961), or by executory
process, id. arts. 851-65 (West 1960). Under the latter procedure, the contract must
contain a confession of judgment and must be by authentic act, that is, signed by a no-
tary. See Anderson & L'Enfant, Fuentes v. Shevin: Procedural Due Process and Lou-
isiana Creditor's Remedies, 33 LA. L. REv. 62, 77 (1972); Comment, Fuentes v. Shevin:
Its Treatment by Louisiana Courts and Effect Upon Louisiana Law, 47 TUL. L. REv.
806, 819 (1973).
176. 2 G. GILMORE, SEcuTrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPRTY 1212 (1965).
177. Id.
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automobile178 consumer goods purchased under secured installment
sales contracts is the most common modem application of provisional
remedies,' 719 and it is to the low-income consumer group that these
remedies are applied with greatest frequency. Indeed, a 1966 study
in the District of Columbia showed that, while retailers serving the gen-
eral market resorted to judicial process once for every $230,000 of net
sales, the average for retailers selling in low-income markets was once
for every $2600 of net sales.180
"If you don't pay, they take it away"'' is of course true for all classes
of buyers; nevertheless, the impact of provisional collection remedies
falls most heavily on low-income consumers for a number of reasons
relevant to evaluation of due process requirements. Few would find
it surprising that debtors living in a precarious financial situation are
more likely to default than are their more affluent neighbors. When
the debt-to-income ratio is high, even small decreases in available re-
sources caused by temporary illness or layoff, or an unforeseen repair
bill, may render the debtor unable to make payments. And creditors
generally agree that most defaults occur because the low-income con-
sumer has become unable, rather than unwilling, to pay.' s Large
178. In states that have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, self-help reposses-
sion is used almost exclusively to repossess automobiles since entering homes uninvited
to repossess household goods would be a breach of the peace not permitted by UCC
§ 9-503. Thus, judicial repossession by provisional remedy is the method generally used
to repossess household goods. A California study disclosed that less than 1% of auto-
mobile repossessions in that state are by replevin. Johnson, supra note 150, at 95; see
White, supra note 40, at 513.
179. In this Note, the term "provisional remedy" is intended to include the prejudg-
ment collection remedies of attachment, garnishment, replevin or claim and delivery, and
sequestration insofar as they permit seizure of a debtor's property in order to secure the
debt or claim in the event judgment is obtained. Replevin and sequestration, as used
in Louisiana, are distinguished from attachment in general for they seek return of chat-
tels in specie. See J. CoBBEY, supra note 14, § 23; note 291 infra.
It is often said that no contract provision gives better protection than the security in-
terest and its matching remedy, the right to repossess on default. See NCCF REPORT
27.
180. FEDERAL TADE COMM'N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLmENT CREnrr AND RE-
TAiL SALES PRACTICES OF DIsTrCT OF COLUMBA RETAILERS 33-34 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as FTC REPORT].
181. Almor Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v. MacMillan, 116 N.J. Super. 65, 69, 280
A.2d 862, 864 (Dist. Ct. 1971) (upholding replevin in light of Sniadach).
182. NCCF REPORT 23:
Survey results indicated that most creditors thought debtors failed to meet their
contractual obligations because they became unemployed, ill, or overextended
after incurring the debt, not because they were "deadbeats" who never intended
to repay.
[Vol. 1974:653
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
Vol. 1974:653] PROVISIONAL REMEDIES AND DUE PROCESS
families, high levels of unemployment or part-time employment, a high
proportion of unskilled workers, low income, job insecurity, negligible
savings, little or poor education, nonwhite race-all these factors are
associated by creditors with high credit risk, hence high credit cost. 83
Yet credit is extended to low-income consumers because many of these
factors make it profitable despite the high proportion of those expected
to default.8 4
Other factors, less obvious to those without experience in this mar-
ket, exacerbate the problems of low-income debtors. Low-income
market 8 " retailers protect themselves against the risk by selling low-
quality goods at high markup on a "dollar down and a dollar a week"
installment contract at high credit cost." 6 The low-income consumer
is "trained by society (and his position in it) to want the symbols and
appurtenances of the 'good life.' ,,187 At the same time he lacks the
means, information, and sophistication to be an effective buyer in a
See Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM.
L. REv. 445, 480 (1968); Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment in Light
of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 837, 846 n.60 (1970) (citing
data that 61% of payment lapses attributed to illness, loss of work, pressure of other
debts; 16% based on belief in creditor fraud); Project, Resort to Legal Process in Col-
lecting D-bts from High Risk Credit Buyers in Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for
Allocating Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A.L. R~v. 879, 894 (1967).
Marital problems appear to be a substantial reason why some debtors are unwilling
to pay. See id. at 894 n.64. Others refuse to pay because of dissatisfaction with, or
as a means of coercing repair of, merchandise purchased. See text accompanying note
452 infra.
183. See NCCF REPORT 156.
184. Project, supra note 182, at 895.
185. CAPLOVITZ 30:
The basic function of the low-income marketing system is to provide consumer
goods to people who fail to meet the requirements of the more legitimate, bu-
reaucratic market, or who choose to exclude themselves from the larger market
because they do not feel comfortable in it. . . . Almost no one-however
great a risk-is turned away. Various mechanisms sift and sort customers ac-
cording to their credit risk and match them with merchants ready to sell them
the goods they want.
186. Id. at 15-20, 23-25.
187. Id. at 14; see J. GALBRArH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY chs. 9-14 (Mentor ed.
1958); Kripke, supra note 182, at 479. In a recent work, Professor Galbraith states:
All forms of consumer persuasion affirm that the consumption of goods is the
greatest source of pleasure, the highest measure of human achievement. They
make consumption the foundation of human happiness.
J. GALBRArrH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 157 (1973). In Watson v. Branch
County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945. 969 (W.D. Mich. 1974), the court said that "families
in modern industrial society require a certain level of material welfare in order to be
successful institutions."
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commercial society."' The result is that the low-income consumer is
particularly susceptible to high-pressure 8 and fraudulent 0 sales tech-
niques and often winds up contracting for shoddy merchandise at high
prices' 91 and high credit costs.' 9 2  Thus the average customer of one
188. CAPLOVrrZ 14.
189. See id. at 165:
Apart from the unscrupulous practices of merchants, many of these incidents
[documented in the study] show the ineffectiveness of these families as con-
sumers. Some are gullible to an extraordinary degree, susceptible to the appeal
of easy credit, ready to assume heavy installment debt provided the payments
are small, and completely lacking in foresight and resources.
Id. at 141-47; FTC REPORT at xiv; Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical
Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 883, 895-912 (1969). See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
190. See Project, supra note 189, at 912-13 (footnotes omitted):
A fraudulent sale occurs when a consumer is induced to purchase goods or
services because of a material misrepresentation as to the quality, price or ben-
efits to be expected of the product....
The outright use of a fraudulent sales pitch by door-to-door salesmen is rare.
[W.hen it does exist, [it] is practiced almost exclusively by disrepu-
table companies in low-income areas. Low-income consumers tend to be less
sophisticated and, hence, they are more easily fooled.
Use of fraudulent techniques is increased because the capacity of many low-income con-
sumers to protect themselves from fraud, deception, and misrepresentation is limited by
ignorance of the fraud, unawareness of their rights, or reluctance for any of several rea-
sons to bring legal action. Id. at 913 n.81.
The low-income marketing system
is in many respects a deviant one, in which unethical and illegal practices
abound. . . . A close association probably exists between the amount of risk
that merchants in this system are willing to accept and their readiness to em-
ploy unethical and illegal tactics. It may even be that under the present mar-
keting arrangements in our society, unethical practices are an inevitable conse-
quence of serving the wants of the poorest risks. Society now virtually pre-
sents the very poor risks with twin options: of foregoing major purchases or
of being exploited.
CAPLoviTz 180. See also Project, supra note 182, at 879-90.
191. CAPLOvlTz 18-19, 81-93. California studies indicated that the complaint of
unreasonably high price for inferior goods was
particularly prevalent among low-income buyers. Although 13 percent of the
purchasers interviewed in middle-income neighborhoods reported dissatisfaction
with price in relation to quality of goods sold to them by door-to-door vendors,
about 65 percent of the purchasers interviewed in a low-income Black neigh-
borhood, and 35 percent in a slightly more affluent Mexican-American neigh-
borhood believed that they had paid too much for the products they had pur-
chased at the door.
Project, supra note 189, at 914.
The District of Columbia survey showed that "on the average, goods purchased for
$100 at wholesale sold for $225 in low-income market stores, compared with $159 in
general market stores." FTC REPORT at x; see 114 CoNo. Rnc. 1831-32 (1968) (re-
marks of Representative Sullivan).
192. Although interest rate ceilings are regulated in all states, nothing prevents thehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
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such retailer in the District of Columbia had a family of five and a
monthly income of $348 per month at a time [mid-1960's] when the
Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that $730 per month would main-
tain a family of four at a moderate standard of living. Nevertheless,
this average consumer made furniture and appliance installment pur-
chases of over $200, paying substantially higher prices than he would
have paid general market retailers for comparable merchandise. 193
Given that most defaulting low-income debtors are not "deadbeats"
but are simply unable to pay, 19 collection tactics short of legal process
or threats of it are least effective in the low-income system.' 95 More-
over, these debtors often lack the resources to arrange a settlement of
disputed debts. Consequently, low-income consumers are much more
likely to be subject to collection techniques involving provisional reme-
retailer from including credit charges in his markup on the goods. See CAPLoVrrZ 16-
18, 87-90. In the FTC study, it was found that:
Most of the [low-income market] retailers surveyed determined finance
charges in terms of an "add-on" rate based on the unpaid cash balance. When
calculated on an effective annual rate basis, finance charges of general market
retailers varied between 11 percent and 29 percent, averaging 21 percent when
contracts were assigned and 19 percent when retailers financed their own con-
tracts. Finance charges by low-income market retailers imposing such charges
ranged between 11 and 33 percent per annum, averaging 25 percent on con-
tracts assigned to finance companies and 23 percent on contracts the retailers
held themselves.
FTC REPORT at xii.
193. FTC REPORT 48. See generally id. at xii-xvi.
Although he discredits much of the "folklore of the rapacious repossessing creditor,"
Professor Kripke nevertheless registers the following caveat:
mhe law of averages makes certain that some percentage of credit extensions
will go into default, even those of a conservative and careful creditor. The
economic growth made possible by sales financing in middle-class contexts has
been well worth the social cost of these defaults. But recent evidence makes
it clear that the growth of the urban slums, welfare loads and our "revolution
of rising expectations" has extended the instalment buying system beyond the
middle class to levels that the companies which pioneered the sales finance sys-
tem would never have touched. In the process merchants use shocking sales
tactics to overload the consumers with debt for shoddy merchandise, and find
financing to meet their needs .... Credit has become increasingly available
to, and even forced on, persons of lower and lower economic strata, thus in-
creasing the percentage of cases of default.
Kripke, supra note 182, at 450.
194. Kripke, supra note 182, at 480 (footnotes omitted), notes:
The bulk of the default problem arises not from overextension of credit or
other over-reaching, but from the debtor's change of circumstances. ...
There are also the real deadbeats, the debtors who can pay but will not, or
who have used fraudulent devices to build up the debt.
See Williams, supra note 31, at 11; note 286 infra.
195. See Project, supra note 182, at 895; cf. text accompanying notes 223 & 394 infra.
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dies. In one study, "one in every five [low-income] families had en-
countered the penalties of repossession, garnishment, and threat of
garnishment."19 6  Since provisional remedies serve different purposes,
depending on whether the market within which they are used is com-
mercial, middle- or high-income retail, or low-income retail, the failure
of the Mitchell Court to acknowledge these distinctions is anoma-
lous.
197
1. Impact of Deprivation
That prejudgment wage garnishment "may as a practical matter
drive a wage-earning family to the wall' 09 has been well docu-
mented 99 and has produced Supreme Court 2 0 and congressional re-
196. CAPLOVrrz 138. Another study reportedly found that debtors whose incomes are
less than $5,000 a year are more than 3 a times as likely as other installment debtors
to be sued for their debts. Project, supra note 189, at 927 n.138, reporting WusTERN
CENTER ON LAW AND POVERTY, A STUDY ON THE IMPACT AND EXTENT OF WAGE GAR-
NISHm:MENT IN Los ANGELES CouNTY (1968).
197. See, e.g., Sandnes' Sons, Inc. v. United States, 462 F.2d 1388, 1393 (Ct. CI.
1972) (in proceeding for redetermination of excessive profits, court said "requirements
of constitutional due process may be different for indigent and solvent natural persons
.. . and for indigent and solvent corporations also"). See also Note, supra note 166,
at 1001 n.69; Comment, supra note 182, at 848 n.70.
The Supreme Court has been invited to make this distinction. In Fuentes it was
pointed out that
the remedy of replevin is also important to wholesale financing of dealer in-
ventory. A dealer in possession of goods which he sells in the normal course
of his business can pass title to those goods to his customers free and clear
of any security interest held by the inventory financer. See Fin. Stat. §
679.307 (1969) [UCC § 9-307(1)]. The remedy of replevin is crucial at this
point and allows the inventory financer to protect against additional loss by
taking the collateral into his possession and preventing further sales to cus-
tomers.
Brief for General Motors Acceptance Corp., et al., as Amici Curiae at 13-14, Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); see id. at 4; Brief for Appellee Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. at 43, Fuentes v. Shevin, supra. In North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
43 U.S.L.W. 4192, 4194 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975), discussed at notes 485-512 infra and ac-
companying text, the Court declined to distinguish Fuentes or Mitchell on the grounds
that the debtors in those cases were consumers rather than corporations. See note 509
infra.
198. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969).
199. See, e.g., Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommenda-
tions, 53 CALiF. L. REv. 1214 (1965); Note, supra note 166; Note, Wage Garnishment
in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WAsH. L. Rnv. 743 (1968); 1967 WIs. L. Rav.
759. See also Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets
the Constitution, 59 VA. L. Rav. 355, 356-59 (1973); Comment, supra note 182.
200. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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sponse. 201 Courts, however, often have turned a deaf ear to, or dis-
missed as mere inconvenience, the somewhat less draconic impact on
low-income debtors of other provisional seizures.202 Prejudgment
seizure is usually impractical unless the collateral is of substantial value;
consequently, most items repossessed are furniture or appliances such
as refrigerators, stoves, beds, or sewing machines.20 3  Unless one as-
sumes that food is life's only necessity, it is difficult to distinguish the
wages that purchase life's essentials from the essentials purchased.
20 4
To paraphrase one sympathetic court, the debtor cannot keep perish-
able food in, cook on, or sleep on the creditor's bond while he waits
for the claim to be tried. -03 Moreover, the impact of judicial reposses-
201. Consumer Credit Protection Act §§ 303, 304, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1674 (1970)
(maximum garnishment 25 percent of disposable earnings or 30 times federal minimum
wage, whichever is less; no discharge of employee for garnishment for any single indebt-
edness).
202. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609, 625 (1974) (majority and con-
curring opinions). See generally Latham v. Tynan, 435 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1970);
American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1970); Brunswick Corp. v.
J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), vacated sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Black Watch
Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F.
Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970); Craig
v. Commonwealth Dep't of Pub. Safety, 471 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); Yoder v.
County of Cumberland, 278 A.2d 379 (Me. 1971); Reutzel v. Minnesota Dep't of High-
ways, 290 Minn. 88, 186 N.W.2d 521 (1971); Almor Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v.
MacMillan, 116 NJ. Super. 65, 280 A.2d 862 (Dist. Ct. 1971). See also cases cited
in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 71 n.5 (1972).
203. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 279, 486 P.2d 1242, 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 57 (1971); White, supra note 40, at 530.
204. E.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 723 (N.D.N.Y.
1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 279-80, 486 P.2d 1242, 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42,
57 (1971); see Note, Replevin: A Due Process Prescription for an Ancient Writ, 45
TE.mP. L.Q. 259, 268 (1972).
205. See McMeans v. Schwartz, 330 F. Supp. 1397, 1400 (S.D. Ala. 1971); cf. Ar-
nett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 190-93 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
Until recently, some courts had held that the consumer's interest in continued utility
service, such as gas or electricity, was protected by the fourteenth amendment. There-
fore, a summary cutoff of service was said to violate due process if carried out prior
to proper notice and an opportunity for a hearing. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas
of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 168 (6th Cir. 1973) (gas service is necessity since life may
depend on it); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 669 (7th Cir. 1972)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973) (electricity is absolute necessity
of modem life); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 450 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (termination notice inadequate on account of failure to advise of remedies avail-
able); Hattell v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1972) (some type of hear-
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sion on the debtor's privacy and peace is, in a sense, greater than the
impact of wage garnishment. The sheriff will usually arrive to seize
goods in the daytime, perhaps in the presence of children or friends
and neighbors. In Louisiana, for example, he may enter the debtor's
home and use the force necessary to effect the seizure, even to the
extent of breaking doors or arresting those who resist.206 The attend-
ant embarrassment, invasion of privacy, and interference with the debt-
or's peace are manifest.207 Furthermore, to the extent that the debtor
perceives the seizure as wrongful, arbitrary, or unfair, there result ero-
sion of respect for the judicial system, 20 8 rancor for the creditor, and
alienation from the marketing system he represents. 20 9
This "parade of horribles 210 obviously occurs only in a small minor-
ity of cases, and the equities are not all in favor of the debtor. Only
a very small percentage of installment sales contracts result in de-
fault. 11 In the majority of default cases, debtors apparently return or
ing required). But cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973)
(no state action); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., supra (no state action). See
also Clark & Landers, supra note 199, at 391-92. In December 1974, the Third Circuit's
result in Jackson was affirmed by the Supreme Court. In an opinion by Justice Rehn-
quist, the Court held that the action of an extensively regulated, privately owned utility
in terminating petitioner's service was not sufficiently connected to the state to make
the conduct "attributable to the state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." Jack-
son v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 449, 457 (1974). Since it found no stato
action, the Court had "no occasion to decide whether petitioner's claim to continued
service was 'property' for purposes of that Amendment. . . ." Id.
206. See LA. CODE Cirv. PRo. ANN. art. 325 (West 1960) (right of entry for execu-
tion). See also White, supra note 40, at 525-26.
At least two courts have held that prejudgment seizure of property by a sheriff with-
out a probable cause warrant violates the fourth and fourteenth amendments. See La-
prease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 722 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Blair v,
Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 277, 486 P.2d 1242, 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 55 (1971).
207. See Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics-An Analysis of the Interests and
the Remedies, 1972 WAsir. U.L.Q. 1, 9-10, 4046, 66-69.
208. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971).
209. See Hearings on H.R. 11,601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 661 (1967)
(statement of D. Caplovitz): "Numerous newspaper accounts have quoted ghetto resi-
dents as rationalizing the looting on the grounds that they have been victimized and
robbed by the merchants for many years." Exploitation of consumers has been recog-
nized as a cause contributing to the civil disorders of the summer of 1967. See REPoRT
oF Tm NATIONAL ADvSORY COMM'N ON CO DisoRDERs 276 (Bantam Books ed.
1968).
210. Clark & Landers, supra note 199, at 357, so describe Mr. Justice Douglas' char-
acterization in Sniadach of the evils of wage garnishment.
211. Statistics for 1966 showed delinquency rates as follows: average for all types
of installment credit, 1.76%; direct automobile loans, 1.08%; PHA modernizationhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
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surrender the merchandise voluntarily.2 12  A fair inference is that the
expectation of most debtors is that, if they default, they will have to
do without the merchandise. Therefore, creditors argue that the im-
pact of a deprivation of goods is not great and is much less than the
impact of garnished wages.213  While many low-income families use
installment credit, "a substantial percentage [manage] to do without
[goods] until sufficient cash [has] been saved to purchase outright."214
The argument follows that if the debtor got along without the goods
before the contract was entered, he can get along without them after
they are seized.215 Creditors argue further that, instead of causing vio-
lence, judicial repossession by a peace officer ensures the public peace
and protects buyers, sellers, and innocent bystanders. 1 6
Nevertheless, a summary procedure that, in an individual case, per-
mits a wrongful 17 or meritless218 seizure to leave a low-income family
with its frozen food defrosting on the floor, without a cooking stove
or a bed, and with no assets with which to replace the seized articles
qualifies as more than a mere "inconvenience."219  Even if the depri-
vation exists only for a short time, the impact on the consumer's inter-
ests in maintaining both a "minimum standard of decency" 220 and his
self-respect is substantial.
loans, 2.41%; home appliance loans, 2.45%. Brief for Appellee Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co. at 15, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), citing Ammuc~A BANKERS ASS'N,
TRENDS IN INSTALLMENT CREDIT 35 (1967). By 1974, average delinquency rates had
risen to 2.7%-the highest level in 25 years-no doubt influenced by inflation. Bus.
WEEK, Oct. 12, 1974, at 94.
212. Affidavit of V. Morgan, supra note 173, at 52-53; see note 224 infra and accom-
panying text.
213. E.g., Brief for Appellee Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. at 17, Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
214. Id.
215. See Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 377 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), in which the following quotation appears:
"The sweet things in life, to you were just loaned,
So how can you lose what you've never owned."
The lines are said to be from the 1930's pop song "Life is Just a Bowl of Cherries,"
copyright 1931 by DeSylva, Brown & Henderson, Inc.
216. See, e.g., Brief for General Motors Acceptance Corp., et al., as Amici Curiae
at 15-16, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); note 367 infra.
217. That is, a malicious, mistaken, or coercive writ.
218. That is, a writ issued pursuant to a claim that the debtor could defeat on the
merits.
219. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 625 (1974) (Powell, I., concurring).
220. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 190-93 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), discussing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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2. Impact of Legal Process
The direct impact caused by loss of possession and use of goods is
a primary, but not the only, cost element of the debtor's interest in free-
dom from deprivations resulting from wrongful or meritless provisional
writs. Equally important are the implications flowing from the fact that
provisional seizure shifts the burden of proceeding from the creditor
to the debtor.2 1 Here, too, the courts should recognize that cost mag-
nitude will depend on who is affected.222 Compared with consumers,
commercial debtors are more knowledgeable, less susceptible to eco-
nomic coercion, and more likely to have legal aid. Apart from the
small businessman whose inventory, and thus his means of earning a
living, may be seized summarily, the property seized from a commercial
debtor is unlikely to be as important as his refrigerator or bed. The
more affluent and better educated consumer is apt to recognize the
need for legal assistance and have the resources to obtain it. But the
empirical data confirm that those who are least competent to protect
their rights through the legal process are members of the same groups
that are most likely to be affected by provisional seizure-working and
lower-middle classes, and the poor.223
Since execution of a provisional writ forecloses the debtor's ability
to protect his rights prior to seizure, if he is to have immediate relief,
he must act. Most do not.224  For those who do act, the barriers to
221. Thus, in Louisiana the debtor must go to court and move for a dissolution of
the writ, LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961), or furnish a release bond,
id. art. 3507. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 16-17, 24-25; notes 144-71 supra, 264-79
infra and accompanying text. It has been suggested that perhaps
one of the finest consequences of constitutionalized repossession will be a shift-
ing of the burden of proceeding with litigation from the debtor to the creditor.
.. . Mhe result of a shifted burden might be fewer pleas "copped" by debt-
ors and more good defenses preserved.
Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession: A Critique for
Professor Johnson, and a Partial Reply, 47 S. ACAL. REv. 116, 144 (1973); see Neth,
supra; note 165, at 47-48.
222. See, e.g., Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit,
8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rv. 441, 449 (1967).
223. See 1 D. CAPLOVITZ, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 1-15 (1972); Project, supra note
182, at 895; text accompanying note 196 supra.
224. CAPLOvTZ 171 (emphasis original):
The families who reported that they had been cheated were asked what they
did about their problem. Half of them did nothing at all; they did not even
complain to the merchant. Another 40 per cent tried to deal with the merchant
themselves. Only 9 per cent sought professional help.
See Project, supra note 182, at 900. A Los Angeles County study in 1968 demonstrated
that in the cases in which garnishment was used, 97% did not go to trial, even though
[Vol. 1974:653
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relief are substantial. Ignorance of his legal rights and misunderstand-
ing of the action taken not only make the debtor easy prey2' for the
unscrupulous user of process, but also effectively close avenues of re-
dress open to the more sophisticated. The data suggest that perhaps
two-thirds of low-income consumers do not even know where to go for
help.226 Financial disability will deter the few who have the acumen
to claim their rights on their own227 or who would seek private legal
aid. Debtors who are able to obtain help from low-cost or free legal
aid groups-- still must bear burdens, which to others are of little conse-
quence-.22 ' The more affluent debtor is not so vexed by the costs of
lost work time, the difficulty in obtaining time off from work, and the
necessity of getting to court, perhaps a considerable distance without
an automobile.23 0 Moreover, there appear to be significant psycholog-
less than one-fourth of those garnished felt they had no defense. "Most considered the
garnishment a final action about which they could do nothing." Comment, supra note
182, at 840.
225. Project, supra note 182, at 900.
226. CAPLOVITZ 175-78. For a discussion of consumer education programs see
NCCF REPORT 193-200.
227. See Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 968 (W.D. Mich. 1974)
("Because of the economics of legal action and automobile financing, debtors as a prac-
tical matter have no legal remedy for abuses"); cf. Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by Warren, C.J.).
228. See Project, supra note 182, at 901. An article heavily cited in the reviews is
Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for
Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Rlv. 395 (1966). See also Carlin & Howard, Legal Repre-
sentation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 381 (1965).
Consumer credit transactions usually involve such small sums that lawyers are not in-
terested in litigation involving them. When low-income debtors are able to obtain legal
aid program advocates, the creditor may be placed in a dilemma. Since he can no longer
obtain an inexpensive default judgment, he can either dismiss his action and write off
the debt, or pay private counsel to prosecute. Unless the creditor has an attorney on
retainer, legal fees are likely to be larger than the debt. In one case, the attorney for
a small retailer spent several hundred hours to win a several-hundred-dollar claim
against a debtor represented by a legal aid attorney. Interview with David H. Vernon,
Visiting Professor of Law, Washington University, in St. Louis, Mo., Oct. 18, 1974.
Consumer finance officials recommend that legal services programs continue to receive
federal, state, and local governmental support and that consumer protection laws be
amended to assure payment of legal fees. NCCF REPORT 62. It is likely that readily
available, free or low-cost legal aid would have a greater impact on creditor costs than
the notice and hearing requirements discussed in this Note.
229. Project, supra note 189, at 927:
Some purchasers cannot afford to leave their job long enough to contest the
claim by personal appearance. Loss of even one day's pay may be sufficient
to unbalance their precarious budgets.
230. See CAPLOvrZ 161.
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ical barriers to obtaining relief from wrongful deprivation. Some debt-
ors plainly believe there is nothing they can do;23' others, after failing
to obtain relief from the seller, simply resign themselves to the loss and
"do not complain. 23 2  Therefore, unless the debtor is fully informed
of his rights at the time of seizure, or unless he can afford the price
of a release bond or the services of an attorney, any rights of redress
after the execution are of small value.
A further consequence of the debtor's inability to protect himself is
the opportunity that the legal process gives the knowledgeable creditor
to exert leverage on the debtor prior to judgment. Conventional doc-
trine holds that the state provides creditors with the provisional seizure
remedy in order to ensure that the claim or debt can be satisfied in
the event that a judgment is obtained. Nevertheless, prejudgment sei-
zure itself, or the threat of it, effectively enlists the state's aid to coerce
the debtor. Although in most cases the resale value of provisionally
seized merchandise, and therefore its value as security, is relatively
low, 233 the cost of executing the writ is further offset because seizure
of necessary household goods exerts great pressure on the debtor to
meet the creditor's demands. Availability of provisional seizure gives
the creditor bargaining leverage in several ways. If the creditor is in
fact unconcerned with resale of the collateral, 34 seizure may neverthe-
231. Id. at 172.
232. Project, supra note 182, at 900. See also Project supra note 189, at 927:
inhere is a general feeling of fear and suspicion of the entire legal process
held especially by low-income consumers. They have been mistreated by the
system too many times in the past to want to expose themselves again.
233. One study reports that, in 1967, a large Los Angeles finance company measured
the value of repossessed merchandise immediately after purchase by the following rule
of thumb: hard good, about 50% of initial value; soft good, about 259o of initial value.
Project, supra note 182, at 894 n.63. A St. Louis legal aid attorney reports that there
is virtually no market for repossessed goods. Interview with Barrett Braun, Staff Attor-
ney, The Legal Aid Society of the City and County of St. Louis, in St. Louis, Mo., Aug.
5, 1974. It is not surprising that no market exists for a greasy armchair or used bed.
Although there has in the past been a lively market for some hard goods, the recent
exodus to suburbia with its built-in kitchens has produced a glut of stoves and refrigera-
tors. See Kripke, supra note 182, at 448 (resale market for nonautomobile consumer
goods is "fantasy"); text accompanying notes 283-84 infra.
234. The value of replevied collateral is not so low if the creditor can recondition
and sell it again as new merchandise. Since this practice is illegal, it is obviously diffi-
cult to document. Caplovitz reports evidence that the practice occurs with some degree
of regularity in low-income markets; merchants can get away with it because their cus-
tomers are too inexperienced to know the difference. CAPLOViTZ 28, 150, 189. A St.
Louis legal aid attorney specializing in consumer problems agrees. Interview with Bar-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
Vol. 1974:653] PROVISIONAL REMEDIES AND DUE PROCESS
less exert pressure sufficient to induce the debtor to abandon valid de-
fenses and counterclaims and capitulate to a dubious claim or settle for
more than the court would find him to owe.2 35 With such severe con-
sequences in the offing, the mere threat of seizure may well cause the
debtor to submit to a new and more costly repayment schedule.23 6 In-
deed, some low-income market creditors occasionally effect seizures
merely to maintain credibility among their installment debtors.237
Thus, in many cases, the state, rather than ensuring collectability of
judgments, has provided an in terrorem device.238  In those cases in
which the debtor fails, for whatever reason, to take the initiative to con-
test the seizure or the underlying claim, or take advantage of proce-
dural safeguards, the "temporary taking" becomes permanent without
a hearing or a judicial determination of the validity of the claim on
which the seizure was based.239
rett Braun, Staff Attorney, The Legal Aid Society of the City and County of St. Louis,
in St. Louis, Mo., Aug. 5, 1974.
235. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83 n.13 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341 (1969); Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Court, 5 Cal.
3d 536, 559-63, 488 P.2d 13, 28-31, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 724-26 (1971); White, supra
note 40; The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 52, 88 (1972); Note, supra
note 154, at 1260; Note, supra note 204, at 268; Comment, supra note 182, at 840; Proj-
ect, supra note 182, at 893.
236. Professor White describes several instances in which a creditor sent out dunning
letters designed to look like complaints. "At the top left corner of the notice the debt-
ors name was printed and below that was the creditor's name with the letters 'vs' be-
tween them." White, supra note 40, at 515 n.44. See also CAPLOVITZ 21 n.8: "Since
recipients of welfare funds are not supposed to buy on credit, this threat [to disclose
credit purchases to welfare authorities] exerts powerful pressure on the family."
237. Interview with Barrett Braun, Staff Attorney, The Legal Aid Society of the City
and County of St. Louis, in St. Louis, Mo., Aug. 5, 1974. "One merchant said that he
will occasionally repossess an item, not to regain his equity, but to punish a customer
he feels is trying to cheat him." CAPLOVrrZ 21.
238. See Hobbs, supra note 130, at 183; White, supra note 40, at 530; cf. 114 CONG.
Rac. 1831 (1968) (remarks of Representative Sullivan):
We have hundreds of pages of testimony on the cruelties of the garnishment
system . . . as a means not of satisfying just debts but of selling shoddy or
defective goods at high prices to poor people who cannot afford them. . . and
then using the device of garnishment to force the courts and the employers to
do the bill collecting.
239. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 n.13 (1972); Comment, supra note
182, at 840.
One of the most heavily criticized results of the entire collection process occurs when
repossession, self-help or judicial, is followed by a deficiency judgment. If the collateral
is grossly undervalued, as is usually the case with nonautomobile consumer goods, see
note 233 supra, the deficiency claim will be inflated accordingly. Additionally, boiler-
plate in many installment contracts providing that the debtor is liable for reasonable
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The commentators are in agreement with creditors that state coer-
cion should be available against debtors who are able, but refuse, to
pay just debts due and owing.240 Undoubtedly it is true that judicious
use of leverage against the majority of debtors in default-those who
are not "deadbeats," but who nonetheless have no valid defense-re-
sults in some payments and a substantial number of voluntary sur-
renders of merchandise.241  "All too often, however, it is not the 'dead-
beat,' but rather the naive victim of the overreaching creditor, who is
subjected to the worst collection practices. '242  Given the cost ele-
ments described-the direct impact of loss of possession and use, the
leverage wielded by creditors, the barriers to redress-it seems impos-
sible to regard as less than substantial the individual consumer's interest
in preventing execution of a wrongful or meritless provisional writ.24 3
Moreover, if a recent estimate that "[alt least 20 percent of default
debtors interviewed had valid defenses' 244 is accurate, 2 " the equitable
and constitutional problems resulting from overbroad application of
legal expenses will further inflate the deficiency by the costs of the repossession, court
costs, and attorney's fees. It has not been unusual for the consumer to be finally liable
for more than the purchase price of goods which he no longer owns. See, e.g., NCCF
REPORT 28; B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER Cnorr CASES § 24 (1972);
Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the Under-
world and a Proposed Solution, 51 ORE. L. REv. 302 (1972); Jordan & Warren, supra
note 222, at 458; White, Representing the Low Income Consumer in Repossession, Re-
sales and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 808 (1970); Note, supra note
204, at 267-68. But cf. LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 2373 (West 1960).
240. See, e.g., Jordan & Warren, supra note 222, at 457 ("Coercion by the state ..
is defensible where the debtor can pay but will not, and the specter of the 'deadbeat'
is constantly invoked by creditors to justify tough collection remedies"); Kripke, supra
note 182, at 480-83; Williams, supra note 31, at 111; Project, supra note 182, at 894
n.64.
241. See text accompanying note 212 supra.
242. Jordan & Warren, supra note 222, at 457.
243. See note 202 supra and accompanying text.
244. Professor D. Caplovitz, quoted in Gansberg, Courts Are Held Creditors' Allies,
N.Y. Times, July 19, 1971, at 17, col. 3.
245. See Yudof, Reflections on Private Repossession, Public Policy and the Constitu-
tion, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 954, 969-70 (1974). But cf. Johnson, supra note 150, at 114;
White, supra note 40, at 526-27. In the context of automobile repossession, Professor
Johnson suggests that the large number of voluntary surrenders and default judgments
indicates that "only a small proportion of consumers in default appear to have a valid
defense." Johnson, supra note 150, at 114. In the same context, Professor White
doubts "that repossession from debtors not actually in default is a serious problem."
White, supra note 40, at 527. For criticism of Johnson, see Dauer & Gilhool, supra
note 221, in which the authors state that Johnson's conclusion that consumers in default
generally have no defense to offer is "patently. . . non sequitur." Id. at 143.
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prejudgment seizure without prior notice and hearing should be con-
spicuous.
3. Fuentes and Mitchell Compared
Mr. Justice White wrote in Arnett v. Kennedy24 that, in assessing
due process hearing requirements, the Court considers how the "legiti-
mate interests asserted" by both parties "would be furthered or hin-
dered. ' 247  His statement of principle makes even more remarkable the
stark contrast between the Fuentes Court's evaluation of the debtor's
interests and the treatment given the same interests in Mitchell. In
Fuentes, the debtor's property interest in chattels purchased by condi-
tional sale was said to be an interest sufficiently significant2 48 to
warrant due process protection from "substantively unfair or mis-
taken"249 encroachment. The debtor's interest was defined as an in-
terest in "continued possession and use."'250 The Court considered
with some particularity the hindrances resulting from summary sei-
zure.251  In Mitchell, the debtor's property interest was said to be a
heavily encumbered, defeasible "ownership. '2' 2  More explicitly, "un-
til the purchase price was paid in full," 25 the debtor's interest
was no greater than the surplus remaining, if any, after foreclosure and
sale of the property in the event of his default and satisfaction of out-
standing claims. 254
After reciting that a duality of interests existed, the Mitchell Court ex-
pansively appraised the ways in which Louisiana process promoted and
safeguarded the interests of both creditor and debtor.255 Nowhere in
the opinion was there a serious assessment of the significance of the
fact that the same procedure interfered with the debtor's interest in
continued possession and use. The interest-hindering impacts of lever-
age on low-income debtors and the barriers to redress were ignored."'
246. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Arnett was decided a month prior to Mitchell.
247. Id. at 188.
248. 407 U.S. at 86. See also Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 347
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (due process protects any property interest that is not
de minimis).
249. 407 U.S. at 81.
250. Id. at 81, 86.
251. Id. at 82-87.
252. 416 U.S. at 604.
253. id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 608-10, 616-20.
256. See text following note 224 supra.
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The direct impact of deprivation was said to carry little weight because
the debtor's basic source of income was unimpaired. 25 7  Moreover,
Mitchell's failure to pursue a hearing was evidence that the deprivation
was not severe.258
If the Fuentes Court was overly solicitous for the interests of low-
income debtors, the Mitchell Court was exceedingly indifferent to the
realities of consumer credit in low-income markets. The dollars-and-
cents definition of the consumer's interest ignores the effects of mini-
mal resale value.2 59 It is a definition more appropriate in a commercial
context in which bargaining power is more nearly equal. The Court's
evaluation of the debtor's interest overlooks the reality that "[t]he con-
sumer's usual interest in goods is a specialized consumptive interest"2 0
and represents a commercial or upper- and middle-income considera-
tion of what is essentially a lower-income problem.20 "
If an interest-balancing test for due process is to be achieved rather
than a "Procrustean rule' '20 2 of prior notice and hearing vel non, the
first step is for both factions of the Court to admit that they have been
guilty of tunnel vision. The result reached on particular facts is less
likely to depend on the manner in which interests are defined if the
interests of all parties to the issue-debtor, creditor, and state-are re-
alistically evaluated and compared, in the same case.20 8  This Note has
thus far evaluated the interests of debtors. To be sure, creditors and
the state both have interests that are furthered or hindered by proce-
dural rules; those interests are considered next.
B. The Creditor
As a matter of economics, the creditor's paramount interest under
his contract is in collecting the debt as soon as each installment be-
comes due with the expenditure of as little effort and money as possi-
ble.204  This interest is impaired by any procedural rule that directly
or indirectly operates to increase the creditor's costs, decrease the value
257. 416 U.S. at 610.
258. Id.
259. See notes 233 & 239 supra.
260. Hobbs, supra note 130, at 183.
261. Cf. Jordan & Warren, supra note 222, at 449.
262. Mr. Justice Powell's characterization of the holding in Fuentes. 416 U.S. at
628.
263. But see North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (U.S.
Jan. 22, 1975) (no balancing analysis).
264. Greenfield, supra note 207, at 8.
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of his security, delay the receipt of monies due, or interfere with his
collection efforts.
1. Interest in Avoiding Provisional Remedies
Most consumers pay their debts on time.265 If, however, an install-
ment debtor misses a payment or suspends payment altogether, the
least expensive and time-consuming collection methods are nonjudi-
cial-by letter, telephone call, and personal contact.2 6  The process
begins with several notice letters and, if payment is not forthcoming,
often may carry through a long and notorious checklist of coercive
tactics, depending on the scale and specialization of the creditor's col-
lection operation.20 7 Only after extrajudicial efforts fail to induce the
debtor to pay or make new financing arrangements 268 will the creditor
assign the account to a collection agency 2 69 or resort personally to the
more expensive and time-consuming judicial process. Of course, as le-
gal controls become more comprehensive, costs increase. 7 °
The Mitchell majority clearly believed that the increased cost of re-
sorting to judicial process "weighs heavily" to minimize the risk that
creditors will bring wrongful or mistaken suits.2 71 The almost uni-
versal first resort to nonjudicial methods testifies to the fact that, in
most cases,272 creditors stand to lose money if they must repossess.
2 7 1
265. See note 211 supra.
266. Greenfield, supra note 207, at 8; Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dy-
namics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970); Project, supra note 182, at 886.
Extrajudicial efforts are also less likely to alienate the consumer and are thus more fa-
vorable to future business. Id.
267. See generally Greenfield, supra note 207.
268. In 1968, about 10% of families with debt payments reported rescheduling such
payments, though not necessarily as a result of collection tactics. G. KATONA, L. MA'N-
DELL & J. SCHMIEDOSKAMP, 1970 SURVEY OF CONSUmR FNANcEs 34 (1970).
269. Smaller retailers with less elaborate collections operations often assign accounts
for collection earlier than their larger counterparts. "The collection agency is in a better
position to exert unwelcome pressure on the buyer, for the countervailing force of main-
taining the customer's good will is no bar to effective collection." Project, supra note
182, at 887; see FTC REPORT 34; Leff, supra note 266, at 35-36.
270. "[E]very nuance of regulation that forces individual handling or variation from
routine adds greatly to expense." Kripke, supra note 182, at 448.
271. 416 U.S. at 616-17; see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 100 (1972) (dissenting
opinion). This assumption seems to underlie much of Justice White's reasoning.
272. It has been argued that some retailers "gear their operations to repossess" in
order to profit from repossession and execution of a subsequent deficiency judgment. A
study suggests that although this is true for a "few sharp dealers," it is not generally
the case. See NCCF REPORT 28; Neth, supra note 165, at 29-30.
273. See White, supra note 40, at 527.
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Professor Kripke states the case less cautiously:
Even if every dollar of principal and finance charge is ultimately
realized by collection, an account that requires individual collection
handling yields a loss. 274
It is undoubtedly true that cost will deter creditors from suing on frivo-
lous claims and that a "creditor of institutional size [does not] deliber-
ately walk into a collection struggle at the inception of the credit
... . ,"25 The reality is, however, that sellers in low-income markets
rely heavily on efficient, high-volume collection techniques to minimize
the costs of using judicial remedies.276 Procedures are standardized and
"[c]reditor suits are often filed en masse with a pro forma recitation of
the claim. '277 Indeed, the National Commission on Consumer Fi-
nance's Report on Consumer Credit in the United States (NCCF Re-
port)
disclosed that creditors thought the single most important remedy or con-
tract provision in a secured consumer credit transaction was the right
to take a security interest in the goods . . . and the concomitant right
to repossess if the debtor defaulted.278
Given the leverage that can be achieved by summary seizure, or the
threat of it, and the barriers to contesting seizures experienced by
lower income debtors, the cost deterrent, though real, may be of much
smaller impact on creditors than the Mitchell majority believed. There
is evidence that many low-income market retailers use judicial reme-
dies against consumers who suspend payments as a "normal matter of
business rather than as a matter of last resort. 279
2. Impact of Depreciation
As a matter of theory, the greater the delay between the debtor's
discontinuation of payment and the seizure of the collateral by the
274. Kripke, supra note 182, at 448.
275. Id. (emphasis added).
276. Hobbs, supra note 130, at 184; Leff, supra note 266, at 22-23; Project, supra
note 182, at 885, 887-88.
277. Hobbs, supra note 130, at 184. But see Martin, Secured Transactions, 19
WAYNE L. REv. 593, 630 (1973): "Another probable result of required pre-seizure hear-
ings is the mass scheduling of pro forma hearings, with debtors routinely failing to appear
278. NCCF REPORT 29-30.
279. FTC REPORT at xiv-xv. The Report also states:
Low-income market retailers have every incentive to continue these [door-to-
door, sometimes deceptive and high-pressure sales] techniques since their risk
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creditor, the greater is the creditor's cost. Continued possession and
use by the consumer cause steady deterioration of the merchandise,
with resultant depreciation in resale value. 80  Creditors argue281 that,
because low-income debtors are often judgment proof, any deteriora-
tion in resale value pendente lite is an unrecoverable loss.282 If credi-
tors must absorb this loss, they insist that credit to low-income consum-
ers must be either curtailed or permitted to become more expensive.
In a commercial context or in the consumer automobile market, in
which the collateral is likely to have substantial value and the resale
market is lively, theory comports reasonably with reality. 28 3  In the
of loss is substantially reduced by their virtually unopposed access to judgment
and garnishment proceedings to enforce payment or secure repossession.
Id. at xv.
280. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 608 (1974); see Brief for General
Motors Acceptance Corp., et al., as Amici Curiae at 8, 13, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972).
The amici brief in Fuentes contains an interesting argument. It was suggested that
the delay of notice and hearing would impair "the use made of replevin to recover goods
from abandoned, boarded, locked premises whose continued presence is an open invita-
tion to theft." Id. at 8. There was no indication of the frequency with which this oc-
curs. Self-help repossession under UCC § 9-503 would seem to be available in this situ-
ation, but there is room for argument. The amici brief also argued that, in addition to
usual wear and tear, obsolescence and perishability were aggravated by delay. Id.
281. See, e.g., Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 278 n.12, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256 n.12,
96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 56 n.12 (1971).
282. Debtors may be "judgment proof" in several ways. In California, for example,
a secured creditor may proceed against a defaulting debtor either by disregarding the
security and suing directly on the debt or by repossession and foreclosure sale. If he
repossesses, any deficiency is lost because the alternatives are exclusive. CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 1812.2-.5 (Deering 1972). Of course, even if the creditor gets a judgment on
the debt, he may still be unable to find assets of the debtor sufficient to satisfy his judg-
ment. This is the traditional definition of "judgment proof." In those states in which
repossession and deficiency judgment are available, creditors would seem to be amply
protected from deterioration of security since any depreciation would turn up in the defi-
ciency. The only apparent cost differentials are the opportunity cost of any delay
caused by notice and hearing requirements prior to seizure and the risk that the defi-
ciency judgment will be uncollectable. Repossession and subsequent deficiency judgment
are often unmitigated disaster for the consumer, see note 239 supra, and the availability
of deficiency judgments is being limited in many states. For some effects of the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code and the National Consumer Act, see B. CLARK & J. FON-
sEcA, supra note 239, § 24, at 100-03; Neth, supra note 165, at 15-17.
283. See generally Johnson, supra note 150; White, supra note 40 (both articles deal
with automobile repossession).
A staff attorney for a large St. Louis general market retailer stated that about the only
item his company would consider repossessing judicially was a fur coat. Interview with
Anonymous Staff Attorney for a General Market Retail Corporation, in St. Louis, Mo.,
Aug. 5, 1974.
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household goods market, however, and especially in its low-income
segment, relatively low initial cost of merchandise, very low or null re-
sale values, and nonexistent resale markets undermine the argument
that depreciation pendente lite is a serious problem. If a $400 washing
machine is "worth" $200 the day after purchase, but is perhaps unsal-
able at a cash price of even $100, it is doubtful that it would further
depreciate more than marginally during the delay necessary for notice
and hearing. 284  If it is true that the real value of judicial repossession
in this market is in leverage and the credibility gained by an occasional
seizure in terrorem,2 s5 the depreciation argument all but vanishes, leav-
ing exposed the somewhat less savory, but nonetheless valuable, cred-
itor interest in judicial process for its coercive effect.28 6
Alternatives less onerous than summary deprivation give ample pro-
tection to this interest of creditors. Although the leverage obtained
by mere availability of provisional seizure would be weakened some-
what by preseizure notice and hearing requirements, 87 it seems that
creditors could maintain the credibility of their repossession threats as
well in such a procedure as in one permitting summary seizure. If de-
preciation pendente lite is seen as a realistic consideration,"" a provi-
sion requiring the debtor to post bond in the amount of the deprecia-
tion expected would adequately protect the creditor's interest.280 The
California Supreme Court suggested what is the most rational alterna-
tive, however, when it said that
284. Some used goods are practically worthless on the resale market and would not
bring proceeds sufficient to pay the costs of seizure. See note 233 supra. Creditors
obviously would not cause judicial repossession of such merchandise but for the il ter-
rorem effect. In such a case, a depreciation argument is clearly frivolous since what
is already worthless cannot depreciate further.
285. See notes 233-39 supra and accompanying text.
286. For the implication that the small minority of defaulting debtors fairly capable
of characterization as "deadbeats" (those who can afford to pay legitimate debts but re-
fuse to do so) deserve whatever coercion they sustain, see Jordan & Warren, supra note
222, at 457; Project, supra note 182, at 894 n.64; note 194 supra.
287. Presumably notice and hearing requirements would deter wrongful and mistaken
writs, which are more likely to result in summary seizure where no such requirements
exist. See notes 345-53 infra and accompanying text.
288. The limiting case occurs when the creditor determines that his debtor in default
has no potential for paying, his assets are insufficient to warrant bringing a deficiency
suit, or the resale value of the merchandise is less than the costs of seizure and lost
good will. See Project, supra note 182, at 894.
289. See Hobbs, supra note 130, at 184. Typical release bond provisions operate in
practice to strengthen creditor leverage. See notes 144-71 supra and accompanying text.
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the answer . . . is not to deprive the debtor of a hearing but to provide
him with an expeditious one so that the property may be quickly re-
covered. 290
3. Risks of Debtor Misconduct
State recognition of the creditor's interest in protecting his security
from debtor misconduct pendente lite is demonstrated by the availabil-
ity of the various provisional remedies. In addition to preventing de-
preciation pendente lite, seizure without warning is said to prevent the
debtor from concealing, transferring, destroying, removing, or other-
wise disposing of the collateral, or absconding with it, before the credi-
tor can obtain judgment and execution.2 " The Fuentes and Mitchell
290. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 278 n.12, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256 n.12, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 56 n.12 (1971).
291. Although there are distinctions in the purposes of, and specific property affected
by, each of the prejudgment seizure remedies made available by the various states, the
statutes generally either imply or expressly provide for protection from debtor miscon-
duct.
Attachment is the seizure of property out of a debtor's general assets to secure a claim
in event of judgment where, inter alia, the defendant has assigned, disposed of, secreted,
absconded with, or committed some fraudulent act in order to put the property beyond
the reach of creditors, or is about to do any of the foregoing. E.g., IND. CODE § 34-
1-11-1 (Burns 1973); LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3541 (West 1961); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 521.010 (1969); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2715.01 (Page 1954, Supp. 1973); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-520 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. H9 7.12.020(4)-(8) (1961, Supp. 1973);
see S. REISENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PRO-
TECTION 180-81 (1967); Countryman, supra note 14, at 523-24.
Replevin is the seizure of specific chattels wrongfully detained, in which the creditor
has a property interest; this remedy is used to recover purchase money collateral.
Claim and delivery, the statutory twin of replevin, also permits recovery of value when
delivery of specific property is impossible. Although simple default and refusal by a
debtor to redeliver the property are sufficient to ground the actions, both actions are
founded in theory on tortious detention and imply protection from debtor misconduct.
But see text accompanying notes 112-13 supra. In Missouri, for example, replevin lies
if, inter alia, "plaintiff will be in danger of losing his said property, unless it be taken
out of the possession of the defendant or otherwise secured." Mo. REv. STAT. §
533.010(5) (1969). After the decision in Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d
1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971), California modified its claim and delivery statute to re-
quire a preseizure hearing unless, inter alia,
[tihere is [probable cause shown of] an immediate danger that the property
will become unavailable to levy by reason of being transferred, concealed, or
removed. . . or will become substantially impaired in value by acts of destruc-
tion or by failure to take care. . . in a reasonable manner ....
CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 512.020(b)(3)(ii) (Deering Supp. 1974).
Detinue, like replevin, is the seizure of specific chattels wrongfully detained. Origi-
nally distinguishable from replevin in that detinue would lie for goods obtained right-
fully, whereas replevin would lie only for goods wrongfully taken, detinue permits chat-
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opinions both recognized the substantive legitimacy of this creditor in-
terest. The procedural emphasis in the two opinions, however, was
quite different. In Fuentes, the Court stated that under the standards
of a narrowly drawn statute, "special situations demanding prompt ac-
tion" could be grounds for seizure without prior notice and hearing.2 2
Thus, in the unusual situation "in which [the] creditor could make a
showing of [an] immediate danger" of debtor misconduct, summary
seizure might comport with due process.2 3 In Mitchell, the Court
stated, as a preliminary to balancing interests, that the risks of debtor
tels to remain- in the possession of defendant pendente lite. Today detinue is used for
the same purposes as replevin and permits summary prejudgment seizure. A seizure or-
der may, in Virginia for example, be issued by a judge or magistrate ex parte, if, inter
alia,
there shall appear from [the] evidence . . . (ii)(A) that such property will
be sold, removed, secreted, or otherwise disposed of by the defendant ... or
(B) that such property will be destroyed or materially damaged ... if permit-
ted to remain longer in possession of such defendant ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-586(b) (Supp. 1974). See generally 26A C.J.S. Detinue § 1
(1956); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.13 (1973).
Sequestration seizes or sets apart specific property that is the subject of conflicting
claims; it is used generally in civil law jurisdictions to accomplish the same purposes
as replevin by providing for summary seizure prior to judgment. In Texas, for example,
sequestration may issue if, inter alia, plaintiff
makes oath that he fears the defendant . . .will injure, ill-treat, waste or de-
stroy, or remove the same out of the county during pendency of the suit.
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840(3) (1960); see LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3571
(West 1961); 70 AM. Jti. 2D Sequestration § 6 (1973).
Although there is no self-help repossession in Louisiana, see LA. REV. STAT. §§
9:4562-64, 13:3851 (1950); Thomas v. Werein, 181 La. 104, 158 So. 635 (1935); cf.
Brandeson v. International Harvester Corp., 223 La. 504, 66 So. 2d 317 (1953); More-
lock v. Morgan & Bird Gravel Co., 174 La. 658, 141 So. 368 (1931), in other states
the UCC permits self-help repossession on contractually defined grounds that are anal-
ogous to debtor misconduct in judicial repossession. UCC § 1-208 authorizes the use
of an "insecurity clause," which provides that the creditor may accelerate the maturity
of the entire debt whenever he "deems himself insecure." If the creditor fears debtor
misconduct, he presumably "deems himself insecure" and may accelerate. If the debtor
is caught by surprise, he is likely to default, which triggers the creditor's right to self-
help repossession under UCC H§ 9-501 to -507. Use of the insecurity clause in con-
sumer contracts is widespread, and its frequency increases as the debtor's bargaining po-
sition is weaker. See 2 G. GILMORE, -supra note 176, at 1195-99; J. WhiTE & R. SuM-
MERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 954-75 (1972).
292. 407 U.S. at 93. That is, the situation is an "extraordinary" one and due process
protection may be postponed. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
293. 407 U.S. at 93. It is unclear whether such a showing under a narrowly defined
statute is a sufficient, or merely a necessary, condition to seizure without prior notice
and hearing. Cf. Clark & Landers, supra note 199, at 363. In Fuentes, the Florida
and Pennsylvania statutes were held to be insufficiently narrow to meet only such an
"unusual condition." 407 U.S. at 93,
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misconduct are real, exacerbated by the warning effect of preseizure
notice, and compounded in Louisiana by expiration of the "vendor's
lien" if the debtor transfers possession.2 94 The risks of debtor miscon-
duct and the impact of those risks on the interests of creditors, in Louisi-
ana in particular, deserve further consideration.
a. Loss by Transfer
The conditional sale, in which the seller retains title until the pur-
chase price is paid,295 is impossible under the civil law of Louisiana.
Vesting of title is said to be the essence of a sale, and divided incidents
of ownership are not recognized.296 The installment seller is not left
without security, however, for the Louisiana seller is by statute afforded
a privilege on the property sold, analogous to the UCC security inter-
est, "9 7 to the extent of the unpaid purchase price.29 The seller's
privilege on personalty is a "substantive right" incident to the sales
294. 416 U.S. at 608-09.
295. For a statutory definition, see UNIFoRm CONDTOqAL SALES ACT § 1. See gen-
erally I G. GILMORE, supra note 176, at 62-85; J. WHra' & R. SUMMERS, supra note
291, at 755-56.
296. See Comment, The Conditional Sale in Louisiana, 2 LA. L. REV. 338, 340
(1940) (cases cited).
297. UCC § 1-201(37): "'Security interest' means an interest in personal property
* . . which secures payment or performance of an obligation .... " See text accom-
panying note 308 infra.
Terms used in Mitchell by the Supreme Courts of the United States and Louisiana
may be confusing. The United States Supreme Court called the privilege a "seller's ven-
dor's lien." 416 U.S. at 609. The Louisiana court distinguished the common law ven-
dor's lien from the privilege, 263 La. at 637, 269 So. 2d at 189, by pointing out that
the former is lost when the vendor delivers possession to the buyer, but the latter is cre-
ated by the same act. The Louisiana court correctly defined the traditional, common
law lien; however, the modem tendency is to refer to a lien as a charge on the buyer's
property that must be satisfied before the property is available to general creditors. See
D. EPSTEIN, DEETOR-CREDrrOR LAW IN A NuTSHELL 3, 74-76 (1973).
298. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3217 (West 1952) provides:
The debts which are privileged on certain movables, are the following:
7. The price due on movable effects, if they are yet in the possession of
the purchaser.
Id. art. 3227 provides:
He who has sold to another any movable property, which is not paid for,
has a preference on the price of his property, over the other creditors of the
purchaser, whether the sale was made on a credit or without, if the property
still remains in the possession of the purchaser.
The seller is also given statutory protection called a "resultory condition," which permits
him to dissolve the contract if the buyer defaults. See id. arts. 2561-64; Comment, supra
note 296, at 346.
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contract 9 and gives him an assurance of payment even if nonpriv-
ileged creditors receive nothing.300 The privilege may be exercised
only so long as the personalty sold remains in the buyer's possession.30 1
If the seller desires security against third party assignees of the buyer,
he must protect himself by taking a chattel mortgage.3 0 2 Upon re-
cordation, the lien arising therefrom is "superior in rank to any privi-
lege or lien arising subsequently thereto." 08
In UCC states, creditors are subject to hazards similar to expiration
of the vendor's privilege in Louisiana. Like civil law sales, UCC sales
may be for cash or on credit; credit sales may be secured or unsecured.
Unlike the civil law vendor, the unsecured UCC seller has no "privi-
lege": he has only the buyer's promise to pay the price.,30 4  If the buyer
defaults, the unsecured seller has a limited right to reclaim the goods;
generally he must sue for the price. 0 5 Further, the unsecured seller's
299. W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 636, 269 So. 2d 186, 189 (1972).
300. LA. Cirv. CODE ANN. arts. 3217, 3227 (West 1952), quoted in note 298 supra;
see Dainow, Ranking Problems of Chattel Mortgages and Civil Code Privileges in Louis-
iana Law, 13, LA. L. REV. 537, 538, 545-46 (1953); Comment, Vendor's Privilege, 4 TUL.
L. Rnv. 239 (1930).
301. 263 La. at 636, 269 So. 2d at 189; LA. Cirv. CODE ANN. arts. 3217(7), 3227
(West 1952); see Dainow, supra note 300, at 545; Comment, supra note 296, at 346
(and cases cited); Comment, supra note 300.
302. LA. REv. STAT. § 9:5354 (1950); see Daggett, The Chattel Mortgage in Lou-
isiana, 13 TUL. L. REV. 234 (1939); Comment, supra note 296, at 346.
303. Daggett, supra note 302, at 234. As long as the chattel remains in the hands
of the original vendee, an unrecorded vendor's privilege is superior to a subsequently re-
corded chattel mortgage. Id.
304. The rights of sellers in unsecured sales are governed by UCC art. 2. See gener-
ally W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACrIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(1964); R. NoRDSToM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALs (1970); J. WHITE, & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 291, at 21-396.
305. A cash-sale buyer's default can occur if, for example, subsequent to delivery the
buyer's check is dishonored, the "cash" is counterfeit, or the buyer tendered in exchange
goods in which he had no title. In the case of dishonor of the buyer's check, the cash
seller may sue for the price, UCC § 2-709, or on the check, id. § 3-413, or reclaim the
goods, id. § 2-507(2).
More commonly, the unsecured sale is on credit. If the buyer is insolvent, the seller
may reclaim the goods under UCC § 2-702(2). Otherwise, the seller's only recourse,
other than an action for the price, lies in the remedies indexed in § 2-703. That section
permits cancellation of the contract, and perhaps return of the goods, if the buyer's con-
duct in default is within one of four categories. The usual case in which the buyer has
taken delivery and subsequently fails to pay is not within any of these categories. The
unsecured creditor is therefore limited to his action for the price and, unlike the Louisi-
ana seller, his legal position is indistinguishable from other creditors of the buyer. See
W. HAwKLAND, supra note 304, at 298-301; R. NORDsTRoM, supra note 304, at 498-503.
Compare -the Louisiana remedy called a resultory condition, note 298 supra.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
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rights in the goods sold are restricted by the protection the UCC affords
good faith purchasers for value.310 Under UCC section 2-403, if a
debtor with voidable title transfers the goods to a good faith purchaser
for value, any right the seller may have had to reclaim the goods is lost,
for the third party purchaser has priority.30 7
If the credit sale under the UCC is secured,3" 8 the seller may take
an interest in the goods sold that is perhaps more nearly analogous
to the privilege than is the unsecured seller's limited right to reclaim.
Like the holder of a Louisiana chattel mortgage,30 9 the UCC seller with
a perfected security interest 310 in the goods generally has the right on
default to proceed against the goods,311 to take the collateral free from
the claims of general, and later secured, creditors,312 and to be pro-
tected against third party purchasers. 313 There are, however, several
special UCC provisions relevant to consumer goods. 14 Although the
most common and most important method of perfecting an article 9
security interest is the filing of a financing statement,31 5 purchase
money security interests in nonautomobile consumer goods316 are auto-
matically perfected at the time of creation without further action by
306. See UCC §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(b) ("good faith"); id. §§ 1-201(32), (33)
("purchaser"); id. § 1-201(44) ("value").
307. A buyer's title may be voidable because his seller has a right to reclaim under
UCC § 2-507 (cash sale) or § 2-702 (credit sale), see note 305 supra. See R. NoRD-
sTRoM, supra note 304, at 511-18.
308. The rights of sellers in secured sales are governed primarily by UCC art. 9. See
generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 176; J. WHrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 291, at
754-1007.
309. See generally Daggett, supra note 302.
310. See UCC §§ 1-201(37), 9-107. A security interest is ordinarily perfected by
making a public filing or by taking possession of the collateral. Id. § 9-302(1). But
see id. § 9-302(1)(d); text accompanying note 317 infra. See generally UCC art. 9,
pts. 1 & 4.
311. See generally UCC art. 9, pts. 2 & 5.
312. See id. art. 9, pt. 3.
313. See id. §§ 9-201, -306(2), -307.
314. "Consumer goods" are defined in UCC § 9-109(1) as goods that "are used or
bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes .
315. J. WHrra & R. SuMMERs, supra note 291, at 796.
316. UCC § 9-107 states:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that
it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part
of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obliga-
tion gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral if such value is in fact so used.
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the creditor.317  The creditor holding a security interest perfected with-
out filing enjoys the same rights in his collateral as does the creditor
whose interest was perfected by filing or taking possession, except for
a transaction relevant to this discussion. Unless a creditor holding a
purchase money security interest in consumer goods files a financing
statement, a qualifying third party purchaser may, under UCC section
9-307(2), take the collateral free of the creditor's security interest.8 1 8
Such a security interest is lost in nearly the same manner as the Louisi-
ana vendor's privilege is lost;8 19 it may be protected in much the same
way that a privilege may be converted into a chattel mortgage; 20 and
the reason why ultimate protection is not always sought by sellers is
much the same in both cases.8 21
Thus, both the UCC creditor with a perfected but unfiled security
interest and the Louisiana creditor with less than a properly recorded
chattel mortgage have an interest in preventing possible transfer of con-
sumer goods by the debtor. In fact, the unsecured UCC creditor has
317. UCC § 9-302(1)(d); see J. WHTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 291, at 797.
318. UCC § 9-307(2) provides:
In the case of consumer goods, a buyer takes free of a security interest even
though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security interest, for
value and for his own personal, family or household purposes unless prior to
the purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement covering such
goods.
This section applies primarily to the situation in which one consumer sells used goods
to another consumer. For explication see 2 G. Gmmom, supra note 176, at 715-17;
J. WHrra & R. SUMMERS, supra note 291, at 943-44; Vernon, Priorities, The Uniforn
Commercial Code and Consumer Financing, 4 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 531 (1963).
319. That is, when the debtor transfers. The UCC provision does not protect third
party dealers since the purchase must be for the buyer's "own personal, family or house-
hold purposes. . . ." UCC § 9-307(2), quoted in note 318 supra.
320. The analogy is not perfect. The privilege attaches absent contractual provisions
while the security interest must be provided for in the contract. A privilege does not
become a chattel mortgage merely by recording; the chattel mortgage too is contractual
and must be recorded.
If the secured UCC seller chooses not to rely on automatic perfection and instead
files a financing statement, he will have complete protection against all unauthorized
buyers, absent preclusion by waiver or estoppel. See 2 G. GiLMORE, supra note 176,
at 716.
321. This reason, also a prime rationale of the UCC's provision for automatic perfec-
tion, was well expressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Mitchell:
The formality, time and expense involved in executing and recording chattel
mortgages often prevent their use, particularly on small, inexpensive chattels
or where the vendor neglects or is prevented from using the chattel mortgage.
263 La. at 637, 269 So. 2d at 189. For discussion of the rationale of automatic perfec-
tion, see I. WMTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 291, at 798-99.
[Vol. 1974:653
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES AND DUE PROCESS
less protection than his "privileged" counterpart in Louisiana.3 22 It fol-
lows that the argument implicit in the Mitchell opinion that creditors
have less protection from debtor transfers in Louisiana than in UCC
states323 is not persuasive, since transfers likely to be made by con-
sumers in default produce similar results3 24 under both systems.
No data have been found that would indicate the frequency with
which debtors make unauthorized transfers of consumer goods on which
they still owe money. Of those transfers that do occur, some are un-
doubtedly made by good faith debtors out of ignorance of contract re-
sponsibilities.122  It is also probably true that some debtors 21 postpone
the inevitable by transferring collateral one step ahead of the sheriff,
thereby forcing both UCC and Louisiana creditors to sue on the
debt.327  Available data indicate, however, that the profile of the de-
faulting debtor is generally one of good faith inability to pay rather than
of the deadbeat.328  It would seem to follow that, if and when transfers
take place, the majority are probably not in bad faith. Particularly in
low-income markets, the nature of the consumer goods sold and the
general lack of resale markets for those goods329 imply further that
there are probably very few such transfers made in good faith or in
bad, and that the creditor's risk of losing his collateral to a third party
is probably not very great.33 '
b. Loss by Removal
Another facet of debtor misconduct recognized in many statutes and
argued by creditors is the risk that the debtor will remove the collateral
from the reach of process, that is, the debtor will abscond.3 1 It is obvi-
322. See note 305 supra and accompanying text.
323. 416 U.S. at 607-10.
324. That is to say, a seller is remitted to suing on the debt and must take his place
with other general creditors.
325. Ci. text accompanying notes 188 & 223 supra.
326. See note 286 supra.
327. Cf. note 286 supra. But cf. text accompanying note 223 supra.
328. See note 182 supra and accompanying text.
329. See notes 203 & 233 supra and accompanying text.
330. See Comment, supra note 175, at 816. The writer suggests that the creditor's
risk be further discounted since, if he is vulnerable to a transfer, he has "not availed
himself of the methods provided by law that insure his right of pursuit." Id.; cf. text
accompanying note 177 supra. But cf. note 209 supra, and accompanying text.
331. Insofar as the debtor may conceal himself or leave the jurisdiction to avoid proc-
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ous that the most ironclad security agreement is worthless for reclaim-
ing property if a writ of execution is returned "nulla bona" by the sher-
iff. Creditors, therefore, have an interest in preventing debtors from
removing property, and, so the argument goes, this interest is protected
by summary seizure.132
In an individual case there well might be a real danger that a debtor
has removed, or is about to remove, the collateral.338  It is not clear,
however, that seizure without prior notice and hearing will protect
against this risk. If the debtor intends to abscond, he will have had am-
ple opportunity to do so before the sheriff arrives; 334 the debtor is the
first to know of a default. If the debtor has withstood the routine pano-
ply of private collection efforts without removing the collateral, it is not
compelling to argue that he will abscond on receipt of court papers an-
nouncing suit, hearing, and possible seizure. 35 Moreover, if the debtor
is unable to pay his debt, it seems unlikely that he could afford to re-
move the property from the jurisdiction. Generally, the average debtor
most often subject to legal process is a member of lower income and
minority groups who has lived in the same area for a long time and
whose stability makes him amenable to execution levy.8 0 In a recent
ess, the use of provisional remedies to secure the court's jurisdiction is not here consid-
ered. This Note's concern is with the unreliable defendant and the collateral, rather than
with the unavailable defendant and jurisdiction. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94
(1921); Clark & Landers, supra note 199, at 366-71.
332. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1970); Santiago v. Mc-
Elroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 293-95 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Supe-
rior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 556-57, 488 P.2d 13, 26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 722 (1971); Cedar
Rapids Eng'r Co. v. Haenelt, 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 277, 333 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (1972);
Gardner, Fuentes v. Shevin: The New York Creditor and Replevin, 22 BuFFALo L. REv.
17, 35 (1972).
333. During oral argument before the Court in Mitchell, Mr. Justice Rehnquist said:
"Notice and hearing also give an opportunity to debtors to spirit chattels away. Expe-
rience with this type of practice shows that the stuff disappears." 42 U.S.L.W. 3345
(U.S. Dec. 11, 1973).
334. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 278-79, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256-57, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 56-57 (1971).
335. See White, supra note 40, at 515; Note, supra note 204, at 268. In the former
article, Professor White suggests that although receipt of court papers motivates some
to abscond, the papers motivate others to pay. White, supra.
336. See Comment, supra note 182, at 845-46; Project, supra note 189, at 927. One
writer quotes a veteran collector as follows:
The argument that prejudgment garnishment is necessary to catch someone
about to leave town is a lot of bunk. I know of only one such case in forty-
five years experience.
Note, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. Rav. 743,
7,53 (1968).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
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case, the California Supreme Court noted that no exigency exists in the
"vast majority" of cases. 337
c. Loss by Destruction or Concealment
Two other classes of debtor misconduct often mentioned are destruc-
tion and concealment. One can only guess at the frequency with which
debtors maliciously destroy collateral out of spite.3 8 If consid-
eration is limited to those cases involving consumer goods and lower
income debtors, the general importance of the collateral to the
debtor 39 ought to resolve ipso facto the question of how great is the
creditor's risk. Would a debtor destroy his own refrigerator?
Concealment of assets is perhaps the most realistic option for a bad
faith debtor fearful of repossession. Concealment, however, means
loss of use, which raises the same questions of debtor impact as sei-
zure."' ° Given the impracticality of hiding household goods, it is ques-
tionable whether this risk is sufficiently large to warrant inclusion in
the due process balance as a significant hindrance to creditor interests.
d. Warning
Even if it be taken as true that bad faith debtors pose a signifi-
cant threat to creditor interests, it should be reemphasized that the
interests of creditors in preventing misconduct are not being evaluated
to determine if prejudgment seizure should be abolished. What should
be assessed is the impact on the incidence of misconduct effected by
granting notice and a hearing prior to prejudgment seizure. In
Mitchell, the Court agreed with the creditor's argument by taking the
following position:
The danger of destruction or alienation cannot be guarded against if
notice and a hearing before seizure are supplied. The notice itself may
337. Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 558, 488 P.2d
13, 27, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 723 (1971). To the absconding-debtor argument, the court
in MacQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 1972), replied: "'Emer-
gency!' is the cry of intuition rather than reason." For an evaluation of what New York
courts consider to be "exigent circumstances," see Gardner, supra note 332, at 33-35.
The risk of the absconding debtor is much greater in the commercial context, in which
replevin can be used, for example, to seize easily removed stock certificates, securities,
or commercial paper.
338. Cf. Leff, supra note 266, at 18-19.
339. See generally notes 198-220 supra and accompanying text.
340. See text accompanying notes 198-205 supra.
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furnish a warning to the debtor acting in bad faith.341
Notice and hearing would no doubt impress a bad faith debtor with
the seriousness of the creditor's intention to press ahead with collection.
But it is also true -that notice and hearing would not be the first warn-
ing received by the debtor. Since private collection efforts are less ex-
pensive than judicial remedies, creditors almost always make extensive
use of delinquency notices, personal letters, the telephone, personal
visits, and negotiation before resorting to the judicial process.8 42 Pro-
fessor Johnson's study indicates that the average repossession is pre-
ceded by thirty-four contacts between the creditor and the debtor.3'13
The conclusion reached by the California Supreme Court seems ines-
capable:
If the debtor wishes to abscond with the property [or conceal, destroy,
or transfer it], he will have had more than ample opportunity to do so
long before the claim and delivery process is initiated. Affording
alleged debtors a hearing on the merits prior to seizure of their property
will not substantially increase the risk that they "Shall fold their tents,
like the Arabs, And as silently steal away."1
3 44
4. Loss of Leverage
One suspects that the genuine creditor interest hindered by the
provision of preseizure notice and hearing is the leverage gained by
341. 416 U.S. at 609.
342. See notes 266-69 supra and accompanying text.
Professor Leff suggests that in some cases in which businesses combine large volume
collection with no concern about business reputation, it "may be cheaper overall to
standardize all activities and 'go to law' immediately in every case, without regard to
the specific facts of the specific debtor's problem." Leff, supra note 266, at 22-23 (foot-
note omitted).
343. Johnson, supra note 150, at 94, citing CONSUMER BANKERS Ass'N, REPOSSESSION
SURvEY FOR THE YEAR 1971.
344. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 278, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42,
56 (1971), quoting, Longfellow, The Day Is Done (1845).
The creditor's rebuttal to the argument in text was well stated in Brief for General
Motors Acceptance Corp., et al., as Amici Curiae at 14, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972):
Experience of these amici dictate [sic] that any notice of an impending replev-
in results in destruction, removal or disappearance of the chattel in a high per-
centage of instances. The bill-collection demands which are made often and
with some persistence prior to any replevin, serve only to notify the debtor that
immediate action will be taken but apparently does [sic] not convince him, as
the real and close threat of immediate repossession seems to do, to destroy,
sell or secrete the security.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
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aeizure, rather than protection against debtor misconduct.3 45  Unless
the protection from coercion inherent in the due process clause846 has
been emasculated, it is doubtful that the interest of creditors in protect-
ing their leverage is sufficiently legitimate to warrant due process pro-
tection; this is especially true when there is no concomitant requirement
that debtor misconduct be shown to have occurred or be imminent. By
requiring preseizure notice and hearing unless, inter alia, the creditor
can show an immediate danger of misconduct, Fuentes 47 in effect par-
tially severed the misconduct interest from the leverage interest.3 48
Mitchell unmistakably reunites them. For sequestration in Louisiana,
an immediate danger of debtor misconduct need not be shown. Se-
questration can issue merely "if it is within the power of the defendant
to conceal, dispose of, ... waste . . . or remove the property
.... ,$4 With respect to household goods, this is obviously no re-
quirement at all since a creditor can always truthfully swear to the exist-
ence of the debtor's power of misconduct. 350 The Mitchell Court's ac-
345. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 235, at 91 n.37; Comment, su-
pra note 182, at 846; text accompanying notes 232-38 supra.
346. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1969); cf. Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972).
347. See text accompanying note 293 supra.
348. Leverage is reduced if the debtor is informed of the seizure and granted an op-
portunity to contest it.
349. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961) (emphasis added) (grounds
for sequestration). Prior to revision of the statute, in order for sequestration to issue,
the creditor was required to have "good reason to fear" that the debtor would perform
some act that would deprive him of the property. Id., Comment (a). The revision pro-
vides "the more liberal requirement that the detrimental act be 'within the power' of the
defendant. . . so that no longer is the apprehensiveness of the plaintiff at issue." John-
son. supra note 1, at 15. It is interesting to note that the corresponding grounds for
issuance of a writ of attachment are that the debtor has engaged, or is about to engage,
in misconduct with intent to defraud or give a preference to one or more of his credi-
tors. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. arts. 3541(2)-(3) (West 1961). Apparently the burden
on the creditor is lighter in sequestration because of the alleged interest in the specific
property to be seized. See Anderson & L'Enfant, supra note 175, at 76-77; Comment,
supra note 175, at 814.
It might be noted that, apparently to be on the safe side, the creditor in Mitchell as-
serted reason to believe that the debtor would "encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose
of the merchandise. . . during the pendency of [the] proceedings .... "416 U.S. at
602.
350. Cf. Young v. Guess & Swanson, 115 La. 230, 38 So. 975 (1905). The colloquy
between the creditor's counsel and Justices Stewart and Marshall during oral argument
in Mitchell is illustrative:
Mr. O'Sullivan: "[Tihis case falls within the exception to Fuentes because
a creditor may make a showing of the possibility of destruction of the chattels."
Mr. Justice Stewart: "What in this case shows that?"Washington University Open Scholarship
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ceptance of this "requirement" as a reflection of the creditor's miscon-
duct interest permits reinjection of the leverage interest into the balanc-
ing equation without so much as an allegation of misconductY81
Plainly, debtor misconduct hinders creditor interests; if a showing of
misconduct is made, the leverage obtained incident to the availability
of a misconduct seizure is easily justified. The low incidence of debtor
misconduct implies, however, that the rule in Mitchell giving substan-
tial weight to creditors' interests in avoiding misconduct 5 2 actually
protects the leverage interest. The legitimate creditor interest in pro-
tection from debtor misconduct would be fairly preserved by limiting
misconduct seizures to those individual cases in which the showing re-
quired by Fuentes can be made.3 53
Mr. O'Sullivan: "The uncontradicted allegations that the property may be
destroyed."
"Isn't that part of a form routinely used in Louisiana?"
"I don't know."
"Suppose it was, would it make any difference?"
"Yes, there must be something more than a pro forma showing."
"Wasn't it pro forma here?"
"It may have been.. .. "
Mr. Justice Marshall: "In the appendix to the petition ... it appears that
a form was indeed used by the creditor in this case in seeking the writ. Do
you now agree that the allegations were made on a form?"
Mr. O'Sullivan: "Yes, sir."
42 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1973).
351. The Mitchell opinion assumed that debtor misconduct might occur and, as a
general rule, weighed the possibility in the due process balance; the Fuentes opinion as-
sumed that debtor misconduct would not occur unless shown in the individual case. See
text accompanying notes 291-94 supra.
352. See text accompanying note 294 supra. But see note 344 supra.
353. But see Williams, supra note 31, at 111:
If a realignment of debtor-creditor law requires that the debtor be protected
against unscrupulous creditors, it conversely should require that creditor and
public interests be protected against unscrupulous debtors.
In Randone the court did not doubt that the legislature could draft a constitutional
statute which would
permit attachment before notice in exceptional cases where, for example, the
creditor can additionally demonstrate before a magistrate that an actual risk
has arisen that assets will be concealed or that the debtor will abscond.
Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 563, 488 P.2d 13, 31,
96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 727 (1971). Professors Clark and Landers argue that, in addition
to documentary symptoms of debtor misconduct, the creditor should be required, inter
alia, to show that there are no other assets from which a judgment could be satisfied.
Clark & Landers, supra note 199, at 369-70.
For consideration of what the creditor must allege in New York, see Cedar Rapids
Eng'r Co. v. Haenelt, 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 333 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1972); Finkenberg Furni-
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5. Costs of Notice and Hearing
Perhaps the most obvious creditor interest in maintaining provisional
remedies without prior notice and hearing inheres in the fact that as
procedures become more elaborate, costs and difficulty increase and
the creditor's return from using the legal system goes down.354 The
additional cost increments of more process are both explicit and im-
plicit.
In the general case in most states, a creditor may obtain a provisional
seizure simply by filing a complaint accompanied by an application and
affidavit asking for issuance of a seizure writ.355 Additionally, the
creditor must post bond35" and pay for service and execution of the
writ.357  The complaints and affidavits may be "mass produced," and
plaintiff need not send a witness to court. Although Fuentes has not
been decided long enough for the exact nature of the required hearing
to emerge, if a preseizure hearing is necessary, the creditor must incur
the added cost of making the requisite showing that the seizure writ
should issue. 3" The explicit costs include the increased legal costs of
pleading with greater specificity, the cost of sending a witness to court,
and delay. Implicit costs result from decreased ability to mass produce
complaints and affidavits, lost leverage, and decreased recoveries 359 -
ture Corp. v. Vasquez, 67 Misc. 2d 154, 324 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Gardner,
supra note 332, at 33-34.
354. Cf. Project, supra note 182, at 891.
355. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 918 (1960) (statutory detinue), held unconstitu-
tional in Yates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 362 F. Supp. 520 (M.D. Ala. 1973), and Ander-
son v. Barnett First Nat'l Bank, 60 F.R.D. 104 (M.D. Ala. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
11, §§ 1, 2, 2a (Smith-Hurd 1963) (attachment); LA. CoDE CIrv. PRO. ANN. arts. 3501,
3571 (West 1961) (sequestration); Mo. REV. STAT. § 533.010 (1969) (replevin); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.64.010-.020 (1961) (claim and delivery).
For data on the cost of using judicial repossession in California and Louisiana, see
Johnson, supra note 150, at 98 n.40.
356. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 7, § 918 (1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11, §§ 4a, 4b,
5 (Smith-Hurd 1963); LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. arts. 3501, 3544, 3574 (West 1961);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 533.030 (1969); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.64.030 (1961).
357. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 533.210 (1969). For examples of costs involved
see White, supra note 40, at 517 n.47.
358. In the context of automobile repossessions, see Johnson, supra note 150; White,
supra note 40.
359. Creditors with marginal collateral who doubt that debtor's assets are sufficient
to warrant carrying the suit to judgment and attempted execution may simply write off
the debt. Recoveries will be diminished generally if the opportunity for a hearing en-
courages more debtors having defenses to contest seizure. Also, fewer summary seizures
will be granted. See Gardner, supra note 332, at 29-30; cf. Brunn, Wage Garnishment
Vol. 1974:653] 715
Washington University Open Scholarship
716 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
that is to say, the increased cost of requiring the creditor to shoulder
the additional procedural burden.3 10
The magnitude of these cost increases would be allayed by at least
two factors. First, not all and perhaps very few cases would result in
a full contest at the preseizure hearing. More probably, as Fuentes
recognized, "many debtors would forego their opportunity, sensing the
futility of the exercise in the particular case."" 1 In light of the fore-
going discussion,"62 this seems a realistic observation. Secondly, al.
though the hearing opportunity and its potential costs should give debt-
ors greater bargaining power, it may be that in a substantial number
of cases the debtor's increased power will result in a negotiated settle-
ment, a result costing everyone, including the creditor, less than judg-
ment and execution.3 63 Even so, it is clear that preseizure notice and
hearing do inject added costs. The costs to creditors may be substan-
tial in those cases in which the genuine value of summary seizure lies
in its coercive, leverage effect.
Because the paramount interest of seller-creditors lies in obtaining
maximum profits, they can be expected to pass any additional cost
increment on to others if at all possible. The methods are many:
higher prices of goods; increased interest rates; higher downpay-
ments; denial of credit to the poorer risks; shifting costs to cash buyers
and better credit risks;3 and shifting costs to buyers of other goods.305
Some of the effects and implications of these efforts will be discussed
below.
C. The State
If maximizing the general welfare is one of the state's prime goals,
then in the installment credit sales context the state entertains a catalog
of interests.3 6 In order that commercial prosperity be promoted, the
in Calfornia: A Study and Recommendations, 53 CAIJF. L. REV. 1214 (1965). But cf.
Note, supra note 204, at 265-67.
360. See text accompanying note 221 supra.
361. 407 U.S. at 92 n.29.
362. See notes 221-45 supra and accompanying text (discussion of "barriers to re-
dress").
363. This factor has been called the "workout effect." See Dauer & Gilhool, supra
note 221, at 144-45. But see Johnson, supra note 150, at 105.
364. See NCCF REPORT 124.
365. See White, supra note 40, at 522.
366. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 273, 486 P.2d 1242, 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 57 (1971); Gardner, supra note 332, at 34; Note, supra note 204, at 264-65; cf.
Greenfield, supra note 207, at 14-15.
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state is interested in providing a framework within which debts may
be promptly paid and contracts performed. Also the state is interested
in protecting the vitality of the credit and sales industry so that credit
resources will be readily accessible. In contrast to this collective com-
mercial interest is the underlying concern for the protection of individu-
als. The state should be interested in protecting persons from coer-
cion, that is to say, from the use or threatened use of judicial power
to effect takings from innocent parties. 36 7  Moreover, the state has an
interest in preserving the right to judicial process for redressing griev-
ances. Finally, the state is interested in protecting the fisc by promot-
ing efficiency and reducing congestion in the courts and by ensuring
that its writs and process are complied with expeditiously.
As alluded to above,3 " the availability of provisional remedies re-
flects state recognition of the interests of the parties, and it also reflects
the state's concern that disputes be resolved with dispatch. Presum-
ably the specific procedures chosen and the manner in which they af-
fect the rights of the parties reflect the state's determination of the wise
and proper accommodation of state, consumer, and creditor interests.
The typical state's two-stage accommodation of these interests, how-
ever, has not necessarily been based upon a fair and modern appraisal
of all the interests.369 At the bargaining stage, the state remains essen-
tially neutral and permits the parties to reach whatever agreement is
within their respective powers. Theoretically, the full power of the
state is thereafter available to coerce any reluctant party to perform.
In reality, the coincidence of state and creditor interests in promoting
commercial prosperity has combined with barriers to redress and the
unequal bargaining power of many consumers to make the power of
the state more readily available to creditors than to individual debt-
ors.170 A symptom of this imbalance is the disparity in legal costs: the
367. An historical theme of both sequestration and replevin was the state's interest
in "forestall[ing] xiolent self-help and retaliation." Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600, 605 (1974); see J. COBBEY, supra note 14, § 38; T. PLUCKNETr, supra
note 93, at 368 (replevin); Millar, Judicial Sequestration in Louisiana: Some Account
of Its Sources, 30 TuL. L. REv. 201, 206 (1956) (Latin sources of sequestration); cf.
Yudof, supra note 245, at 972. But cf. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAMUES *4.
368. See text accompanying note 291 supra.
369. See Jordan & Warren, supra note 222, at 457.
370. See CAPLOVITZ 151; NCCF REPORT 24; Neth, supra note 165, at 46.
Individual consumer interests, however, have not been ignored by the state. With re-
spect to recent "truth in lending" legislation, the following comment is instructive:
[Existing] consumer-credit laws have been aimed at permitting credit suppliers
to charge profitable rates and at regulating the strictly "credit" aspects of trans-
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consumer's marginal cost of defending a repossession suit is much
greater than the creditor's marginal cost of prosecuting it.371  If in fact
the state has neglected seeing to its interest and that of the debtor in
protecting the individual, the remedy ought to be found in the due
process clause.8 72 Complications arise, however, when it is recognized
that a measure intended to increase the protection and alleviate the
costs of the debtor-for example, preseizure notice and hearing-will
of necessity decrease the protection and increase the costs of credi-
tors.37 3 The question therefore arises: Given this inverse relation, how
would the various state interests be affected by requiring preseizure no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard?
1. Welfare Economics
A substantial element of creditor dominance derives from the fact
that, under the umbrella of state interests, creditors are more successful
than debtors at shifting transaction costs from themselves onto the
other party and the state. Easy access to state-subsidized judicial proc-
ess and the leverage available in a summary seizure scheme permit
creditors to externalize some of their collection costs. 874 Greater bar-
gaining power permits further cost shifting; debtors whose property is
seized and against whom judgment is executed pay direct costs of legal
process as well as indirect costs, shared by all debtors, generated by
debtors who have been unable to satisfy judgments. 75
Standard microeconomic theory holds that "social welfare is a maxi-
mum when marginal social cost equals marginal social benefit
.... ,3r It follows that insofar as creditors are successful at ex-
ternalizing their costs of achieving wrongful or mistaken recoveries, ex-
actions-namely, placing ceilings on, or requiring disclosure of, finance and re-
lated charges. These laws have emphasized protecting the consumer at the
contract-formation stage, and have largely ignored safeguarding him at the
vital default and collection stages ....
Jordan & Warren, supra note 222, at 448.
371. Dauer & Gilhool, supra note 221, at 144; Leff, supra note 266, at 19-23; Neth,
supra note 165, at 46.
372. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
373. See, e.g., Neth, supra note 165, at 35.
For effects of notice and hearing on court congestion and efficiency, see notes 397-
401 infra and accompanying text.
374. See Leff, supra note 266, at 23; cf. Note, supra note 154, at 1263-64.
375. See Leff, supra note 266, at 23; Project, supra note 182, at 902; cf. Hearings
on H.R. 11,601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 264 (1967); NCCF REPORT 124.
376. C. FERGUSON, MIcRorscoNoMIc THEORY 391 (1966).
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ternal diseconomies result.3 77  To the extent that notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard weaken the impact of leverage and tend to minimize
wrongful or mistaken seizures, costs are shifted back to creditors and
internalized as real costs of doing business. Theoretically, any result-
ing adjustment in availability or price of credit will be in the direction
of a more efficient allocation of resources. 3 8
The theoretical result is consonant with the response of creditors.
Whether, as creditors contend,379 both substantially decreased availabil-
ity of credit and substantially higher prices would occur if preseizure
notice and hearing were required is problematical. What is certain is
that the internalized costs of notice and hearing would be spread over
a greater number of consumers,380 protection of the individual debtor
would be increased, and perhaps social resources would be more effi-
ciently allocated.
2. Impact of Restricted Remedies
Several methods available to creditors for passing on increased costs
resulting from restricted collection remedies were listed earlier.381  Es-
sentially, all methods are of two classes: a creditor can either keep
credit rates constant and exercise greater selectivity or keep risk stand-
ards constant and increase rates to absorb increased collection costs and
bad debt losses.38 2 Which alternative, or relative mix of alternatives,
377. An "external diseconomy" occurs when "marginal social cost is greater than
marginal social benefit." Id.; see id. at 391-92; cf. Note, Direct Loan Financing of
Consumer Purchases, 85 HAiv. L. REv. 1409, 1411-12 (1972).
378. See C. FERGUSON, supra note 376, at 391-92.
379. See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 556-
57, 488 P.2d 13, 25-26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 721-22 (1971); Affidavit of V. Morgan, su-
pra note 173, at 55. Mr. Justice White appears to agree. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 103 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
380. See Project, supra note 182, at 902-03; Williams, supra note 31, at 98-99. Pro-
fessor Kripke views this mechanism as analogous to the recent growth of strict liability
in tort in products liability law.
The debtor's misfortune could be "insured" by our legal institutions by throw-
ing the loss on the creditor through denial of enforcement remedies. But the
loss so allocated would not come to rest on the bloated stockholders of the
creditor. The cost would be and would have to be passed on by the creditor
to the debtors who do pay, as bad debt expense . . . . This spreading of cost
might be legitimate social engineering.
Kripke, supra note 182, at 485.
381. See text accompanying note 365 supra.
382. NCCF REPORT 114; see Krahmer, Clifford & Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due
Process and the Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEXAS TECH L. REv. 23,
52-53 (1972); Affidavit of V. Morgan, supra note 173, at 55:Washington University Open Scholarship
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creditors would choose, and the magnitude of the effect, is not known.
There is some indication that availability of credit would be affected
less than price,3 3 but the NCCF Report suggests the contrary. 884 Al-
though it seems that lower income consumers would be more greatly
affected by increased selectivity than by higher credit prices,88 the cru-
cial consideration, about which there is almost no hard data, is the mag-
nitude of either effect. Apart from the claims of credit sellers, the infor-
mation available suggests that the magnitude of effects resulting from a
Fuentes-type notice and hearing requirement may not be very large.880
The primary reason appears to be that because the default and repos-
session rates for consumer goods are quite small,38 7 if costs resulting
from notice and hearing are widely spread, the individual increment
of increased cost is small.
It has been assumed that increased purchasing on credit is good for
the economy and good for purchasers and suppliers. 88 If notice and
Mhe retailer, operating under our present credit system at or below his cost
of credit sales, if confronted by an increased rate of loss from repossession,
must either increase his prices to a noncompetitive level, or restrict his exten-
sion of retail credit, thereby curtailing his sales volume.
383. See Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 556-57, 488
P.2d 13, 26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 722 (1971); 114 CONG. REc. 1833 (1968); Brunn, supra
note 359, at 1240-43; Comment, supra note 182, at 846.
384. See NCCF REPORT 23-44, 109-48. But cf. id. at 124.
385. Although higher credit prices, reflected either in finance charges, interest rates,
or costs of goods, restrict demand, it is arguably better to have dearer credit than none at
all. Moreover, rather than curtailing consumption, reduced availability may stimulate
deviant credit patterns such as loan sharking and peddling. See CAPLOvWTz 191-92.
Creditors, of course, put the argument more forcefully:
A fallacious impression which should be corrected is that business can or
will absorb this additional cost in its existing profit margins.
[Large proprietary retailers will continue to engage in the extension of retail
credit, but will confine their credit sales to high or middle income consumers
with demonstrated credit ratings. While perhaps smaller retailers will be com-
petitively forced to accept somewhat more marginal credit risks; [sicl clearly,
the low income consumer, who is most in need of retail credit would not find
such credit readily available at lawful rates.
Affidavit of V. Morgan, supra note 173, at 56, 55.
386. See Krahmer, Clifford & Lasley, supra note 382, at 54-62; cf. White, supra note
40, at 530. See also Note, supra note 204, at 268.
387. See CArLovrrz 121; FTC REPORT 33-34; NCCF REPORT 20; Krahmer, Clifford
& Lasley, supra note 382, at 61-62; The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 235, at
91 n.37; Project, supra note 182, at 885 n.22; note 211 supra.
388. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 375, at 278 (statement of R. Moot, Administra-
tor, Small Business Administration). Even this point is not free from argument. Al-
though the growth of credit stimulates growth in production and mass markets in dura-
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hearing were required and the concomitant costs internalized and
widely spread, it is reasonable to conclude that the increased protection
for debtors qua individuals would accrue at an insubstantial cost to
creditors and debtors qua purchasers. On balance, the trade-off
furthers state interests.
If, however, creditors perceive the costs of notice and hearing as too
substantial to spread effectively and, for that or some other reason,
choose instead to concentrate the costs by passing them on in low-in-
come markets via increased prices and stricter selectivity, a policy di-
lemma of the proper accommodation of state interests emerges.389 On
the one hand, it can be argued that credit is too easy and that the poor
as a class receive too much credit. The question that follows is whether
it is within the state's general welfare interest to act affirmatively to pre-
vent low-income debtors from becoming overburdened or whether the
state should acquiesce in a free market denial of credit to the high risk
class-an ironic possible result of increased costs of notice and hear-
ing.390  On the other hand, it can be argued that the state should be
ble goods, which would be damped by credit restrictions, it has been argued that easy
credit creates artificial material wants and contributes to uncertainty and instability in
the national economy. J. GALBRAnH, Tnn AFPnIE.NT SOCITY 157-66 (Mentor ed.
1958). Comparison of the following is illustrative:
To disturb the balance of the existing credit structure can have immediately
amplified repercussions on employment, production, stock prices, inflation, wel-
fare, and, indeed, our entire standard of living..... There would be an in-
crease in retail prices of consumer durables, which would contribute to our al-
ready serious inflationary spiral ....
Affidavit of V. Morgan, supra note 173, at 58-59.
The effect of the expansion of consumer credit is to add an uncertainty . . .
to the hitherto more reliable consumer spending....
. . . [Clonsumers will add the most spending from borrowed funds to their
spending from current income during the period when it is least needed. This
will exaggerate inflationary pressures.
J. GALBRAITH, supra at 163.
The contributions of consumer credit to cyclical movements of the economy are
not substantial and may be controlled by general monetary and credit policy.
Williams, supra note 31, at 110.
389. See generally Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536,
554-57, 488 P.2d 13, 25-26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 721-22 (1971); CAPLOvrrZ 188-92; P.
MCCRACKEN, J. MAo & C. FRICKE, CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1965); NCCF REPORT 156; Neth, supra note 165, at 34-35; Williams, supra note 31, at
110-12; Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economists View, 54 CORELL
L. REv. 491, 496-97 (1969); Project, supra note 182, at 902-03.
390. Cf. Kripke, supra note 182, at 478-79 (footnotes omitted):
It must be recognized that even in the poverty situations, putting aside the
cases of fraud and high pressure in home sales, the buyers do want the goods.
. . . Thus we cannot adopt restrictions on remedies so punitive as to put the
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concerned about the availability of credit to the poor as a class, and
that -the state should act affirmatively to support liberal credit for those
lower income consumers who need credit and who would repay just
debts.
Regardless of the stance taken by the state in resolving the conflict,
no grand accommodation of collective interests should be permitted
to deprive substantial numbers of debtors of individual procedural
protections.3 91  It should be reemphasized that the due process
requirement was designed to protect against overemphasis on collective
solutions and the basing of state determinations of procedural rules on
results in most cases rather than on just results in individual cases. 0 2
3. Debt Collection and Tort Remedies
Society and the state have a strong interest in providing a mechanism
by which individuals may be protected from the socially unreasonable
conduct of other individuals. In our system of law, the mechanism pro-
vided is embodied in the law of torts. 93 Coercive and socially abusive
debt collection practices are notorious and have provided a fertile
source of tort liability. 94 As is the case with all judicial remedies, the
credit sellers in the poverty areas, and their financers, out of business. Despite
the present high social cost, they serve a social purpose. The demand for mod-
em appliances and other amenities, and for such necessities as color television
and stereo sets, is irresistible at all levels of poverty, including that of welfare
clients.
391. See Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 557, 488
P.2d 13, 26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 722 (1971). See also NCCF REPORT 30:
With full understanding of its probable impact, the Commission, neverthe-
less, recommends that prior to repossession-whether with or without judicial
process-the debtor must be given notice of the claim against him and the op-
portunity to be heard on the merits of the underlying claim.
392. See Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1961);
Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974). In striking
down the self-help provisions of the Michigan UCC, the Watson court said:
Although the Constitution does recognize rights to life, liberty, property, and
due process of law . . . a diligent search has failed to reveal that the institu-
tional availability of credit is a fundamental constitutional value. In past
years, automobile advertising has been aimed at convincing the individual that
his personal worth and happiness depend upon his owning a snazzy car ....
This hustle, and the credit which supports it, does not find protection in the
Constitution.
Id. at 970 (footnote omitted); cf. Yudof, supra note 245, at 970-71. See also Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451-52 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972).
393. See, e.g., RSTATEmENT (SEcoND) Op TORTS § 1, comment d (1965); W. PROS-
sunt, supra note 95, §§ 1-4.
394. For an exhaustive survey defining the limits of extrajudicial debt collection tac-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/3
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES AND DUE PROCESS
consumer-plaintiff must have his day in court if he is to obtain relief.
One might speculate, however, that if perhaps two-thirds of low-income
consumers do not know how to respond to a summary deprivation of
property, 95 even fewer are aware of the tort remedies available against
abusive collection tactics. If this conjecture is valid, a procedure that
apprises consumers of, or provides them with, an opportunity to assert
available remedies furthers the interests of the state. It is clear that
notice and even a limited opportunity to be heard serve the state's inter-
est by affording information. It has been suggested, moreover, that
the possibility that a creditor may be called to account (at a hearing) for
the frequency and the nature of [his preseizure contacts with the debtor]
may be expected to inhibit any creditor conduct that might smack of
nascent tort.3 96
4. Burden on Courts
The state, of course, has an interest in conserving financial, adminis-
trative, and judicial resources. Some say that a preseizure notice and
hearing requirement would jam the courts.39 7 Presumably the argu-
ment is that more debtors would appear and that an additional hearing
would require more of the courts' time.3 99 Nevertheless, any addi-
tional burden would be mitigated to the extent that creditors would be
deterred from seeking provisional writs in situations in which the debtor
could move successfully for dissolution.399 Moreover, it can be ex-
pected that notice and hearing would discourage a significant fraction
of the disproportionately large number of actions presently being
brought by low-income market creditors in the expectation of a default
judgment.40  Neither of these arguments, however, can be finally per-
suasive. Courts are established by the state for the fair adjudication of
disputes. Ultimately it is in the interest of society that vindication of
tics and evaluating the tort remedies that establish those limits, see Greenfield, supra
note 207.
395. See text accompanying note 226 supra.
396. Dauer & Gilhool, supra note 221, at 145-46 (footnotes omitted).
397. See. e.g., Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1971), vacated sub
non. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); cf. NCCF REPORT 30:
Although ["probable cause" type] hearings. . . would probably be unduly bur-
densome to the existing court system, the Commission insists that an opportu-
nity for hearing should be granted.
398. But see text accompanying note 361 supra.
399. See Note, supra note 166, at 1005.
400. See FTC REPORT 34; notes 221-45 supra and accompanying text.
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rights not "be made dependent on any theory that it is less expensive
or more expedient to deny them than to afford them. '401
5. Conclusion
Although the Court adverted to state interests, with vastly different
emphasis, in both Fuentes and Mitchell, neither opinion dealt satisfac-
torily with "routine" state interests. Fuentes emphasized the possibil-
ity of extraordinary situations in which a summary seizure might be "di-
rectly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public
interest 40 2 and dismissed the interest in debt collection as "no more
than private."403  Other than concluding that "the State has reached
a constitutional accommodation of the respective interests of buyer and
seller, ' '40 4 the Mitchell majority made no explicit evaluation of the
state's stake in the collective interests of creditors or in the protection
of the individual.40 5 Implicitly, however, the Court's decision to bal-
ance interests in the general case aligned the interests of cred-
itors and the state in promoting commercial prosperity against the inter-
ests of the individual debtor; the result was a deemphasis of individual
protection. In so doing, the Court adopted the commercial bias of the
state40 6 rather than balancing afresh the state's collective and individual
401. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 139 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also
Yudof, supra note 245, at 967-68 (footnotes omitted):
Where the judicial backlog is substantial, obviously other statutory solutions
may be required. The legislature might also take up the Supreme Court's invi-
tation in Fuentes to create more efficient informal and less time-consuming
systems for redressing creditor-debtor conflicts, e.g., special consumer courts.
Such courts, relying perhaps upon lay advocates, might well reduce the low in-
come consumer's fear of the judicial process and his unwillingness or inability
to employ it as well. Legislative innovation might, alternatively, allow a cred-
itor to prove his claim inexpensively, by affidavit in the . . . cases in which
the debtor defaults. Thus, given a reasonable response by creditors, lawyers
and legislators, . . . estimate[s] of the costs of judicial repossession may be
greatly exaggerated.
402. 407 U.S. at 91. Harmonizing its prior decisions, the Court suggested that the
public interests in collecting taxes, conducting a war, and protecting against bank failure,
misbranded drugs, or contaminated food are extraordinary. Id. at 92 (citing cases);
see notes 42-90 supra and accompanying text.
403. 407 U.S. at 92.
404. 416 U.S. at 610.
405. See text accompanying note 366 supra. But cf. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term,
88 HARv. L. REv. 43, 75 (1974) (interpretation of Court's interest analysis).
406. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Powell made it explicit:
The governmental function ... is to provide a reasonable and fair framework
of rules which facilitate commercial transactions on a credit basis.
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due process interests.40"
It is clear that the state has various interests in the debtor-creditor
context that are hindered or furthered by the procedural rules it
chooses. If the state reaches an accommodation of interests that is ex-
cessively unbalanced, the due process clause is the available remedy.
When called upon to apply due process to challenged procedural rules,
the Court should evaluate the effects of state interests and inject them
into the balancing process. Otherwise, the party prejudiced by a bi-
ased state accommodation enters that process at a distinct disadvantage.
V. NARROWING THE ISSUES
The Court in Mitchell began its constitutional analysis by answering
the debtor's claim that the due process clause guaranteed continued
possession of the property in question pendente lite.4 8  Citing cases
dealing with interests in land, the Court noted that the issue of posses-
sion may be severed from adjudication of the ultimate right involved.4°9
Thus the issue in Mitchell became not whether due process guaranteed
continued possession but whether a hearing on the issues relevant to
possession must precede the taking.410 In the Court's view, the issues
relevant to the possessory action were three: default, the existence of a
vendor's privilege, and the possession of the debtor.41' It was against
416 U.S. at 624-25. The "reasonable and fair" emphasis is on procedural safeguards
rather than on balancing of interests. Id.
407. See text accompanying note 370 supra. But cf. Consumer Credit Protection Act
1 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
408. 416 U.S. at 607. Petitioner was undoubtedly relying upon the Fuentes major-
ity's statement:
[l1t is now well settled that a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is
nonetheless a "deprivation" in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
It is enough to invoke the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth
Amendment that a significant property interest is at stake, whatever the ulti-
mate outcome of a hearing on the contractual right to continued possession and
use of the goods.
407 U.S. at 84-85, 87 (footnote omitted). See also Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337, 339 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
409. 416 U.S. at 607, citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), Bianchi v. Mo-
rales. 262 U.S. 170 (1923), and Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133
(1915).
410. 416 U.S. at 607.
411. Id.:
Petitioner's claim must accordingly be narrowed to one for a hearing on
the issues in the possessory action-default, the existence of a lien, and pos-
session of the debtor-before property is taken.
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this narrow background that the "balance of interests" was struck in
Mitchell. The Court neither questioned the basis for this narrowing
nor explored the implications.
Separating the issue of possession from the issue of an ultimate
right-for example, ownership-is conceptually sound in situations in
which the promises of undisturbed possession and payment for property
are independent. Independent covenants are quite common in the law
of landlord and tenant.412  Thus, in Lindsey v. Normet,413 the provision
of Oregon's Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute4 14 that precluded an
evicted tenant from raising any defenses that did not rebut the claim
for nonpayment of rent was held to comport with due process. The
tenants in Lindsey sought to assert the landlord's breach of an implied
warranty of habitability as a defense to nonpayment.4'6 In upholding
the Oregon court's dismissal of this pleading, the Court held that the
due process clause guarantees that every available defense may be
raised.41 6 That Oregon did not make the defense available was not un-
constitutional since the "Constitution has not federalized the substan-
tive law of landlord-tenant relations. . . ."a The holding implies that
a state may regulate the timing and substance of defenses.418  Due proc-
ess requires only that the defense be available in some fashion before
the final adjudication on the merits.419 In Lindsey, this requirement was
met because the tenants could bring a separate action to redress the
412. C. MOYNmAN, INTRODUCrION TO ThE LAW OF REAL PRoPna'n' 69-73 (1962).
413. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
414. ORE. REv. STAT. § 105.145 (1974).
415. See, e.g., Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968);
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). For a discussion of the
implied warranty of habitability, see 1973 WAsH. U.L.Q. 949.
416. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972), quoting American Surety Co. v.
Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932), and citing Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393,
396 (1934).
417. 405 U.S. at 68.
418. Cf. Clark & Landers, supra note 199, at 407-08:
The essence of the Lindsey holding is that the tenant's defenses may not be
raised because, as a matter of substantive law, they are not defenses to the
landlord's request for possession on the ground of nonpayment of rent. The
clear implication of this holding is that if the tenant's claims were defenses,
they would have to be considered at the hearing [for forcible entry and de-
taminer].
See also The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 235, at 91 n.34.
The question turns on the state's recognition of which parties have what property in-
terests. This recognition will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court. Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974).
419. See cases cited note 416 supra.
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uninhabitable conditions of the premises. 420
A. Contractual Defenses
Professor Williston once suggested that the conditional sale was es-
sentially the chattel version of the realty mortgage transaction; the rela-
tively low value of chattel security in the individual case made it desira-
ble to abridge mortgage formalities by providing that the seller retain
title.42 That some courts, prior to the UCC, overemphasized the im-
portance of title and refused to permit affirmative defenses in posses-
sory actions for chattels more clearly reflects the realty concept of inde-
pendent covenants than it does the contract notion of dependent prom-
ises. Enactment of the UCC in all but one state has made the substance
of Williston's insight obsolete. Nevertheless, this emphasis on title and
analogy to real property rules underlie what is perhaps a crucial prem-
ise in the Mitchell opinion-that the issues may be narrowed in an ac-
tion for possession of chattels.
At early common law, mutual promises in a bilateral contract were
held to be independent of each other and unconditional. Absent an
express condition, one party could obtain judicial enforcement of the
other's promise even though the first party had breached the con-
tract.4 22  Since the development of the doctrine of constructive condi-
tions of exchange,423 substantial performance on one side has been con-
sidered a condition to the duty of performance on the other side,
and a material breach by one party discharges the other.424 Thus,
in an ordinary sales transaction, a material defect of performance, such
as failure to deliver or delivery of defective goods, is a good "de-
fense"425 to an action for the price. 26  In addition to failure of consid-
420. 405 U.S. at 66. The Court also noted that Oregon law recognized certain de-
fenses to the landlord's claim for possession. Id. at 66 n.1 1.
421. 3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOvERNING SALES OF GOODS § 579, at 225 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
422. See 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS H§ 653-57 (1960) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN];
E. FARNSWORTH, W. YOUNG & H. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 691-92
(1972).
423. In Kingston v. Preston, 99 Eng. Rep. 436 (K.B. 1773), Lord Mansfield held
that mutual promises were dependent and conditional even though absolute in form.
424. See generally 3A CORBIN §§ 653-60; L. SIMPSON, LAW OF CONTRACTS 99 152-
63 (1965).
425. "Defense" is used generically in this context to include the various buyer's rem-
edies, e.g., rescission, counterclaim, setoff, recoupment.
426. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 267-69 (1932); UCC 9H 2-301, -314, -711,
-717; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 291, at 307 n.3.
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eration42 7 and breach of warranty,428 the buyer's "defenses" generally
include fraud429 and, under the UCC, unconscionability, 430 among
others.43 1
A "defense" is valuable, of course, only to the extent that it produces
a remedy. Historically, the value of buyers' defensive remedies has
varied depending on the action brought and the form of the sale.
Where the buyer has accepted the goods and the seller has been
guilty of some misconduc4 2 but claims the purchase price, the
common law generally affords election433 among three remedies: re-
coupment,434 counterclaim for damages, 433 or rescission.430  With im-
427. See generally 3A CORBIN §§ 658-60; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 274, 347
(1932).
428. See generally 5 CORBIN §§ 1015, "1119 (1964); J. WHnm & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 291, at 306-25; 1 WILUSTON §§ 178-257.
429. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 95, § 105; REsrATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§§ 470-91 (1932); 3 WILLISTON §§ 623-52.
430. UCC § 2-302; see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965). See generally J. WHrE & R. SUMmERS, supra note 291, at 112-33.
431. E.g., statute of frauds, impossibility, marriage, duress, mistake, illegality, usury.
See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 454-609 (1932). In secured transactions,
the most obvious defense is nondefault. Other defenses may be classified generally as
those based on defects in the goods and those based on defects in the contract. Martin,
supra note 277, at 635.
432. "Seller misconduct" refers to seller's failure to perform, breach of warranty,
fraudulent misrepresentation, etc.
433. See, e.g., UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69. But see UCC § 2-608, Comment 1.
434. E.g., if there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer need not seek
rescission, but may keep the goods and set up the breach by way of recoupment in dim-
inution or extinction of the purchase price. See Campbell Music Co. v. Singer, 97
A.2d 340 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953); Desbergers, Ltd. v. Lincoln Labs., Inc., 344 Ill.
App. 184, 100 N.E.2d 395 (1951); J.B. Beaird Co. v. Burris Bros., 216 La. 655, 44 So.
2d 693 (1950); Morrow v. Barron Motor Co., 229 Miss. 51, 90 So. 2d 20 (1956); Heuer
v. Ulmer, 281 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955). See generally 3 WILUSTON §§ 605-
06. See also note 435 infra.
435. "It is fundamental that the breach of an obligation gives rise to a right of action
[claim or counterclaim] for damages." 3 WILLsToN § 607, at 339. For the distinction
between recoupment and counterclaim, see id. § 605.
The UCC has generally followed the common law in allowing the buyer to deduct,
in the seller's action for the price, damages resulting from the seller's breach. See
UCC §§ 2-714, -717; J. WirT & R. SumM s, supra note 291, at 306-11.
Regarding the requirement that the buyer give notice of breach within a reasonable
time after taking possession, see RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACs § 412 (1932); UCC §§
2-607(3) (a), -714(1), UNIFORM SALES ACT § 49.
436. Rescission is the primary remedy for failure of consideration, that is to say,
when seller's breach is total even though he may have partly performed. 3A CORBIN
§§ 658-59; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 274, 347 (1932); 3 WILLISTON § 600.
Thus, if the seller does not deliver, or delivers goods of a kind both different from
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portant but now obsolete exceptions, these remedies are available today
whether the transaction was a cash sale or one on secured credit.437
Under the same circumstances, if the seller brings an action for pos-
session, the buyer's situation is less clear. Prior to adoption of the
UCC, the location of title was crucial. Conventional doctrine was that,
in order to bring an action for possession on a contract of absolute sale,
the seller must have had titie to the goods, or title must have revested
in him as a result of rescission.43 8 Title residing in the seller was the
and inferior to that called for in the agreement, the buyer's defense to a claim for the
price is to rescind and return or tender the goods delivered. "The further element of
mistake or fraud is a proper ground for rescission everywhere." Id.; see UNInORM
SALES Acr § 69.
The UCC changes the language of this remedy. See UCC § 2-601, -608, -612. Pro-
fesors White and Summers suggest that, under the UCC, "rescission" applies only to
cases involving fraud, mistake, etc. J. WrTE & R. SuMMERS, supra note 291, at 248.
Under the UCC, a finding of unconscionability may operate as a rescission, or pro-
duce the same result as recoupment. UCC § 2-302(1); see J. Warra & R. SumMERS,
supra note 291, at 112-33.
437. Generally speaking, the conditional buyer may plead in defense to the seller's
action for the price any matter that a cash buyer may plead, e.g., failure of considera-
tion and fraud. 78 C.J.S. Sales § 613(d) (1952); cf. UNoRm CONDITIONAL SALES
AcT § 2. The ordinary buyer's right of action for breach of warranty was not, how-
ever, uniformly recognized in conditional sales because warranty rights are collateral
to complete sale and passage of title. Taking the view that the conditional buyer had
no independent right of action for warranty damages, courts usually held that there
could be no recoupment or counterclaim by the conditional buyer in the seller's action
for the price. But cf. Starrett Operating Serv. v. Baker, 70 F.2d 780, 781 (D.C. Cir.
1934). Although early in this century it was apparently the general view, with substan-
tial exceptions, that the conditional buyer could not as defendant plead breach of war-
ranty, the trend of the decisions, accelerated by modem procedural and statutory re-
form and supported by the commentators, was in the direction of permitting such "de-
fenses." See, e.g., Peuser v. Marsh, 167 App. Div. 604, 153 N.Y.S. 381 (1915); Pullen
v. Johnson, 67 S.D. 173, 290 N.W. 488 (1940); U.S. Mach. Co. v. International Metals
Dev., Inc., 74 Cal. App. 2d 5, 168 P.2d 37 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946); cf. Starrett Operat-
ing Serv. v. Baker, supra. See generally Annot., 130 A.L.R. 753, 761-62 (1941); Annot.,
48 A.L.R. 969, 970-73, 983 (1927); 3 WILLISTON § 607a.
Since the UCC deemphasizes the location of title, the pre-UCC rationale for cutting
off warranty defenses in secured transactions vanishes. Moreover, the UCC's concep-
tual bifurcation of the sale and security elements of a secured transaction supports the
mine conclusion. See UCC § 2-102, -401, 9-102, -202. In an action for the price on
a secured transaction, there is presently no reason why "defenses" available to the buyer
should be different from those available when the sale is absolute. Cf. FED. R. CIV.
P. 8, 12, 13; 2 G. GmMORF, supra note 176, at 1091.
438. See, e.g., Keeler v. General Prods., Inc., 137 Conn. 247, 250, 75 A.2d 486, 487
(1950); Ryder & Brown Co. v. Lissberger, 300 Mass. 438, 15 N.E.2d 441 (1938); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Weatherford, 370 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); 3 WILLISTON
6 608; cf. J. CoaBEY, supra note 14, § 250.
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distinctive characteristic of a contract of conditional sale .43  In theory,
therefore, the absolute seller whose contract was repudiated and the
conditional seller whose buyer was in default were entitled to posses-
sion of the goods.440
Other than the customary general denial, 441 which has always been
permitted in any action, the matters that the buyer could raise by way
of defense to judicial repossession, usually replevin, varied with the ju-
risdiction. 442 Some courts held that the buyer was permitted to inter-
pose matters questioning the seller's title, right to possession, or buyer's
default, and that a breach of contract by the seller would not defeat
the repossession. 44 3  A possibly larger number of courts refused to per-
mit the buyer to defend, or recoup or counterclaim for damages, by
arguing breach of warranty. 444  In most jurisdictions, however, either
by rule or exception, buyers were permitted to interpose "defenses"
either to defeat the possessory action or for recovery of damages.441
Commonly in those jurisdictions permitting recoupment or counter-
claim, if the damages would be equal to or exceed the amount due on
the contract, the possessory action could be defeated.44 G
The UCC contains no provision that necessarily modifies the rights of
439. See note 437 supra.
440. See, e.g., UNiFORM CONDrrIONAL SALns Acr § 16 (conditional sales); 69 AM.
JUR. 2D Secured Transactions H9 583-84 (1973) (conditional sales); 67 AM. JUR. 2D
Sales § 571 (1973) (absolute sales); 2 G. GiMoRE, supra note 176, at 1213 (condi-
tional sales); cases cited note 438 supra (absolute sales).
441. See 66 AM. JuR. 2D Replevin § 83-84 (1973); 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 154-59
(1952); Annot., 194 A.L.R. 1154, 1157 (1936).
442. See generally 69 AM. Jup. 2D Secured Transactions § 586 (1973); 78 C.JS.
Sales § 420 (1952) (absolute sales); 3 WILLISTON § 607a (conditional sales); Annot.,
151 A.L.R. 520 (1944) (replevin, counterclaim, and setoff); Annot., 130 A.L.R. 753
(1941) (conditional sales, breach of warranty); Annot., 48 A.L.R. 969 (1927) (same).
443. See, e.g., Mills Novelty Co. v. Transeau, 196 A. 187 (Del. Super. Ct. 1937);
Salant & Salant v. Richfield Shirt Co., 29 Pa. Dist. 651 (Dist. Ct. 1919); Beck v. Lee,
52 Utah 31, 172 P. 686 (1918).
444. See Annot., 130 A.L.R. 753, 757-58 (1941); Annot., 48 A.L.R. 969, 973-75
(1927).
445. See, e.g., Stevens v. Whalen, 95 Ark. 488, 129 S.W. 1081 (1910); U.S.
Mach. Co. v. International Metals Dev., Inc., 74 Cal. App. 2d 5, 168 P.2d 37 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1946); W.H. Bintz Co. v. Mueggler, 65 Idaho 760, 154 P.2d 513 (1945); Capitol
Refrig. Co. v. Schmidt, 120 N.J.L. 433, 200 A. 552 (Sup. Ct. 1938), affd per curiarn,
121 NJ.L. 581, 3 A.2d 603 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939); Peuser v. Marsh, 218 N.Y. 505, 113
N.E. 494 (1916); Millenson v. Lamp, 99 W. Va. 539, 130 S.E. 137 (1925).
446. See, e.g., Riss & Co. v. Wallace, 350 Mo. 1208, 171 S.W.2d 641 (1943); Apple
v. Edwards, 92 Mont. 524, 16 P.2d 700 (1932).
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buyers or sellers vis-h-vis judicial repossession.447  Nevertheless, the
Code's deemphasis of the location of title and the increasing acceptance
by the states of modern procedural systems, which in most cases permit
and sometimes require the assertion of affirmative defenses and coun-
terclaims,448 will quite clearly curtail the few instances in which the
buyer has been forced to bring a separate action if he is to have any
relief at all. On this analysis, the rule under which issues were nar-
rowed in Lindsey is clearly distinguishable from the rule applicable in
personal property, consumer contract disputes in UCC states.
B. Consumer Defenses After Mitchell
As applied in Mitchell,449 the narrowed-issue technique undercuts,
sub silentio, two procedural safeguards announced in Fuentes. First,
the thrust of Fuentes was to protect the defaulting debtor from losing
his property absent a showing of the probable validity of the creditor's
claim.4 ° Although the content of a probably valid claim was left
open, 45 the Court recognized that defenses on the contract might be
raised." 2 The Louisiana hearing procedure, however, occurs after the
seizure and provides no forum for debtor defenses.4 53
447. There is no repossession provision in article 2 of the UCC. See UCC §§ 1-103,
9-501, -503; cf. id. § 2-507.
448. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8, 13.
449. 416 U.S. at 607.
450. 407 U.S. at 97, quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
451. 407 U.S. at 96-97 (footnote omitted):
The nature and form of such prior hearings, moreover, are legitimately open
to many potential variations and are a subject, at this point, for legislation-
not adjudication.
452. Id. at 87; Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurring). One court has followed the suggestion in Fuentes:
The court realizes that the details of Fuentes hearings were left to state legis-
lation. . . and that states may set up procedures in particular types of cases
which preclude defendants from raising certain affirmative defenses, Lindsey
v. Noriet. . . . But this court is of the opinion that if the pre-seizure hear-
ing is to be fair (in the sense of allowing both sides an opportunity to present
their available, good-faith legal arguments) and to provide a real test (in the
sense of allowing the court to consider all relevant factual and legal matters
before making a decision), such a hearing must include the right to raise af-
firmative defenses. Absent some limiting legislation, preclusion of affirmative
defenses would turn the hearing into a proceeding only slightly more fair than
an ex parte appearance by plaintiff, as defendant would be unduly restricted
to disproof of plaintiff's assertions, when valid affirmative defenses may exist
which could entitle defendant to possession until final adjudication.
Computer Leasing Co. v. Computing & Software, Inc., 66 Ohio Op. 2d 44, 45, 306
N.E.2d 191, 193 (C.P. Franklin County 1973) (emphasis original).
453. Definitional confusion was evident in oral argument before the Court inWashington University Open Scholarship
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The writ of sequestration in Louisiana is not strictly analogous to
the common law replevin action, the conventional judicial repossession
device in UCC states.454  Prejudgment seizure under both devices is
considered conservatory. Seizure under a writ of replevin is a remedial
element of the underlying action of replevin. 455 Although ancillary to
the main demand for relief, the Louisiana sequestration procedure is
conceptually more self-contained.45 6 Unlike a writ of replevin, seques-
tration may stand or fall without affecting the trial on the merits of the
underlying dispute. If the seller obtains a writ of sequestration and
causes the goods to be seized, Louisiana permits the buyer to contest
the seizure by filing a motion to dissolve without waiting for trial.4 57
The ensuing summary proceeding is a "mini-trial" for possession pend-
ing final adjudication. All that is tested, however, is the strength of
the seller's sequestration petition. The buyer may not interpose de-
fenses other than those that controvert the grounds on which the writ
issued.458
In a sense, the Louisiana motion to dissolve can be viewed as a com-
promise between the procedure for possession of realty upheld in
Lindsey and the mini-trial on the merits apparently envisioned in
Fuentes. In this mini-trial, the debtor may defeat the seizure if he can
raise a reasonable doubt that the creditor will prevail on the merits.4"'
Mitchell.
Mr. Justice White: "What is the Louisiana standard at a hearing to quash
the seizure? Probable cause? Is it comparable to a preliminary hearing?"
Mr. O'Sullivan [creditor's counsel]: "'rhere is an inqury [sic] into the
probable validity of the claim."
42 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1973).
454. Modem replevin is "common law" only in a generic sense; in most states it is
now statutory. See note 291 supra.
455. See generally 66 AM. JuR. 2D Replevin §§ 67-71 (1973); J. COBBEY, supra note
14; D. DouBs, HANDHOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEmiES § 5.13 (1973); note 291 supra.
456. See LA. CODE CIm. Puo. ANN. arts. 3501-14, 3571-76 (West 1961). See gener-
ally Johnson, supra note 1.
457. LA. CoDE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961).
458. Id. & Comments (a)-(f); Johnson, supra note 1, at 25-26; see, e.g., Oil City
Iron Works v. S. Bender Supply Co., 147 La. 450, 85 So. 201 (1920); Young v. Guess
& Swanson, 115 La. 230, 38 So. 975 (1905); Tucker & S&honekas v. Dohmann Chev.,
Inc., 260 So. 2d 99 (La. Ct. App. 1972). See also Martin, supra note 277, at 636:
[S]urely [the defense of nondefault] is one of the least important for which
to hold a hearing. Either [the debtor] has or has not [defaulted], and the
matter ought to be settled by quick reference to the records. The more impor-
tant defenses, such as breach of warranty, ... need hearings for resolution
459. See 407 U.S. at 87.
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Louisiana's notions about title460 and its modem procedural rules461 en-
sure that the debtor will have an opportunity to interpose defenses at
some time before possession is finally adjudicated. Nevertheless, the
grounds on which the sequestration may be dissolved are narrow. 6 2
The debtor will be unable to defeat the sequestration unless the credi-
tor is unable to prove his grounds-the debtor's default, the existence
of a lien or privilege, debtor's possession, and the debtor's power to
conceal, dispose of, or waste the collateral. In the typical case in which
the debtor can prevail on the merits, his defense will be breach of war-
ranty, and the existence of prima facie grounds for the writ will be a
foregone conclusion. The debtor who has withheld installment pay-
ments in a self-help attempt to obtain repair or other relief from the
seller for defective goods will find the motion to dissolve entirely use-
less. Moreover, the debtor with a valid claim of fraud, duress, or a
Truth-in-Lending violation is silenced until the merits are reached.4 8
Pending final adjudication on the merits, he has no chance to reclaim
the property other than by posting a release bond.46 4  Even if the ex-
plicit refusal in Mitchell to follow the Fuentes preseizure hearing re-
quirement was justifiable, the Court's failure to recognize the limited
nature of the postseizure hearing is very difficult to support.
Secondly, Fuentes cast doubt on the propriety of compelling a debtor
to bring an action to reclaim his property.46 5 The Fuentes majority
remarked that a constitutional wrong could not be "undone" by allow-
ing the debtor another day in court.4 66  The Court in Mitchell made
no mention of this principle. Rather, it pointed out that the availability
of an immediate postseizure hearing was a safeguard for the debtor. 67
460. See text accompanying note 295 supra.
461. Louisiana borrows heavily from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See LA.
CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. arts. 1003-06, 1061-65 (West 1960, Supp. 1974).
462. Id. arts. 3506, 3571 (West 1961).
463. Compare Justice Douglas' careful description of the Wisconsin procedure that
unconstitutionally deprived the debtor of his property "without any opportunity to be
heard and to tender any defense he may have, whether it be fraud or otherwise." Snia-
dach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
464. L . CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3507 (West 1961); Johnson, supra note 1, at 24-
25.
465. See 407 U.S. at 80-84.
466. Id. at 82:
But no later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbi-
trary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due process has already
occurred.
See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
467. 416 U.S. at 616-18.
Vol. 1974:653] 733
Washington University Open Scholarship
734 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
As noted, however, the Louisiana debtor is protected only to the extent
that he is permitted to attack the face of the petition for sequestration.
He may not contest the contractual dimensions of the creditor's claim
until a later date." s
The narrowed-issue device also taints the Mitchell Court's balancing-
of-interests analysis. Within the narrow issues, the debtor has only one
interest, continued possession. His interests in freedom from fraudu-
lent and oppressive contract terms and shoddy merchandise, expres-
sible only by affirmative defense, are not cognizable under the Court's
approach. To say that the debtor may be subjected to "limited hard-
ship ''469 ignores the realities of consumer installment sales. Balancing
interests is not meaningful if the important interests are artificially elim-
inated.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question most often asked about Mitchell is whether it overruled
Fuentes. Insofar as Fuentes established a rule of general and. certain
application in the consumer context-that due process requires notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to a taking of any significant prop-
erty interest-inescapably the answer is yes.4 0 The pains taken by the
majority to distinguish Fuentes,47' however, prompt the question: Why
was Fuentes not explicitly overruled? At oral argument, Mr. Justice
Blackmun inquired of respondent's counsel, "Are you asking that
Fuentes be overruled?" The reply was, "No sir. Louisiana law [is]
distinguishable .... ,,472 Justice Blackmun later asked, "Why don't
you urge reversal of Fuentes? It was a four to three decision." The
reply of counsel was, "Because we are disturbed that so many courts
have acted in response to and in reliance on Fuentes.' 47 8  It seems
468. LA. CODE COv. PFo. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961).
469. 416 U.S. at 618-19.
470. In Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974), a post-Mitchell case,
the court upheld Florida's Mechanics' Lien Law and said that its "decision [was] made
with the realization that the once ominous spectre of the Sniadach-Fuentes doctrine has
faded into the past." Id. at 432 (footnotes omitted). Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp.
1364 (W.D. Tenn. 1974), upheld a repossession statute enacted "in response to" Fuentes,
but which permitted seizure before notice and hearing. The debtor's "counsel ... con-
ceded, in effect, that ...Mitchell does require a holding that the involved Tennessee
statute is constitutional on its face." Id. at 1365. The court agreed.
471. See notes 42-90 supra and accompanying text.
472. 42 U.S.L.W. 3346-47 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1973).
473. Id. at 3347.
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a fair inference, moreover, that the majority may be less certain of the
surefootedness of its balancing analysis than appears from Justice
White's opinion. If this observation is accurate, one should not be sur-
prised at the tentativeness of the conclusion of one recent commenta-
tor: "It is evident that Mitchell, at least tacitly, has overruled Fuentes in
part." 74  Two articles published since the Mitchell opinion point out
that the result of Mitchell's reasoning will likely be increased confusion
in the lower courts.475 The cases decided since Mitchell confirm these
predictions.
In Singer Co. v. Gardner,47 6 decided two and a half months after
Mitchell, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated its state's replevin
statute, as follows: "It does not seem debatable that insofar as our stat-
ute deviates from [the Fuentes] standard, it too is unconstitutional. ' '477
Mitchell was mentioned only in the dissenting opinion as calling into
question the viability of Fuentes.47 8 In Garcia v. Krausse,479 a federal
district court in Texas invalidated that state's sequestration provisions
because they
fail[ed] to comply with prior notice and hearing requirements of
Fuentes and [did] not measure up to the standards approved by the
Supreme Court in Mitchell.480
Although the Texas procedure provided that judges or court clerks
were authorized to issue writs, the court emphasized the "lack of judi-
cial administration and supervision under the Texas law."481 The same
deficiency was held inconsequential in North Dakota, however, in
Guzman v. Western State Bank.482 In Guzman, the federal district
court upheld North Dakota's attachment statute even though the sei-
zure order was issued by the clerk and the debtor was dispossessed
without prior notice and hearing. Ironically, the court cited Justice
Stewart's dissent in Mitchell for the proposition that there is no consti-
474. Note, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.-The Repossession of Fuentes, 5 MEM1Hs
ST. U.L. REV. 74, 87 (1974).
475. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 82 (1974); Note, supra
note 474, at 89.
476. 65 N.J. 403, 323 A.2d 457 (1974).
477. Id. at 415, 323 A.2d at 464.
478. Id. at 422, 323 A.2d at 468.
479. 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
480. Id. at 1259.
481. id.
482. 381 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1974), vacated, No. 74-1740 (8th Cir., Mar. 11,
1975).
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tutional significance in whether a judge or a clerk signs the writ;488 the
court concluded that the North Dakota procedure "gives the same
broad constitutional protection to the debtor as that provided by the
Louisiana statute. ' 484  To highlight these anomalous results, it is argu-
able that, in substance, the closer statutory analogies are between the
Texas and Louisiana statutes, on the one hand, and the North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, and Florida statutes, on the other hand. None of the
courts in the post-Mitchell cases embarked on a balancing analysis.
On January 22, 1975, the Supreme Court added a curious case to
the Sniadach-Fuentes-Mitchell series, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc.48 5 In an opinion joined by the four-Justice Fuentes ma-
jority, with Justice Powell concurring in the judgment, Justice White
reversed the Georgia Supreme Court and struck down Georgia's pre-
judgment garnishment statute. Under the Georgia provision, a typical
garnishment statute exempting wages from impoundment, Di-Chem
filed an affidavit before a superior court clerk asserting that North
Georgia's debt of over $51,000 was due and owing and that the corpo-
rate creditor had "'reason to apprehend the loss of said sum or part
thereof unless process of Garnishment issues.' "486 The; clerk issued
process, and the debtor's bank -account was garnished without prior no-
tice. The corporate debtor filed a release bond three days later and
subsequently moved to dismiss the writ and discharge its bond on the
ground that the statutory procedure was unconstitutional.48 7
Upholding the statute, the Georgia Supreme Court48 8 reasoned that
Sniadach was not controlling, for it had merely "carve[d] out an excep-
tion for wage earners from . : . the general rule of legality of gar-
nishment statutes. 48 9 Justice White, however, said that "[tihis ap-
proach failed to take account of Fuentes . . . .,,490 The Georgia
statute was said to have "none of the saving characteristics of the
Louisiana statute."491  The affidavit contained only conclusory allega-
483. Id. at 1265-66; see notes 123-43 supra and accompanying text.
484. 381 F. Supp. at 1266.
485. 43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975).
486. Id. at 4193, quoting Affidavit of Respondent Di-Chem, Inc.
487. Id.
488. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 231 Ga. 260, 201 S.E.2d 321
(1973).
489. Id. at 263-64, 201 S.E.2d at 323.
490. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4193.
491. Id. at 4194.
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tions and was issued without judicial participation; moreover, there was
no provision for an early hearing at which the creditor would have to
show probable cause.49 Concluding his opinion on a paradoxical note,
Mr. Justice White said:
It may be that consumers deprived of household appliances will more
likely suffer irreparably than corporations deprived of bank accounts,
but the probability of irreparable injury in the latter case is sufficiently
great so that some procedures are necessary to guard against the risk
of initial error.
493
Although he relied primarily on the same distinction drawn by Jus-
tice White, Justice Powell declined to join the majority opinion because
"it sweeps more broadly than is necessary and appears to resuscitate
Fuentes . . . . In footnotes, however, Justice Powell voiced his
view that Sniadach's wage emphasis made it only "peripherally rele-
vant" and his discord with the "Court's suggestion that the Due Process
Clause might require that a judicial officer issue the writ of garnish-
ment.,, 4
95
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justice Rehnquist and, in part,
by the Chief Justice. Observing that the Court had "endeavor[ed] to
say as little as possible in explaining just why the Supreme Court of
Georgia [was] being reversed,"49 6 Justice Blackmun pursued two
themes. First, he argued that Fuentes should not have been decided
on a "4-3 vote by a bobtailed court" and that the result of Fuentes
is that
we [are] immersed in confusion, with Fuentes one way, Mitchell an-
other, and now this case . . . [leaving] other States uncertain as to
whether their own . . . statutes pass constitutional muster with a waver-
ing tribunal off in Washington, D.C.497
Secondly, Justice Blackmun thought that "Sniadach . . . concerned
and reeks of wages" and observed correctly that the debtor North
Georgia was "no wage earner." 498  Georgia's requirements that suit be
492. Id.
493. Id. This statement seems at variance with Justice White's finding in Mitchell:
"[W]e remain unconvinced that the impact on the debtor ... overrides his inability to
make the creditor whole .... ." 416 U.S. at 610.
494. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4194.
495. Id. at 4195 nn. 2 & 3 (emphasis original).
496. Id. at 4196.
497. Id. at 4196, 4197.
498. Id. at 4197.
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filed, double bond be posted, and apprehension of loss be sworn were
said to be adequate to protect a corporate debtor.4 9
The conclusions to be drawn from North Georgia regarding due
process are unclear. Justice White's reasoning departs significantly
from that developed in his Fuentes dissent, his concurrence in
Arnett,500 and the majority opinion in Mitchell.r0 1 No attempt was
made to balance the interests involved in North Georgia, perhaps be-
cause of the case's similarity to Sniadach.50 2 As Justice White pointed
out in Mitchell, Sniadach could be distinguished from Mitchell in that
"[t]he suing creditor . . .had no prior interest in the property at-
tached . *."..503 In Arnett, however, Justice White did take a balanc-
ing approach to Sniadach.50 4
The approach taken in North Georgia appears to be one of matching
-the safeguards found adequate in Mitchell.5"5  Since the Georgia stat-
ute did not match up to the safeguards in Mitchell, it was struck
down.506  If Georgia were to reenact the statute with the safeguards
employed in Orleans Parish, Louisiana, presumably it would be upheld.
499. Id. at 4197-98. Chief Justice Burger concurred in this second theme.
500. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 190-93 (1974).
501. See notes 61, 68, 89 supra and accompanying text.
502. But see 43 U.S.L.W. at 4195 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 4197 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
503. 416 U.S. at 614.
504. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 190-93 (1974); note 68 supra.
505. The Court's first reference to Fuentes, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4193, is confusing. At
first glance, one might suppose that the Court is urging a two-step analysis: the statute
is defective under Fuentes, and it is not "saved" by Mitchell. The reference to Fuentes,
however, serves no purpose, since under Fuentes any statute that does not operate in
"extraordinary situations" and does not provide for preseizure notice and hearing pre-
sumably will violate due process. Justice White's reference to Fuentes is idiosyncratic.
In both Mitchell and North Georgia, he read Fuentes as requiring notice, opportunity for
a -hearing, "or other safeguard." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4193; see 416 U.S. at 615 (Fuentes
struck down statutes because they did not provide for notice, hearing, or "judicial par-
ticipation"). It is difficult to reconcile the Fuentes opinion with Justice White's reading
of it. See also notes 59-82 supra and accompanying text.
The majority's second reference to Fuentes may be more defensible: "We are no more
inclined now than we have been in the past to distinguish among different kinds of prop-
erty in applying the Due Process Clause." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4194. If this is taken to
mean that due process always applies in some manner to a taking of property, the state-
ment is consistent with precedent. If taken to mean that due process applies in the same
manner to all takings of property, it is not so consistent. The latter reading does not
recognize any balance of interests, even though the broad rule of Fuentes does so in
its recognition of "extraordinary situations." See 407 U.S. at 90-92.
506. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4194.
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North Georgia appears to make little new law. North Georgia and
Calero-Toledo50 7 do demonstrate some viability for Fuentes, even if it
no longer represents a rule of general and certain application. The
relevant inquiry then is for what propositions does Fuentes stand.
Calero-Toledo verified Fuentes insofar as the latter case permitted tak-
ing property in extraordinary situations without prior notice or hear-
ing."' If Justice White's opinion in North Georgia is read carefully and
in context, however, it seems to attribute to Fuentes little that could
not have been attributed to other cases.
Perhaps the best and safest inference to be drawn from North
Georgia is that it is a signal to those who would return to the halcyon
days before the Court decided Sniadach. For those who inferred that
Fuentes was overruled in toto by Mitchell and viewed the latter case
as a first step on the road to dismembering Sniadach and others, Justice
White may be setting one due process boundary: in addition to express-
ing the extraordinary-circumstances rule, Fuentes stands for the exten-
sion of Sniadach beyond wages.509 Therefore, the boundary set is that
"any significant taking of property by the State'' 10 must be accompa-
507. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
508. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
509. See 407 U.S. at 88-90. This rationale may explain Justice White's statement
that the Georgia Court's reasoning, based on the old case of McKay v. McInnes, 279
U.S. 820 (1929), and the proposition that Sniadach applied only to except wages, 231
Ga. at 263-64, 201 S.E.2d at 323, failed to take account of Fuentes. Justice Powell ap-
pears to agree with this analysis, for, after pointing out the Court's past approval of
prejudgment remedies in McKay, Coffin, and Ownbey, he said:
But the recent expansion of concepts of procedural due process requires a more
careful assessment of the nature of the governmental function served by the
challenged procedure and of the costs the procedure exacts of private interests.
43 U.S.L.W. at 4195, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-66 (1970), and Cafe-
teria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). But see Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 613-15 (1974). Dissenting in North Georgia, Justice
Blackmun, joined in this part of the opinion by Chief Justice Burger, said:
Sniadach should be allowed to remain in its natural environment-wages-and
not be expanded to arm's-length relationships between business enterprises of
such financial consequence ....
[ .. Perhaps Sniadach for a time was . . .expanded .. .by the implica-
tions and overtones of Fuentes. But Mitchell came along . . . . Sniadach's
expansion was surely less under Mitchell than it might have appeared to be
under Fuentes.
43 U.S.L.W. at 4196.
510. 407 U.S. at 86 (emphasis added). Note that the last three words of the
quoted phrase do not say "under the state's aegis." See also Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974) (summary cutoff of utility service upheld; no
state action); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
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nied by prior notice and an opportunity to be heard or by some "other
safeguard against mistaken repossession ..... 11 Where there is no
prior notice and hearing, whether Mitchell represents the other bound-
ary-that is, whether procedural safeguards affording the debtor less
protection than those in Louisiana are sufficient-remains for litiga-
tion.5 12 A disappointing feature of the post-Mitchell cases, however, is
that, in spite of the emphasis on interest analysis in Fuentes and
Mitchell, neither the lower courts nor the Supreme Court in North Geor-
gia embarked on a balancing analysis.
Given the history of cases before and after Mitchell and the proposi-
tion that what a rule is does not necessarily follow from the conclusion
of what it is not, the question posed at the outset of this Part-whether
Fuentes is overruled by Mitchell-seems largely irrelevant. In the
present state of affairs, in which each party can cite a Supreme Court
case in his favor and distinguish his opponent's Supreme Court case to
his heart's content, the safest and surest approach for a court is a bal-
ancing analysis that fully and thoroughly accounts for all the interests
involved.
1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974) (UCC self-help repossession upheld; no state
action); McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in
Procedure and Substance-Repossession and Adhesion Contract Issues, 26 HAsTINas
L.J. 383, 387-88, 396-97 (1974); note 205 supra. But see Watson v. Branch County
Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (UCC self-help repossession unconstitu-
tional; state action).
511. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4193.
512. Based on the ratio decidendi of North Georgia, it is quite arguable that, were
the statutes in question in Fuentes again before the Court, they would again be held
violative of the fourteenth amendment. Debtors, nervous since Mitchell, might breathe
easier were they reminded that the usual provisional remedy statute in common law
states bears a greater resemblance to the Fuentes statutes than to the Mitchell provisions.
Nevertheless, if the opinions are reread and the Justices recounted, a 5-4 decision up-
holding the next statute challenged would not be surprising.
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